GLOBALISATION AND THE FUTURE OF TERRORISM: PATTERNS AND PREDICTIONS

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GLOBALISATION AND THE FUTURE OF TERRORISM: PATTERNS AND PREDICTIONS

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IN ENGLISH:

a) Globalisation and Security
b) Trends in Terrorism
c) European Security
d) Future of Armed Conflict
e) Technology and Terrorism

IN NORWEGIAN:

a) Globalisering og sikkerhet
b) Trender innen terrorisme
c) Europeisk sikkerhet
d) Fremtidens væpnede konflikter
e) Teknologi og terrorisme

The present report is a continuation of the work presented in previous reports on an analytical framework for the study of terrorism and asymmetric threats, on the potential for terrorist strikes against infrastructure, and on theories on the causes of terrorism. In the wake of the Cold War, concern has been expressed with regard to new and complex threats to security. The report takes on the widely diverging statements made in existing literature and aims at developing a systematic basis on which to evaluate future trends in terrorism. The study identifies societal conditions that can affect the occurrence of terrorism and the degree to which they are undergoing change. By linking the analysis of societal factors with theories on the causes of terrorism, the present report draws conclusions on future patterns of terrorism. Postulates are reviewed in five issue areas: the international system, the global market economy, demography and ideological changes, and technology. It is impossible to give a precise answer on the occurrence of terrorism in the future. Instead, trends point in opposing directions; some conducive to domestic and international terrorism, some indicating different kinds of terrorism, with varying degrees of lethality and different types of actors and some that are likely to discourage terrorism. There are no systemic factors that clearly show that there will be more terrorism in the future, but there are indicators of the emergence of more transnational, less state-oriented and more lethal forms of terrorism.
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GLOBALISATION AND THE FUTURE OF TERRORISM: PATTERNS AND PREDICTIONS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (IN NORWEGIAN)


Det internasjonale system har utviklet seg i retning av en større grad av multipolaritet og svekkede ideologiske konfrontasjon etter den kalde krigens slutt og dette svekker grunnlaget for og statsstøtten bak internasjonal terrorisme. Det betyr at det ideologiske bakteppet for terrorgrupper er blitt mer komplekst og skifter raskere enn før. En kan således forvente mindre ideologisk terrorisme til fordel for enkeltsaksextremisme. Terrorgrupper kan også forventes å bli mer transnasjonale og å ta i bruk andre, fortrinnsvis private finansieringskilder. Generelt går trenden i retning av at makt fordeles til flere aktører utenom staten, blant annet får multilaterale institusjoner en større rolle i reguleringen av forholdet mellom stater, noe som blant annet styrker mellomstatlig samarbeid mot terrorisme.

Framveksten av et internasjonalt system preget av kompleksitet og mangfold reflekteres også innenfor internasjonal økonomi, der det blir stadig vanskeligere å klassifisere ulike verdensdeler som enten industrialiserte eller utviklingsland. Samtidig som skillet mellom internasjonal og intern politikk gradvis viskes ut vil økende ulikhet mellom rike og fattige


Rapporten konkluderer med at det i fremtiden vil bli stadig flere stater som gjennomgår en rask moderniseringsprosess og vil være utsatt for ustabilitet. Terrorismen forekommer oftere i samfunn som opplever rask økonomisk vekst. Rapporten ser det som sannsynlig at man vil se en økning i antallet svake og ”collapsed” stater. Svake stater vil stå overfor store utfordringer mht å integrere ulike grupper i samfunnet og skape et varig legitimitetssamt. Denne omstillingen har konsekvenser for forekomsten av terrorisme. Av størst betydningsomfattende er overgangsprossessene fra en autoritær til en demokratisk styreform i Østeuropa og Nordafrika/Midtøsten, der det er en fare for spredning av intern uro og terrorisme. ”Collapsed states” har ofte vist seg å fungere som et gjemmested for radikale opprørersopper, noe som kan skape et grunnlag for økt internasjonal terrorisme.

Terrorisme blir ofte betegnet som en politisk kommunikasjonsstrategi. Utviklingen peker her i flere ulike retninger. På den ene siden er det en fare for at eksisterende kommunikasjonskanaler i mange land oppfattes som begrenset, blant annet fordi samfunnet er i rask endring og utvikler seg mot en større grad av individualisering og markedstilpasning. Dette kan føre til at mer ekstreme kommunikasjonsmidler, inkludert terrorisme, taes i bruk i større grad. På den andre siden, har maktforseliden bidratt til at den sentrale statensmakten svekkes til fordel for en rekke andre aktører, som frivillige organisasjoner og interessegrupper. Disse kan ofte fungere som et talerør for marginaliserte grupper og veksten i denne type organisasjoner kan derfor innebære at bruken av terrorisme som politisk kommunikasjonsstrategi vil avta.

Maktforsel til et stadig økende antall nye aktører og økende konkurranse om oppmerksomhet i de stadig mer globaliserte informasjonsmedia kan også medføre en radikalisering av idéer og politiske virkemidler for at en gruppe skal bli hørt. Samtidig vil radikale grupper ikke risikere å avskrække potensielle tilhengere, hvis den vil bygge opp en bredere støtte. Likevel er man viet til å hånd i hånd med en radikalisering av idéer går en radikalisering av midler. Det har vært en relativt klar trend i retning mot ”mass casualty” terrorisme de siste tiårene. Grupper som representerer motkulturer, slik som transnasjonale religiøse bevegelser og kulturer, har vokst og vil trolig styrkes i fremtiden, selv om andelen av disse som kan tenkes å ville anvende massevold og masseødeleggelsesvåpen er meget begrenset. Men selv om den forespeilde bruk av masseødeleggelsesvåpen med få unntak har
uteblitt så langt er både konsekvensene og smitteeffekten så stor at trusselen må taes alvorlig. Dessuten vil flere land fortsette utviklingen av ABC-våpen og sannsynligheten for at mer dødbringende våpen vil spres til ikke-statlige aktører vil trolig øke i fremtiden.

Et lignende mønster synes å fremkomme mht informasjons- og cyberangrep. Til tross for at sannsynligheten for dødbringende og paralyserende cyberangrep er liten, kan samfunnets økende avhengighet av informasjonsteknologi gjøre cyberterrorisme til et attraktivt virkemiddel for fremtidens terrorgrupper. Det er mest sannsynlig at det vil taes i bruk av ensaksaktivister og at de vil gjennomføre sabotasje ("cybotage" – noe en har sett eksempler på allerede) heller enn dødbringende terrorangrep. Men også den teknologiske utviklingen har motsvarende implikasjoner. Mens den gir terrorgrupper tilgang til nye virkemidler, styrkes også staters kapasitet innen overvåkning og kontraterorisme.


1 INTRODUCING A MODEL FOR PREDICTING PATTERNS OF TERRORISM

This report is the second publication by the FFISYS Research Project No. 776 “Terrorism and Asymmetric Warfare: Emerging Security Challenges After the Cold War (TERRA),” which began officially in March 1999 and will be concluded by June 2001. An outline of the entire project and some initial theoretical work were done in our “Analytical Framework for the Study of Terrorism and Asymmetric Warfare,” published in September 1999.

The overall aim of the research project is to map out and analyse asymmetric, non-conventional security challenges with a view to assessing their importance for Norwegian national security. A key research objective is to provide a systematic survey of these threats, based on existing research literature. In the final analysis, assessments the implications of these threats will be assessed for overall security policy planning in general and long-term defence planning, in particular.

The present report aims at providing a systematic basis for predicting future patterns of terrorism. We have previously argued that the plethora of literature on terrorism trends (the future of terrorism, the so-called “new terrorism” or the “new face of terrorism”) does not necessarily give a coherent picture of new and evolving patterns of terrorism. A weakness of current research on trends in terrorism is that the theoretical research underlying many of the current studies on terrorism trends is weak. The ‘future-of-terrorism’-genre is often based on assumptions and hypotheses that have not been rigorously tested, and much of the literature on terrorism has been stigmatised by its non-scientific character. Clearly, predictive models have to be grounded in solid theoretical studies on the causes of terrorism. By contrast, the use of current trend patterns to predict future evolution in the patterns of terrorism is an uncertain method of prediction, although it is widely used in the literature on terrorism. The risk is that long-term shifts are only understood after they have occurred. Or a temporary short-lived surge in certain forms of terrorism may be erroneously interpreted as a long-term change.

In this study we have established an alternative basis for prediction, which does not primarily rely on current terrorism trends. We offer instead a new approach to the study of the future of terror...
terrorism. The present study establishes a model or more accurately a research strategy, which predicts broad systemic shifts in the pattern of terrorism over the next few decades. The model is attractive because of its simplicity, coherence and flexibility, and may easily be adapted to encompass future theoretical findings on the causes of terrorism.

The model consists of merely two main building blocks: (i) well-researched propositions about future societal changes and (ii) the causes of terrorism. Put simply, we identify those societal conditions, which appear most likely to affect patterns of terrorism in one way or another, analyse how these conditions are changing, and on this basis we may draw some conclusions on the future patterns of terrorism. An illustration of this research strategy is given below.

![Figure 1: A theoretical model for predicting patterns of terrorism](image)

Needless to say, this research strategy is unable to capture short-term shifts or local variations. After all, any terrorist attack is the result of a decision by an individual or group and does not necessarily conform with existing social science theory on terrorism patterns. Instead, the model's strength lies in its ability to uncover possible future shifts. In an era of rapid societal change and globalisation of economy, culture and politics, the conditions which cause terrorism are rapidly changing. Looking at past patterns of terrorism may yield a better understanding of the causes of terrorism still, yet as a way of predicting the future it may increasingly turn out to be a futile exercise. Predictions which are based on simple extrapolations of past terrorism trends into the future have proven unreliable, if not for short term changes, then at least for long-term shifts. This is increasingly acknowledged in much of the recent literature on terrorism. Walter Laqueur, for example, has argued that much of what we have learnt about terrorism in the past may be irrelevant to understanding the ‘new
terrorism.\(^8\) Still, there has been no systematic study so far, which employed alternative methods for predicting future patterns of terrorism. Extrapolation of trends will still be a useful method for short-term prediction, yet it should be complemented by alternative models, which are more sensitive to long-term shifts. The current study is the first step towards creating new research strategy for analysing future long-term shifts in terrorism patterns. Our findings are surprising and contain a number of new hypotheses, which should be examined and tested more rigorously in empirical research. Hopefully, it will generate new impetus to the study of the future of terrorism.

This study is structured around the two building blocs of the model, as presented above. Chapter 2 deals with the causes of terrorism, based on a thorough survey of existing theoretical literature on causes of terrorism. A summary of the causes of terrorism is given in the appendix A. Chapter 3 gives a broad outline of what we have termed “the future global security environment,” drawing on the considerable bulk of literature on globalisation and the future of conflict. Chapter 3 concludes with the methodological guidelines used to describe or map the future security environment by developing a set of concrete postulates or propositions about the future. Chapters 4 to 8 further describe the future global security environment. Here, the set of propositions about the future is presented in detail. These five chapters delineate expected changes or evolutions in the international state system, in the global economy, and demography, in addition to ideological shifts and technological changes. Each subchapter relates the discussion to possible effects on the occurrence and patterns of terrorism, drawing upon theories discussed previously in chapter 2. The main findings are presented and discussed in the concluding chapter.

\section{CAUSES OF TERRORISM}

In a previous report we have surveyed and discussed theories and hypotheses on the causes of terrorism. Therefore, we will only provide a brief summary of these theories here in order to establish analytical tools for analysing future patterns of terrorism. Some of the theories surveyed are well grounded in theoretical and empirical studies, others admittedly are not, and should be seen as hypotheses drawn from research literature, rather than established theory. Yet only by reviewing existing theories on the causes and conditions for terrorism may we establish the first building blocs of a sound predictive model. Prediction can only be based on theories that explain past patterns.\(^9\)

When analysing the causes of terrorism, we are confronted with different levels of explanations. These are clearly marked by diverging notions about which research questions are the most central ones. In much of the existing research on terrorism, explanations have focused on the individual and group level. These aim primarily at providing psychological explanations, such as identifying why individuals join a terrorist group. Explanations at the societal or national level primarily attempt to identify causal relationships between certain

\(^8\) Laqueur (1998).
\(^9\) Crenshaw (1990a).
historical, cultural and socio-political characteristics of society and the occurrence of terrorism. Explanations at the systemic or international level seek to establish causal relationships between characteristics of the international state system and relations between states on the one hand, and the occurrence of international terrorism on the other. This study largely disregards individual and group level explanations of terrorism, as this level of analysis is less suitable to explain the long-term effects of global changes on the patterns of terrorism.

2.1 Psycho-Sociological Theories

A major school in social science attributes social revolution to a sense of relative deprivation. The gap between expectations and satisfaction, particularly in times when the gap widens, is a basic condition for participation in collective civil violence and terrorism. The contagion theory of terrorism is another major theory, grounded in psycho-sociological theory. According to this theory, the occurrence of terrorism in one country often leads directly or indirectly to more terrorism in other countries. A related theory attributes a major role to the media, arguing that there is a symbiotic relationship between modern mass media and terrorism. It suggests that the rise of modern electronic mass media has contributed to making international terrorism a popular strategy for disaffected group and that competition for media access tends to make terrorism more lethal and spectacular. However, the exact nature of the media-terrorism relationship is still somewhat ambiguous.

2.2 Societal Theories

The effects of rapid modernisation have received much attention in social science literature. A few studies show that rapid economic modernisation measured in GDP-growth exposes societies to ideological terrorism to a greater extent. Economic inequality measured in income inequality also tends to increase the potential for ideological terrorism.

In part, liberal peace theory is a rival school to radical modernisation theory and dependency theory. It argues that increased trade and economic interdependence tend to discourage both inter-state armed conflict, and arguably also international terrorism. The prosperous peace theory states that long-term economic growth and development are conducive to internal political stability and hence work against the occurrence of domestic terrorism.

Legitimacy and the political regime are particularly relevant in a study of the causes of terrorism. Several studies indicate that democracy and terrorism are correlated, but that the relationship is quite complex. States in democratic transition are clearly more exposed to armed conflict and terrorism than consolidated democracies and repressive autocracies. Because of pervasive state control, totalitarian regimes rarely experience terrorism. At the same time, states with high scores on measures of human rights standards and democracy tend to be less exposed to domestic ideological terrorism. Terrorism is closely linked to a set of

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core legitimacy problems. The lack of continuity in a political system tends to encourage ideological terrorism, while the lack of integration of political fringes has very much the same effect. Ethnic diversity, however, tends to increase the potential for ethnic terrorism. Finally, one study suggests that a high level of unionisation discourages the growth of domestic ideological terrorism.\textsuperscript{11}

The \textit{ecology of terrorism}-thesis is much referred to, but not very well-researched. It argues that societal changes associated with modernisation have created new and unprecedented conditions for terrorism, such as a multitude of targets, mobility, communications, anonymity, and audiences. In line with this thinking, it is also argued that technological developments offer new and more efficient means and weapons for terrorist groups, thereby making terrorism more lethal and dangerous. On the other hand, technology also increases the counter-terrorist capabilities of states so the long-term effect of new technology is very uncertain. A final sub-category of this thesis is the observation that transnational organised crime and terrorism are partly inter-linked phenomena. One may infer that the growth in transnational organised crime may also contribute to increased levels of terrorism.

2.3 Changes in the International State System

The character of the international system is significant in accounting for changes in the level of terrorism. A system characterised by strong bipolar hegemony and a high level of bipolar conflict in world politics tends to be more exposed to international terrorism. State sponsorship of international terrorism has long been a significant cause of terrorism. Finally, the existence of weak and collapsed states tends to encourage both internal armed conflicts and international terrorism.

3 THE FUTURE GLOBAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

In the following chapter we will sketch a number of broad global societal changes which affect the way we look at security and armed conflict. Two main questions in this context are what armed conflict will look like in the future and what the most important sources of violent conflict will be. Armed conflict and terrorism are linked in that terrorist acts often arise from or occur as an element in violent armed conflict. Before moving on to the future of armed conflict, the first part of this chapter describes the wider socio-economic and political processes of globalisation that form the backdrop for changes in the security environment

3.1 Globalisation and New Sources of Conflict

Globalisation is one of the most used concepts in the growing body of literature that attempts to capture the essence of major socio-economic, political, and cultural changes in the post-Cold War age. Not surprisingly, globalisation has been termed “a defining trend of the 20\textsuperscript{th}

\textsuperscript{11} Engene (1998).
In order to gain greater fundamental insight into the future security environment, the main aspects and implications of globalisation will be surveyed in this study.

The term “global security environment” is defined as global political, socio-economic and cultural conditions that have a permanent effect on widely shared perceptions of security in Europe – discounting specific national security perceptions. The definition is admittedly Euro-centric, but unless a specific perspective is chosen, the term loses its meaning.

Several authors have pointed out that globalisation is a process that dates back to before the industrial revolution. There is little doubt, however, that the development has gathered pace since World War II and its most prominent feature has been a progressing internationalisation of the world economy. Its consequences have come to be seen as one of the major determinants in any future socio-economic and political world order. With globalisation came world-wide interdependence and the consolidation of the market system, strengthening and spreading the ground rules for economic activity.

Whereas trade in goods and services and the internationalisation of production are trends that date back to the 19th century, the greatly enhanced financial capital mobility is a novel development. Indeed, “[f]rom being primarily a vehicle of trade, currency has become primarily a trade commodity.”

A simple description of globalisation is that “globalisation means that events occurring on one part of the globe can affect, and be affected by events occurring in other, distant parts of the globe.” In the research literature, the term globalisation usually refers to a broad spectrum of contemporary historical processes of socio-economic, political, and cultural change. Globalisation is closely associated with increased transnational interdependence and interaction. According to Holm and Sørensen, a definition of globalisation is “the intensification of economic, political, social and cultural relations across borders.” The process of globalisation is facilitated through a “technological revolution” in the fields of (i) telecommunication, (ii) transportation and (iii) in the formation of global financial markets. Through these revolutions, “the world is increasingly becoming one,” because they have made “capital and information available everywhere and made possible world-wide mass-media and culture production.”

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14 See for example Cingranelli (1999), pp. 511-34.
Thus, globalisation may be seen as a process of societal change, produced partly by technological advances. A common perspective of globalisation is therefore the various socio-economic, political, and cultural implications of the introduction and proliferation of new technology. Hence, the increasing flow of information, products, people, money, technology, and expertise across national borders and its consequences may be viewed as core aspects of the globalisation concept. A more comprehensive definition of globalisation describes it as a structural shift in the spatial organisation of socio-economic and political activity towards transcontinental or interregional patterns of relations, interaction and the exercise of power.19

A slightly different perspective of globalisation focuses on the transformation of perceptions of time and space produced by innovations of information technology. According to this view, key characteristics of globalisation are “the speed of change and the compression of time and space, [produced by] electronic communication technologies and other means.”20

The concept of globalisation has long extended beyond the confines of economy, however. For example, the globalisation debate has also focused on cultural changes, such as the possible evolution of a global culture, on the one hand and counter-responses to globalisation and the growth of counter cultures, on the other. Changes in the international state system brought about by the globalisation process are yet another topic, especially the challenge to the state as an independent actor in the international system, and the increasing importance of sub-state and supra-state actors in international politics. Finally, by “blurring the lines between ‘out there’ and ‘in here’” globalisation has contributed to a growing internationalisation of local and intra-state conflicts.21

Much of the literature on globalisation, however, focuses on economic aspects of globalisation, such as the emergence of a private sector that is no longer geographically rooted, the growth of global multinational companies (MNCs), the liberalisation and deregulation of trade, and the economic marginalisation of parts of the third world.22 According to a recent study, there are some 38,500 “major transnational companies” in the world. Some TNCs have financial assets far beyond that of many governments and “[t]he 50 largest transnational industrial companies have annual sales revenues greater than the GNP of 131 members of the United Nations.”23 Willetts’ survey study of TNCs shows that

> [s]ince the 1960s, there has been a massive expansion of TNCs with many of the major industrial manufacturers establishing overseas subsidiaries. Now TNCs can be expected to operate in almost any major economic sector. […] The growth in the number of the TNCs, the

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22 See for example Chossudovsky (1997) and Castells (1996), pp. 70ff.
23 Willetts (1999), p. 290. The following are examples of TNCs with major financial assets: Shell, Barclays Bank, Coca Cola, Ford, Microsoft or Nestlé etc.
One should be careful not to assume that the changes brought about by globalisation are all irreversible. Economically, the process of globalisation is not “complete” in the sense that a truly “global economy” (satisfying Keynes’ categories under conditions of globalisation) has emerged.\textsuperscript{25} Furthermore, increasing global trade liberalisation may well be reversed by a protectionist backlash in parts of the world. For example, the strict restrictions on immigration to the Western world are already a powerful obstacle to the free movement of people. Political instability and popular revolts against the economic disadvantages of globalisation may also give rise to new powerful regimes built on ideologies, that challenge the current doctrine of market economy.\textsuperscript{26}

This is particularly true in the face of the negative consequences of globalisation that have become apparent during the 1990s. In periods of economic transition there will always be winners and losers. As became clear in the theoretical discussion of causes of terrorism and violent conflict, inequality and rapid modernisation are accompanied by tension. In a globalising world tensions are more likely to spread and inequality will therefore have a direct impact on what we have described as the future global security environment.

In a recent article in \textit{Foreign Policy}, the US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott focuses on the “economic disadvantages and social disruption” brought about by globalisation:

\begin{quote}
Striking workers in South Korea and Argentina have opposed changes that their national leaders insisted were necessary to meet the demands of the global economy. The unexpected victory of the Socialist Party in last spring’s French legislative elections stemmed in part from voters’ apprehensions about globalisation. In the United States, political figures such as Ross Perot and Pat Buchanan have tapped into similar anxieties. Not all those who are within reach of television consider themselves better off as a result — in fact, often quite the contrary. There are satellite dishes in the slums of the world’s megacities, and the signals they suck in from Hollywood and Madison Avenue can trigger resentment and anger: The communication revolution has the potential to foment revolution of a different sort.\textsuperscript{27}
\end{quote}

The growing economic inequality in the age of globalisation is one of the main topics in the \textit{Human Development Report 1999} published by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).\textsuperscript{28} Devetak and Higgot observe that globalisation’s “failure to ensure social justice on a global scale” implies that the responsibility of ensuring social justice is evaporating as the national-territorial states are being challenged. Since there are no settled social bonds in an

\textsuperscript{24} For a detailed description of how TNCs evade government regulation, see Willetts (1999), p. 290-296.
\textsuperscript{27} Talbott (1997), pp. 70-71.
\textsuperscript{28} UNDP (1999).
age of globalisation, they cast doubt on the ability to provide “social justice in a world where that bond is constantly being disrupted, renegotiated and transformed by globalisation.”

The process of globalisation places pressure on the capacity of the state to deliver welfare provisions and, in turn, transform and weaken the social bond between the state and its citizens. Devetak and Higgott echo the concerns that economic globalisation will create disruptive social tensions, and is a recipe for social revolutions, as long as sub-state or supra-state institutions are incapable of filling the gaps left by the shrinking capacities of the state:

As domestic and foreign economic policy issues become increasingly blurred, as the domestic deregulation and de-nationalization continue, it is more difficult for states to […] provide the compensatory mechanism that could underwrite social cohesion in the face of change in employment structure. As it has become more difficult to tax capital, the burden shifts to labour, making it more difficult to run welfare states […] When pursued in combination, free markets and the reduction of, or failure to, introduce compensatory domestic welfare is a potent cocktail leading to radical responses from the dispossessed.

A series of policy research studies on globalisation authorised by the Canadian government in 1996-97 also stresses the disruptive social effects of globalisation. They argued that “the benefits of globalisation [are] being distributed unequally within and between countries,” causing increasing polarisation and marginalisation. As opposed to previous decades when electronic media and information technology were confined to small segments of the world’s population, today’s communication technologies

allow an increasing number of slum dwellers throughout the world to base their material aspirations on ‘Baywatch.’ A mounting resentment against the rich, be they individuals or chartered banks, is increasingly evident world-wide.

The study predicted that “a further polarisation [between rich and poor, and rich and poor states] is a more likely scenario, compared to a scenario where poor states are able to kick-start their economies and leapfrog the stages that developed states went through.”

Another fundamental aspect that adds to the growing inequality lies in the demographic developments of the near future. McRae suggests that “[o]f all the forces that will change the world over the next generation, demography is probably the most important. […] Population shifts have an inexorable effect on the world’s living standards, its politics, its environment,

29 Devetak and Higgott (1998), p. 484. The danger of instability that particularly threatens weak states and those in transition is discussed in more detail in subsequent chapters.
and on how people behave towards each other in societies as diverse as Italy and China.”

Population growth will take place almost exclusively in the developing world, shifting the geographic distribution of population and decreasing the share of people living in the industrialised part of the world. Instead, the population of the developed world will age, with grave implications for politics, the role of the state, and the labour market. We have no experience with the demographic changes that are emerging. Still, a reasonable suggestion is that an older society will put a higher premium on order and stability and allow more state intervention to achieve just that. In contrast, the younger societies of the south are likely to be plagued by more crime and instability and be under pressure to fulfil expectations as to jobs and living standards.

Globalisation has given rise to what the Spanish sociologist Manuel Castells in his widely acknowledged work *The Information Age* has labelled “the fourth world” composed of “the black holes in informational capitalism.” The social restructuring that globalisation has produced goes beyond the exacerbation of economic inequality and the diffusion of poverty. Today’s dominant global economic system, which Castells labels “informational capitalism,” excludes entire peoples and territories and renders them irrelevant, hence the term *black holes*. According to Castells, “the territorial confinement of systematically worthless populations, disconnected from networks of valuable functions and people, is indeed a major characteristic of the spatial logic of the network society.”

These black holes are socially excluded peoples, such as the large homeless population in American and European cities, or territorially excluded populations in Sub-Saharan Africa, and impoverished areas in Latin America and Asia. Black holes may be found, however, in literally every country and every city. They are made up of American inner-city ghettos, Spanish enclaves of mass youth unemployment, French suburbs inhabited exclusively by North Africans, and shanty towns surrounding Asian mega-cities.

Castells predicts that black holes “are growing in number and increasing in visibility, the selective triage of informational capitalism and the political breakdown of the welfare state, intensify social exclusion.” Castells’ description of the effects of globalisation demonstrates the systemic changes in globalisation that produce social inequality, pauperisation, and exclusion. As we have shown above, there are a number of other studies that point to similar results. Still, economic disparities both between and within countries are nothing new. In fact it was one of the major themes in the discourse among the radical left during most of the 1970s. It is the *combination* of increased information flow, reduced state control over social welfare policies and increasing economic inequality, that is new and that is contributing to what Strobe Talbott called the “iron curtain [...] between the forces of stability and instability,

36 Castells (1996), p. 161ff
integration and disintegration, prosperity and poverty.” This does not imply that a North-South axis of conflict and confrontation is developing similar to the East-West confrontation during the Cold War. Economic inequality has both internal and inter-state dimensions, and historically economic inequality has been a much more potent source of intra-state violent conflicts than inter-state wars. Instead, a far more complex pattern of tensions and conflicts is emerging in which various permutations of intra-state conflicts will be the dominant challenge.

In conclusion, economic inequality within states and between states will increase and become more visible in the future. As long as the global economic development continues to marginalise and pauperise large sections of the world’s population, it is safe to assume that socio-economic grievances and perceptions of injustice will become an increasingly more important source of violent conflict.

3.2 Future Patterns of Armed Conflict: What Types Are Likely to Occur?

As mentioned above, terrorism is frequently a product or a by-product of armed conflict. Therefore, it is important to gain insight into future patterns of armed conflict in the assessment of emerging trends in terrorism. In light of the scope and horrors of the World Wars, it is often overlooked that this century has been marked by a steady decline in the number of conflicts. The only exception is the period immediately following the end of the Cold War in which the world witnessed a sharp rise in the number of conflicts. Although this trend appears to be levelling off, there are still almost 40 on-going armed conflicts as of 1998, some of which are intensifying rather than moving towards a peaceful solution. Aside from the absolute count, conflicts since the end of World War II have changed in character, moving away from interstate wars that had dominated the scene for around 300 years towards becoming almost exclusively internal. A pattern has emerged in which today’s conflicts “tend to be long with extended periods of low-level conflict, punctuated by sudden eruptions of violence.”

Although most conflicts indeed largely take place within a state’s borders, they frequently spill over into neighbouring countries, either through refugee or arms flows, or by dragging border areas directly into the fighting. They thereby defy the traditional classification of being either internal or inter-state. There are two major types of violent conflict, where the second is a function of the first. First, there is the total, predominantly internal war that does not differentiate between soldiers and civilians and that is fought for as much economic gain as

41 At last count, there were only two interstate conflicts in 1998, namely between India and Pakistan and between Eritrea and Ethiopia. See Wallenstein and Sollenberg (1999), p. 593f. McDermott (1997), p. 5.
for political or territorial reasons. Reviving all too familiar terminology, Buse writes that “[t]he war of the future is a total war.”

Thus, the Clausewitzian concept of “trinitarian” war with its distinction into the government, the armed forces and the general population will not be viable, as conflicts become increasingly politicised and civilians are drawn into the fighting to a greater extent. Second, there are international interventions in these wars that are usually conducted by multinational coalitions, operating under significant political constraints and driven by values rather than by strict military goals. The second type of conflict thus springs directly from the first one, due to the fact that globalisation has brought the world closer together, instilling both a sense of responsibility for world order and a fear of the consequences of inaction in members of the international community. The fact that conflicts are geographically remote is of diminishing importance, as its effects are felt across distances, as a result of economic and political interdependence and media coverage. While it has become unlikely for a Western European country, such as Norway, to fight an outright war, there will clearly be a role in crisis management, due to the international implications of future conflict. As a result, the conflicts in which Norway is likely to be involved will be asymmetric in nature. Ayres argues that the number and intensity of ‘nationalist’ conflicts has not changed dramatically since the end of the Cold War. What has changed is the degree to which we allow ourselves to take in more of the anarchy that has always been present in other parts of the world, but to which we did not pay any attention. William Ayres for one has shown that there has been a marked increase in peacemaking and the international community’s efforts to manage crises.

A critical change has occurred since the relatively static situation of the Cold War with respect to the nature of the state and its sovereignty. Whereas the demise of the state and the concept of sovereignty are unlikely, a qualitative change in these notions has undeniably taken place. Key factors in the assessment of the state are its ability to provide security for its territory and population, its monopoly on violence, and its political legitimacy. Although this has not changed in principle, there are a number of weak states that either do not have the means or the legitimacy to exercise effective control over their territory. Enriquez argues that

> It is not that sovereignty has eroded, but rather that it has grown and unbundled, shifting from federal rulers to territorial authorities and now toward individuals. This development implies that the basis for a state’s continued existence and success no longer hinges on its control over a specific territory or its funding a large army but on the legitimacy of its rule, its economic performance, and its ability to reconcile diverse ethnic, religious, and national aspirations. [...] States with diverse national groups or extreme regional divisions will not necessarily split, but the trend is in this direction, particularly for those that cannot deliver economic and personal security.

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46 For a discussion of the concept of asymmetry, see Lia (2000b).
48 Ayres (2000).
As a result of the fact that conflicts are affecting civilians to a greater extent and that sovereignty is increasingly tied to a state’s responsibility for its citizens, more emphasis is placed on individual security and sovereignty. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan supports the view that state sovereignty has become a more diverse concept in the face of globalisation and international co-operation and underlines the relevance of individual sovereignty in the context of humanitarian intervention.

The notion of a “declaration of war” as the distinguishing feature of whether or not we characterise ourselves at war or facing an armed uprising or an Operation other than War (OOTW), rests on the state-centred system and is a recent phenomenon. It has only been dominant for a century and a half, and one might argue that that phase of history is virtually over, after a period in which the two blocs had opposed each other in anticipation of the ‘ultimate’ declaration of war.

In general, conflicts are about access to resources, ranging from natural resources to education, and power, as the means of administrating access to resources. Still, competition for access to resources and power is seldom sufficient to initiate violent conflict. Particularly in multi-ethnic societies, the actual trigger is often a budding sense of insecurity, which is exacerbated by weakened state authority. In this kind of setting the state fails to serve as the framework for non-violent conflict management mechanisms and as the original guarantor of security. Lake and Rothchild maintain that “[s]tate weakness […] is a necessary precondition for violent ethnic conflict to erupt.” The link between weak states and the occurrence of conflict is strengthened by the observation that the majority of current wars are taking place in Africa, where the state system is increasingly challenged and states are struggling to maintain or establish sufficient legitimacy.

In addition, tensions are often wilfully nurtured by for example “[e]thnic activists and political entrepreneurs [who] build upon these fears of insecurity and polarize society.” Thus, structural causes must be reviewed in the political context of the outbreak of hostilities. A serious threat to states emerges when the civic identity of its population is weak or eroded. This can be the product of a lack of legitimacy due to poor government performance, such as the inability to provide security and stability.

Conflicts feature a new type of political economy, in which actors’ involvement in conflicts is motivated by the possibility of economic gain. Duffield argues that “conflicts are

51 Annan (1999b).
52 Lake and Rothchild (1996), p. 44f.; Wallensteen and Sollenberg reflect this thinking and divide the structural causes into two main categories, referring to incompatibility concerning government and incompatibility concerning territory. Wallensteen and Sollenberg (1999), pp. 593-606.
characterised by long-term and innovative adaptations to globalisation, linked to expanding networks of parallel (illegal) and grey (semi-legal) economic activity." This empowers and brings into focus a range of actors, including organised criminal groups, warlords or private security companies, in addition to the parties to the conflict. Coupled with the development towards conflicts becoming more civilian, the economic dimension supports the initial suggestion that conflicts are likely to run on at a low level of intensity for significant periods of time, with periodic eruptions of violence and no clear dividing line between the state of war and the state of peace. This has clear implications for any external intervention that must take into account the economic dynamics of the conflict and the fact that violence is used for economic benefits.

The issue is particularly relevant in weak states, where economic interests – often of a criminal nature – flourish in the absence of authority and where private security may be regarded as a way in which to counteract the gradual loss of monopoly over force. Alternatively, the government itself may have been criminalised. Gamba describes the vicious circle that governments may find themselves in, as criminal organisations “generate a corrupting influence, eroding the effective functioning and the integrity of state institutions” which, in turn further undermines the state’s capacity to combat organised crime. Examples of criminalised states or state-like entities are Sierra Leone, Colombia, Chechnya, Indonesia under Suharto, and Kosovo.

A new “security community” is emerging, where traditional security functions of the state are partly being taken on by non-state actors, be they NGOs or private enterprises or multinational intervention forces. Roles can range from protection or law and order tasks through advice and training to active participation in a military conflict. As the state weakens and actors at national, supra- and sub-national levels become increasingly interconnected, Duffield predicts that the new “security community” will grow further in influence and scope of activity. Not the least, the dispersion of security functions implies an adjustment in norms, in that they represent a move away from the view that the use of force is the prerogative of states.

International responses to armed conflict have undergone fundamental changes in the post-Cold War period. They have increased in depth and breadth, are charged with a greater number and more complex tasks, and involve more and a greater variety of actors. With increasing globalisation, conflicts appear to be demanding more immediate responses from third-parties and more multi-national involvement. Recent interventions have also witnessed closer interaction between military and civilian actors and involve a growing civilian

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58 Goodhand and Hulme (1999), p. 19; See for example Rich (1999). The developments in the field of private security are discussed below.
component, all of which increase the demands on co-ordination between various actors. The more actors are involved and the more profound the intervention, the more critical the strength of the intervening coalition becomes. In addition, it has been argued that a coalition is likely to be weaker the higher the level of violence in theatre. The strength of the coalition is one of the international community’s most vulnerable points.63

It also points to the fact that despite the emergence of a wide variety of non-state actors and the change in the nature of the state, international crisis management still rests on a state-centred system. Moreover, action is limited by the limitations related to decision-making, co-ordination, and funding that are inherent in intergovernmental organisations. Freedman reminds us that “whatever the possibilities for ‘real-time’ military decision and action, policy formulation and political persuasion tend to take time.”64 As Hansen points out, “[a]ny international organisation struggles to establish consensus among its members. It is the price that is paid for co-operative action among democratic states.”65

There is also a move towards placing the burden of intervention on regional shoulders. At this stage, it should merely be noted that “[a]lthough regional organisations are being strengthened world-wide, none has established the same legitimacy as the UN.”66 Here too, the international system appears to be in a period of transition where regional initiatives in crisis management are becoming more prevalent and are being actively promoted, but most have as of yet not managed to develop an adequate framework within which to stage military interventions.

With respect to features of future armed conflict, van Creveld suggests that “very rarely do [low-intensity conflicts] involve regular armies on both sides, though often it is a question of regulars on one side fighting guerrillas, terrorists, and even civilians, [...] on the other.”67 In this way, he indicates the military (and political) asymmetry of future conflicts, which lies in a mismatch in the quality and quantity of military capabilities between the opposing sides. At the same time, it appears that the proliferation of heavier weapons, in part due to the growing number of weak or collapsed states, has empowered non-state actors, evening out some of the discrepancies between, for example, a government and an insurgent group.68 As in the past, future conflicts are also unlikely to feature just two parties. Instead, several factions with varying degrees of support from outside actors will be present in the theatre of war. In addition, an international intervention may be superimposed on a complex constellation of local actors.

Perhaps most importantly, there is an asymmetry in terms of the moral constraints imposed on one side, usually on the part of the intervening coalition. Van Creveld traces the origin of the

64 Freedman (1999).
asymmetry of scruples to the existence of established rules of war, another product of the European and Western state system. Whereas these rules reflect the classic trinitarian concept of war and were indeed largely abided by during the World Wars and in later Western military efforts, this is not true of low intensity conflicts. In part, this is due to the military superiority of one side which induces the weaker party to use unconventional means, but also to the fact that low intensity conflicts follow a fundamentally different dynamic than conventional wars.\textsuperscript{69} As terrorism is typically “a weapon of the weak”\textsuperscript{70} it is the prime strategy in asymmetric warfare. In the context of armed conflict, groups that might choose an asymmetric strategy include guerrilla fighters and secessionist groups, private security companies and mercenaries, and ‘regular’ armed or paramilitary elements in theatre.

Closely related to the moral constraints are the limitations of political commitment that hamper the conduct of war by Western states, as discussed above. Despite the challenges of establishing and maintaining commitment to intervene, intervention has become more tempting with the growing superiority of Western military power. Whereas the balance of the Cold War prevented the use of force in all but the defence of marginal issues, such as fighting proxy wars far away from the actual fault lines between East and West,\textsuperscript{71} the fact that the scale has tipped in favour of the West has unleashed a certain trigger-happiness. Still, a relatively high threshold for the use of military force remains and the option requires powerful motivations in order to be considered a legitimate tool, particularly by the domestic audiences of the potential contributors. When the use of force fails, it triggers a serious crisis of legitimacy for the contributing states. Intervention should also been viewed in connection with the trend towards greater emphasis on humanitarian values and a resulting more normative and proactive stance. This means that a wide spectrum of tools, ranging from diplomatic pressure and foreign aid programmes to military intervention, are becoming acceptable instruments for addressing human rights violations and similar grievances.\textsuperscript{72}

The asymmetry in commitment is often linked to the role of ideology in future conflict. Particularly with regard to the intervention in conflicts by a coalition of states, i.e. the only kind of war most European states are likely to engage in, the motivations of the parties involved are at odds. Prins identifies a trend towards the “re-emergence of ideological confrontations worldwide – less often unified, state-based and Marxist than in the past, more often fragmented, group-based and fundamentalist.”\textsuperscript{73} The prevalence of non-state challengers exacerbates the difficulties of assessing conflict at the state-level. Ethnic mobilisation along structural lines of tension often renders conflicts more protracted and intractable.\textsuperscript{74} Van Creveld points to the fact that low intensity conflicts “have been politically by far the most

\textsuperscript{69} Van Creveld (1991), p. 59f.
\textsuperscript{70} Guéhenno (1998-9), p. 11.
\textsuperscript{71} Smith (1997), p. 13f.
\textsuperscript{73} Prins (1997), p. 3.
\textsuperscript{74} Smith (1997), p. 20. At the same time, Ayres’ study shows that more nationalist conflicts are being resolved now than during the Cold War. This underlines the trend towards greater interventionism, as discussed below. Ayres (2000), p. 105, 113.
significant form of war waged since 1945."75 In contrast to conventional wars, he argues, low intensity conflicts have actually brought about changes in borders, government, etc.

In an effort to systematise the host of predictions launched on future global security, Philip Sabin suggests five paradigms that – in combination – form a political model of the strategic environment. Each paradigm illustrates one aspect of change.

(1) **Power Politics:** states try to assert their national interests in the absence of a world authority. Van Creveld argues that the demise of the state is imminent. Sabin disagrees claiming that “the desire of citizens for security against internal and international anarchy will probably, as in the past, lead to periodic reactions in favour of strong national government, even if this means restrictions on personal liberty and freedom of trade.”76 McRae’s analysis of demographic trends supports this argument with respect to Western countries in which ageing societies are likely to favour relatively strong states.

(2) **Internal Strife:** Van Creveld argues that interstate conflicts have been the exception rather than the rule in recent years. Current trends, as recorded in the studies of Wallensteen and Sollenberg, confirm van Creveld’s intuitive argument.77 Internal strife invariably involves weak and challenged states. Thus, the paradigm is tempered somewhat by the argument in favour of a rebounding state. Regardless, internal conflicts will clearly outnumber interstate ones.

(3) **Rich and Poor Worlds:** There is a marked contrast between rich, technologically-advanced, trading and largely peaceful states and those countries plagued by poverty, resource depletion and, as a result, conflict. Isolationism is a strategy of choice for the rich world, but pressure from poorer parts of the world grows. *(See also 3.2)*

(4) **A New World Order:** Co-ordinated action by the world community to address common transnational challenges, such as sources of instability and threats to peace will increase both at a global and a regional level. Sabin writes that “as globalisation develops further, it will be hard for states to resist the need to co-operate to tackle common problems, since narrow attempts to protect individual interests will become even less productive.” Still, the willingness to co-operate will differ in different areas, such as with respect to the economic sphere versus conflict management.

(5) **A Clash of Civilisations:** Conflict occurs along the fault lines of civilisations, particularly on the fringes of the Islamic world. Although the paradigm on the clash of civilisations does not account for conflicts within civilisations and for the forces of globalisation, it reminds us

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76 Sabin (1998), p. 27.
of “cultural and religious solidarity.” A specific issue of interest is the role of immigrant communities or diaspora and their degree of involvement in conflicts in different theatres.

The significance of technology for future armed conflict is ambiguous. Although it is clear that technology will play some role and might affect “strategic stakes and capabilities,” its influence on armed conflict and the much debated Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) is sometimes overestimated. Sabin underlines that “certain ‘infrastructure’ technologies [...] have in the past had greater strategic impact than developments in weaponry itself.” Moreover, diffusion of existing technology is a more likely development in the course of the next generation than invention. When it comes to the issue of weapons proliferation, diffusion in itself is frequently highlighted as a particular problem of the globalised security environment. It is argued that the quantity and quality of the weapons in the hands of sub-state actors is increasing. But this “spread of advanced weaponry is not occurring as fast as many had feared, since it is limited not only by technical capability but also by arms control and non-proliferation initiatives and by a significant degree of self-restraint.”

The emphasis placed on technology is in part an attempt to match a lack of preparation for the type of conflict faced today with technological progress. As Smith describes,

[Most of these wars are fought with relatively low-technology weapons, and most of the killing in them is done at close quarters – quite unlike the high-tech media event of the 1990-91 Gulf War with its video-recorded, computer- and laser-guided missiles. In these wars the sophistication often lies in the techniques of selecting victims and manipulating terror, rather than in the technology of killing.]

Similarly, “while the technology of armed forces and its forms of organisation may change, its use or invocation still excites emotions and passions that are timeless. Its influence on political events still depends on an actual or demonstrable capacity to damage life and property.”

Perhaps the field in which technology will have the greatest impact is that of information. It accelerates the dissemination of ideas and knowledge, brings peoples closer and redefines the concept of national security and thus the future security environment, which inevitably affects the future of terrorism.

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79 See also Hassner (1999); Schatten (1997); Roy (1999).
3.3 Mapping the Future Global Security Environment and Changes in Patterns of Terrorism

The literature on terrorism contains a number of attempts to predict the future of terrorism. Most of these attempts are unsystematic, however, and lack a theoretical foundation, linking global changes with the causes of terrorism. Or they tend to focus merely on insufficiently substantiated “conditions,” which allegedly have an aggravating effect on the occurrence of terrorism. One example, offered by a political science professor Yehezkel Dror, is unfortunately illustrative of much of the future of terrorism genre. Attempting to underpin his proposition that “known variables that breed and enable terrorism will increase in the near and medium future,” Dror writes that:

Nearly all conditions thought to breed terrorism will probably aggravate in the short and medium future. Value nihilism; the search for new beliefs, especially by the young generation; disappointment with the established order; and broad public malaise will probably increase. Scarcities, unemployment, ethnic tensions, nuclear Angst, acute ecological problems, and the frustration of welfare aspirations are sure to increase in most democracies. Value cleavages and intense disconsensus […] may well grow. International anarchism, hostilities, and fanaticism will expand. Poor Third World countries, well equipped with weapons, but unable to handle their problems, will probably direct their hostility at democracies. The confrontation between communism and democracy will continue and perhaps escalate. Technical tools for expanding terrorism and the vulnerability of democracies to terrorism will increase. […] At the same time basic democratic freedoms will provide a convenient space for terrorism to operate in. Aging population, additional leisure-time facilities, and continued urbanisation will provide “soft” human targets. Modern energy facilities, data networks, roboted factories, and the like will add critical material targets. The ease of international communications and movements, mass-media attention to terrorism and informal networks that support terrorism constitute further trends that will permit or encourage terrorism.

Needless to say, Dror is obviously wrong in assuming that almost every societal process of change will lead to more terrorism. Without any basis in the research literature on the causes of terrorism and without any systematic analysis of “variables that breed terrorism,” it is clear that the outcome of such exercises has limited value only. Therefore, one needs a far more stringent methodological approach if the results are to be anything other than wild speculations.

The overall purpose of this exercise is to build a more comprehensive basis for future predictions than what has been done so far in the scholarly literature on terrorism. In a preceding section, we have outlined and systematised existing theories about terrorism. In this chapter we have sketched a number of aspects of globalisation and armed conflicts. In the

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subsequent chapters we will proceed to present a number of specific postulates or propositions about the future security environment. The criteria for selecting these particular postulates are:

- they are assumed to have a certain minimum of influence on one or more of the causal factors of terrorism as outlined in the theoretical study;
- the changes predicted must be global in the sense that they involve more than just one country or one region;
- the set of postulates should reflect the most likely future scenarios.88

Admittedly, postulates cannot be verified or validated. At best, one may reduce the uncertainty by applying a set of methodological rules, which are to add more consistency and reliability to our postulates:

- inconsistencies between various postulates should be clarified and avoided;
- each prediction or postulate should as far as possible be based on, or at least supported by results from contemporary research literature;
- the postulates should primarily include broad societal and global processes of change, which move slower, are largely determined by their past evolution and hence, are more predictable than discrete events.

Needless to say, the selection of postulates below is just one of many possible inputs in our model for predicting future shifts in the patterns of terrorism. The overall aim has been to identify the most important processes of change, influencing the occurrence of terrorism. We have chosen to sketch a broad variety of future changes and group postulates in four broad categories: international politics, economy, demography and ideological change. Each postulate is followed by an evaluation or assessment of its possible effects on future patterns of terrorism. These assessments are also summarised in the following chapter and will be discussed and analysed in more depth there.

4 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS INTO THE FUTURE

Research literature on terrorism has shown that the occurrence of terrorism, especially international terrorism, is frequently related to events or conflicts taking place in another country or region.89 Moreover, the occurrence of terrorism can also be explained by the character of the international system itself, the foreign policies of states and changing international relations that may generate circumstances more conducive to terrorism. If we are able to describe the most significant changes, which are likely to affect the international state system in the foreseeable future, we may also be able to identify possible future changes in the patterns of terrorism. This is the primary objective of the present chapter.

88 We have deliberately not chosen the term scenario, which are less likely, but which have a more dramatic effect on the occurrence of terrorism. Hence, our postulates are not designed in order to test the limits and robustness of, for example, a state’s counter-terrorism capabilities.

89 For more on this, see Lia and Skjølberg (2000) and the brief overview included in Chapter 2 of this report.
**4.1 No Return to Bi-polarity**

*Our best guess is a gradual development of regional power centres and a relative decline in the US global hegemony, but no return to intense bipolar military and ideological rivalry*

The classical realist tradition in political science postulates that a unipolar state system is inherently unstable and will sooner or later lead to the rise of new global powers, which challenge the hegemonic power and restore the balance of power and hence, the equilibrium of the system. Theory then predicts the rise of new global challengers to the United States in the post-Cold War era. Classical realism, however, may be less accurate in describing and predicting the behaviour of states in an international system, characterised by increasing economic interdependence and a rapidly expanding web of economic and political relations, treaties and regulations, often embedded in permanent multilateral institutions. The urge to restore the balance of power and challenge the global hegemony of the United States may therefore be weaker than the realist tradition leads us to believe.

For the same reason, the chances of the United States retreating as a major player on the global scene through the first part of the 21st century are also slim. The United States is tied into a dense and increasingly growing web of commercial, political, military and cultural ties with other countries. Still, its dominance may sometimes prove offensive to the rest of the world. As a recent RAND Corporation report explains, “its sheer pervasiveness and prominence make the United States the globe’s 500 pound gorilla whether we like it or not.”

The prevalent perception among most segments of the US political elite that a continued major US role in world politics is a historical necessity will probably continue to make US isolationism and US withdrawal from world politics a distant possibility at best.

One may, however, expect a gradual decline of US hegemony as other economic power centres continue to evolve. Bornschier and Chase-Dunn’s recent study *The Future of Global Conflict* which addresses the question of “future competition for hegemony in the core of the global system,” argues that “the US economic hegemony is declining.” There is considerable uncertainty, however, whether new global power centres will be able to challenge the United States in the near future. There is an expectation that the Asian economies, despite the 1998 financial crises, will continue to grow in importance. The World Bank and the OECD expect that by 2020, China will have the world’s largest economy. According to a recent policy report by the OECD Secretary-General on future economic developments, economic growth is expected to “be far more dramatic in the non-OECD world” and their real GDP in 2020 would be around 270% above the 1992 level. As a result of higher growth in the non-OECD area, there would be a global shift in economic weight towards Asia. China is predicted to

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91 The above-mentioned RAND report is illustrative in this respect: it asserts that in the unlikely event of a US withdrawal from the world stage, the “implications would be staggering,” leading to widespread instability and conflict, endangering former friends and encouraging former adversaries. See Khalilzad et al (1998), p.11.
become “the world’s largest economy, equivalent to half of the OECD,” and “the OECD economic performance could depend more and more on their [the non-OECD countries’] policies and performance.”

Therefore, political influence and ambitions are likely to grow and one may expect an increasing Asian assertiveness in global politics.

Bornschier and Chase-Dunn’s study indicates that the nature of global hegemony will probably be transformed. Global hegemony may be based on “a new powerful and increasingly integrated global capitalist class,” or “a new form of hegemony based on transnational alliances among the world’s largest firms.”

The kinds of technologies that will be the leading sectors in the economic expansion such as information and communication, may “facilitate the emergence of a more pacific global polity,” and hence work against the emergence of intense global military rivalry. Furthermore, the arena for hegemonic rivalry will be the core itself, which is expanding by incorporating new members from Central Europe and East Asia. In other words, there will be “hegemonic rivalry within a system of shared institutions and beliefs.”

For the near future, new challengers or “counter-cores” do not seem to constitute a serious challenge, according to Bornschier and Chase-Dunn’s study.

4.1.1 No Bi-polarity Means Less State-Sponsored International Terrorism in the Short Run

The character of the international system is significant in accounting for the level of international terrorism. A system characterised by strong bipolar hegemony and a high level of bipolar conflict in world politics appears to be more prone to international terrorism than a more unipolar or multipolar system, unchallenged by an ideological and military powerful counter-core. As we have seen, a return to a Cold War-type of global military confrontation seems very unlikely. The absence of a new bipolar confrontation will prevent international terrorism from becoming an instrument of war between two global rivals. The theory does not predict, however, that the decline in international terrorism that followed the end of the Cold War will continue. Empirical studies also strongly suggest that a number of terrorist organisations have become more transnational and less dependent upon state sponsorship. The positive effects of the end of bipolarity may therefore turn out to be short-lived.

4.2 Weapons of Mass Destruction

There will probably be a few more nuclear powers in the world, and biological and chemical weapons programmes will continue, primarily in the Middle East and North Korea.

The recent nuclear tests by Pakistan and India may be seen as the last chapter in the uneven but gradual spread of nuclear arms since 1945. Acquiring a nuclear capability is not a policy objective for the majority of countries in the world. Nevertheless, there are very few examples of countries that renounce their nuclear arsenals as South Africa did in the early 1990s. While

96 Bornschier and Chase-Dunn (1999), p. 3ff.
most countries capable of producing nuclear arms will desist from this opportunity, a few states will probably continue their efforts at building nuclear arms, even at high political costs such as sanctions and international isolation. The possession of nuclear arms is regarded as a sign of national prestige and has a valuable deterrent effect on foreign adversaries. Iran is a probable candidate for the nuclear club in the coming decade. It may push Israel to become a declared nuclear state and thereby encourage more determined efforts at building a nuclear capacity in the Arab world. Unexpected regional changes in other parts of the world may also push other states to similar steps.

Regarding biological and chemical weapons programmes, the costs of continuing such weapons programmes will probably increase. Still, as the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-programmes until 1991 demonstrated, states are quite capable of eluding current surveillance and monitoring mechanisms of B/C-programmes. In the future, WMD-related information and technology will probably be more accessible, and the control of dual-use technology proves increasingly difficult in a more global and open economy. Arms control advocates contend that it is still possible to slow down the spread of these “dual use” technologies. Still, according to Ann Markusen, a number of economists “oppose efforts to restrain dual-use exports on the grounds that any checks would be ineffectual and would hamper legitimate commercial activity.” Increased proliferation risk stems from the increased level of education in areas like physics, chemistry and biology, and the availability of information on WMD on the Internet. Finally, the presence of thousands of experts on WMD in the former Soviet Union has long been a major concern, as some of them may be recruited to WMD programmes by other states or even terrorist organisations.

As will be shown below, the number of weak states will probably grow, and there is a likelihood that other states will collapse in the future. The lack of control over Russia’s WMD capabilities has long been an object of concern, especially because of the pervasive networks of organised crime in Russia. Another threatening, and not unlikely scenario is that the central government in states, which today have some WMD-capabilities, first and foremost North Korea, Libya, Syria, and probably also Iraq, will suffer a partial or total collapse. Short of an immediate external military intervention, the coercive capabilities and weapons arsenals are likely to end up in the hands of individuals and non-state actors, similar to the events in Albania in 1997. It is one of the great ironies that the current US-sponsored efforts to topple some of these “rogue regimes” may inadvertently add to the potential for a collapsed state situation in these countries, and hence a privatisation of their deadly weapons.

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98 Markusen (1999). For a similar argument, see Libicki (1999).
99 For the crisis in Albania in January-February 1997 and the international peacekeeping intervention that followed, see Kostakos and Bourantonis (1998), pp. 50ff.
100 In 1999, for example, the US Congress granted some US$ 100 mio to support the efforts of seven Iraqi opposition groups to topple the Iraqi regime. During his campaign for the nomination as the Republican party’s candidate for the 2000 presidential elections, Senator McCain called repeatedly for a more hard-line foreign policy towards rogue states (“rogue state rollback”), including “both overt and covert military assistance where appropriate” and “provide real military aid to Iraqis committed to end Saddam’s reign of terror.” See John McCain, “Foreign Policy Statement” at National Jewish Coalition, 1 December 1999, downloaded at http://www.colead.org/mccain.htm.
4.2.1 Growing Chances for WMD Proliferation to Terrorist Groups

Theories on technology and terrorism are underdeveloped, and tend to dismiss a direct causal link between availability of weapons and their use by terrorists. Furthermore, the terrorism-as-theatre-thesis indicates that most terrorist groups employ violence in carefully choreographed settings designed to impress rather than to kill. Hence, even if the chances of proliferation of WMD capabilities to non-state actors continue to increase, one cannot therefore assume that terrorist groups may find these weapons and technologies useful. Recent empirical studies indicate, however, that a small but growing minority of terrorist groups favour mass casualty attacks. The WMD proliferation is therefore linked primarily to a minority of terrorist groups and constitutes an obvious example of a low probability-high consequence risk.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Nuclear</th>
<th>Biological-Toxicological</th>
<th>Chemical</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>deployed</td>
<td>terminated</td>
<td>dismantiing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>weaponisation</td>
<td>research</td>
<td>Probable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>weaponisation</td>
<td>stockpiled</td>
<td>stockpiled, used in 1983, 1987-88 (against Iran and Kurdish village of Halabja)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>development</td>
<td>development</td>
<td>deployed, used in 1984-88 (against Iraq)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>none?</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>none?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>research</td>
<td>development</td>
<td>Deployed (largest and most advanced CW capability in the Middle East)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>some 100-200 warheads deployed</td>
<td>production capability</td>
<td>production capability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>research</td>
<td>development</td>
<td>Stockpiled, used in 1963-67 (during the Yemeni civil war)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>research</td>
<td>development?</td>
<td>deployed, used in the 1987 (war against Chad)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>research</td>
<td>research</td>
<td>development</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1 Weapons of mass destruction capabilities in the Mediterranean region and Eastern Asia — proliferation patterns.  

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101 Monterey Institute of International Studies’ Center For Nonproliferation Studies, http://cns.miis.edu/research/wmdme/index.htm. (Downloaded in April 1999). Explanantion of terms: Deployed – nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) weapons integrated into military forces and ready for use in the event of conflict. Stockpiled – produced significant quantity of NBC weapons, but these are not stored in close proximity to military units that would employ them. Weaponisation – in the process of integrating nuclear explosives or chemical/biological (CB) agents with delivery systems, such as aerial bombs, missile warheads, etc. Production capability – able to produce significant quantity of fissile nuclear material or CB agents, but not known to have done so. Development – engaged in laboratory- or pilot-scale activities to develop production capability for fissile material or CB agents. Research – engaged in dual-use research with peaceful civilian applications, but that can also be used to build technical capacity and/or infrastructure necessary for NBC development and production. Dismantling – removing NBC weapons from deployment to storage areas and destroying agents and munitions. Terminated – produced NBC weapons, but subsequently ended and dismantled program. None – no confirmed open-source evidence of capability.

4.3 More Democracies … ‘Illiberal’ Democracies … ‘Demonstration’ Democracies

The Number of States in Transition to More Democratic Rule Will Grow.

The community of democratic states has expanded significantly over the last two decades. Samuel Huntington described these sweeping political changes as “the third wave of democratisation.”\(^{103}\) This process began with the introduction of democracy in Greece, Spain, and Portugal in the mid-1970s. Later, a number of democratic governments came to power in Latin America and Asian countries. The process of democratisation then reached Eastern Europe in the early 1990s.\(^{104}\) Hence, the collapse of the Communist bloc, and the on-going democratisation processes in Africa have been the latest stages in the uneven, but gradual expansion of states undergoing a transition to democracy. The Middle East has remained the most enduring bastion of authoritarian rule, but even here a number of states have begun experimenting with more representative and democratic forms of government.\(^{105}\)

There appears to be a broad historical evolution towards democratisation world-wide. Yet the process towards global democratisation is by no means inevitable. As Karantycky’s study of democratisation over the past few decades points out, there have been “many reversals as well as gains,” and the findings “do not suggest that the expansion of democracy and freedom is inevitable.”\(^{106}\) Theories on democratisation processes are complex and offer no clear-cut answers on the future of global democratisation. There is relatively broad agreement, however, that various aspects of today’s globalisation processes will probably contribute to putting greater pressure on non-democratic regimes, forcing them to at least pay lip service to democratisation and human rights. Leading global powers, including the United States, have at least in principle adopted global democratisation as one of their major foreign policy objectives, based on the assumption that “democracies rarely wage war against each other.”\(^{107}\) Moreover, the literature on globalisation emphasises the increasing importance of a transnational community of non-state actors, such as human rights activists, environmentalists and other pressure groups with regard to influencing world politics.\(^{108}\) Also, due to the revolution in information and communication technology, it has been argued that “governments have lost their ability to control transnational communication […] and the transnational relations of their citizens.”\(^{109}\) Although there is no real consensus that the rise of the Internet has had or will force authoritarian regimes to introduce political democratic

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\(^{103}\) Huntington (1991).


\(^{105}\) The democratisation processes in Jordan, Morocco and Iran are particularly encouraging. For studies on democratisation in the Middle East, see the classical study Salame (1994). See also Ghadbian (1997).


\(^{108}\) Their ability to mobilise world opinion and rally support for opposition groups was clearly demonstrated during the Zapatista uprising in Mexico. See Ronfeldt and Armando (1998). For a general study of transnational actors in global politics, see Willetts (1999). For the role of NGOs in armed conflicts, see Mawlawi (1993) and Lia and Hansen (1997).

reform, it seems clear that the power to control information flow and political life inside a single country is decreasing. Restrictions can be imposed but only at high political and economic costs. Countries with poor democratic records, where the rule of law is absent will fail to attract foreign investments, which, in a more global economy, will become an increasingly important determinant of economic performance and political legitimacy. That is not to say that foreign investments will be systematically channelled away from authoritarian states, but that a growing transnational community of NGOs will force multinational companies (MNCs) to pay more attention to human rights and democratic standards in their foreign investment policies.

The globalisation of the economy may also alter the interests of social forces (labour and capital) to champion democratisation. As Eva Bellin has argued, labour and capital are most likely to champion democracy when their economic interests put them at odds with the authoritarian state. In the case of democratisation in late developing countries, a number of factors such as extensive state sponsorship, the structural weakness of social forces, and pervasive poverty, “have led capital and labor to ally with authoritarian states rather than championing democratization.” On the other hand, since the political disposition of capital and labour appears to be largely governed by interest, these interests and alliances may change. Bellin therefore predicts that “[t]he logic of international economic integration may force the state to reduce its sponsorship of social forces. Or robust growth may eliminate mass poverty and the pervasive sense of fear within the propertied class. Under these conditions capital and/or labor may perceive democratisation in a new light and choose to embrace it.”

Globalisation and growing economic interdependence are often assumed to provide incentives for democratisation, although there is no consensus about “whether greater participation in the world capitalist economy pushes a government towards greater or less respect for its citizens’ human rights.” Some empirical studies show that there has been no global improvement in human rights after the Cold War ended, except in the fields of detainment of political prisoners. The improvement in this particular field is a manifestation of what Cingranelli and Richards have termed “demonstration democracy,” namely limited political liberalisation to counter international criticism and domestic pressure, without aiming at introducing a full-fledged democratic system. The rise of so-called “illiberal democracies”, a term used by Fareed Zakariya, nevertheless underlines the trend towards a growing number of states in limbo between authoritarianism and full-fledged consolidated democracies. Anita Schjølset

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110 See discussion in Ferdinand (2000).
111 Bellin follows the tradition in political science which views democracy “neither an evolutionary necessity nor a conjectural outcome; rather it is the product of struggle in which social forces play a central role. Interest, not enlightenment, drives regime change, and among the panoply of interest that animates people politically material change trump all others.” See Bellin (2000), p. 177.
114 Cingranelli and Richards (1999), pp. 512
115 Cingranelli and Richards (1999).
also expresses concern that democracy traditionally has been treated “as a uniform category, which exists only in relation to its antithesis, non-democracy or autocracy.” She argues that the spread of types of democracies with more violent conflict participation might have a questionable effect in terms of peace building.

Zakariya’s prediction on the rise of illiberal democracies has been challenged by Karatnycky, who argues that the substantial increase in electoral democracies since 1987 has been followed by “a growing respect for civil liberties in a number of electoral democracies.” In the latter half of the 1990s, the Comparative Survey of Freedom recorded “an increase in the number and proportions of the world’s electoral democracies that are also liberal.”

Karatnycky argues that “over the last 20 years, the emergence of electoral democracies has been the best indicator of subsequent progress in the areas of civil liberties and human rights.” Other reports paint a less optimistic picture, however. The National Defense Council Foundation’s annual report on global conflicts in 1999 recorded a setback for democratisation processes in a number of countries, and predicted that such setbacks would slow down the long-term development towards global democratisation.

While the global democratisation record may still be relatively optimistic, Europe’s periphery offers a much more gloomy picture. In the former Soviet Union, there have been a number of setbacks, and a number of countries are growing into dictatorships. Along Europe’s southern periphery there are very few democracies, indeed. The Middle East and North Africa remains the region in which the roots of democracy are weakest, with one “free” country (Israel), four “partly free” states (Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco and Turkey) and the rest are described as “not free” in the Comparative Survey of Freedom. Although a negotiated transition to democracy is underway in several Arab countries, the Mediterranean is nevertheless one of the world’s sharpest fault-line in terms of political regime differences, as all 24 Western European states are considered “free,” i.e. full-fledged democracies. Future democratisation processes are likely to take place in Europe’s geographical neighbourhood and will most certainly affect Europe’s relationship to its periphery. The bloody internal conflict and massacres unleashed by the aborted democratic transition in Algeria in 1991-

121 Since 1995 the electoral democracies that have seen a deepening climate of respect for political rights and civil liberties include the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Honduras, India, Mali, Nicaragua, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Romania, Taiwan, and Thailand.” See Karatnycky (1999), pp. 115-116.
123 Raum (1999).
124 Turkmenistan for example is among the most repressive countries in the world according to the Comparative Survey of Freedom. See Karatnycky (1999), p. 115.
125 According to Comparative Survey of Freedom, the most repressive countries are Iraq, North Korea, Cuba, Sudan, Afghanistan, Burma, Equatorial Guinea, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Syria, Turkmenistan, and Vietnam. See Karatnycky (1999), p. 115.
1992 still remain a powerful reminder of the difficulties of democratisation processes.\textsuperscript{127} Despite the negative lessons from Algeria, the pressure to democratise is set to continue in the future.

4.3.1 The Price of Democratisation is More Domestic Terrorism

In sum, with less information control, weaker economic performance and increasing international pressure, authoritarian states will find it increasingly difficult to withstand the pressure for political liberalisation. Hence, we will continue to see a relatively large group of states in some kind of political transition from highly authoritarian rule to more democratic forms of government.

Theories of democratisation, state legitimacy and terrorism argue convincingly that states in democratic transition are more exposed to intra-state armed conflicts and terrorism than totalitarian states. The recent expansion of the democratic community of states in Central- and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, and the growing number of states undergoing some form of early democratisation in the Southern Mediterranean, strongly indicate that terrorism may become a more important feature in domestic politics in these states. Recent empirical studies of terrorism in the former Soviet Union tend to confirm these predictions.\textsuperscript{128}

4.4 Too Many States … Too Many Weak States

*The number of states will continue to increase and many states will be weak states.*

The number of new states grew considerably in the 20th century. The demise of the Ottoman empire, the Habsburg empire and Czarist Russia during and after the Great War 1914-1918 gave birth to a host of new states, many of which were plagued with internal strife, instability and weak political institutions. Another wave of state formation occurred when former European colonies gained independence in the 1950s and 1960s. Three decades later, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and of Yugoslavia created the third large wave of new states during this century. Compared to this impressive historical record of state formations, there have been very few examples of state merger.\textsuperscript{129} The success of separatist movements and rebellious ethnic minorities in achieving formal independence during the latter decade has

\textsuperscript{127} For an account of Algeria’s aborted democratisation process, see Spencer (1994), Heradstveit (1997) and Shahin (1997).

\textsuperscript{128} Dennis Pluchinsky argues that “the southern Russian republics of Daghestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia, North-Ossetia, the regions of Abkhazia and Marneuli in Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Tajikistan […] have the potential of replacing the Middle East as the primary generator of international headaches, international crises, and international terrorism […]. The emergence of terrorism, in its criminal and political forms, is one of these problems [which] the fifteen newly independent states of the former Soviet Union (FSU) have encountered […] on their road to democracy and free market economy.” See Pluchinsky (1998), p. 119.

\textsuperscript{129} Two exceptions are the merger of Yemen Arab Republic of Yemen and People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen in May 1990 (followed by a civil war) and the unification of Germany after the end of the Cold War.
been striking. Their success will probably continue to motivate disaffected and disgruntled minorities for years to come. One may assume, therefore, that the number of states will continue to grow in the future. Multinational and multiethnic states, in particular, will come under increased pressure to grant autonomy and independence to rebellious and assertive minority groups. Yet compared to the relatively recent collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, it still seems farfetched to predict a similar large-scale wave of state formation, despite the intensification of internal conflicts in many of Asia’s multinational states, such as Indonesia, India, China and the Philippines.

New states created in the wake of the demise of multinational empires usually go through a long period of state building and internal consolidation. Their fledgling political institutions are fragile, their economies have often been disrupted either by war or by the fact that the newly erected borders deny or reduce access to international transportation and communication links, and that former patterns of trade and commerce have been disrupted. Finally, new minority conflicts often arise as a result of the new borders, and perceived unsatisfactory outcomes of past conflict.

Writing on the Middle East, Rachel Bronson observes that although ethnic and religious cleavages present problems for the states in the region, whether or not they lead to political turmoil and armed conflict depends on a host of other political and economic factors. More specifically, when states are weak and undemocratic, and when they lack the economic and financial wherewithal to address domestic problems effectively, internal conflict is likely. Newly created states are not only weak; they are often formed in the wake of civil wars and violent turmoil. If state formation is the outcome of negotiated settlements, future instability is even more likely. As has been observed by Roy Licklider and others, negotiated settlements after civil wars are inherently unstable and are rarely sustainable. Pavel Baev has observed in a recent study of secessionist conflicts in Central and Eastern Europe in the 1990s that “few if any of the violent secessions have found satisfactory resolutions.” According to Baev, the upsurge of secessionism in Europe’s periphery is partly related to the European integration process and the fear of being left outside the zone of prosperity.

As the shape of the future Europe is still undetermined and a host of ethnic secessionist conflicts unresolved in the periphery of the European Union, it may be safe to conclude that the “rise of secessionist movements [in OSCE-Europe] is far from exhausted.” Menon and Fuller agree, arguing that the fighting in Chechnya is leading dissatisfied nationalities in the

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130 Writing on secessionist conflicts in the OSCE Europe, Pavel Baev observes that it is not only the sheer number of secessionist conflicts that is striking, but the capacity of the secessionist drive to achieve victory as well.” Baev (1999), p. 27.
133 Baev defines secessionist conflicts as “violent confrontations between a state and an armed grouping seeking to take control over certain territory inside this state with the aim of establishing an independent state.” See Baev (1999), p. 23.
Russian Federation to rethink their options and their dependence on Russia. While Chechnya was the first to rebel, it “will no be the last.”135

4.4.1 State Formation Is Violent, New States Tend to Be Exposed to Terrorism

Political instability, economic disruption and new intra-state violent conflicts are all familiar features of the painful processes associated with the creation of new states in the 20th century. State formation may end protracted secessionist conflicts and hence remove the main sources of ethnic separatist violence. More often, however, the redrawing of borders often creates new patterns of conflict, reshaping, rather than removing sources of ethnic strife.

One may therefore assume that if the growth in the number of states continues, most of these new states will be weak and unstable, plagued by internal unrest and civil violence. Theories of state legitimacy and terrorism assert that factors such as lack of continuity of the political system tend to encourage domestic terrorism. Hence, it follows that new states are often considerably exposed to domestic terrorism. The contagion theory of terrorism argues that the occurrence of terrorism in one country tends to lead to higher levels of terrorism in other countries. Thus, the effects of increased domestic terrorism in emerging states will have international implications. The recent wave of state formation and the relatively good prospects for further state formation (or state fragmentation) will continue to take its toll in terms of more domestic and international terrorism.

4.5 Collapsed States in the Non-OECD World

Under certain circumstances states may become “collapsed states,” whose main characteristic is the absence of a central government authority controlling most of its territory.136 The 1990s witnessed an increase in the collapse of central governments in a number of countries, usually in conjunction with internal armed conflicts. In Europe, the most prominent examples were the demise of Yugoslavia and the collapse of the central authority in Albania. In Eurasia, Tajikistan has experienced internal regional fragmentation and civil war (1992-1997). In Africa, the central government collapsed in a number of countries, in particular Somalia and Sierra Leone. In North Africa, Algeria witnessed an unprecedented surge in political violence and massacres, and the loss of state control over significant territory.137

While these conflicts are all different, a common trait is that the central government authority lacks both sufficient coercive power and political legitimacy to establish a monopoly on the use of force, hence its capacity to function as a state comes into question. The recent rise in

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135 Menon and Fuller (2000).

This is not to say that the Russian Federation will disintegrate, however. Instead, as Nunn and Stulberg observe, “[m]ore and more, Russia’s restless regions are asserting themselves in domestic and international affairs, whether Moscow lets them or not.” They argue therefore that the West “must learn to contend with a larger cast of actors who are both unfamiliar and unruly.” See Nunn and Stulberg (2000).

136 For a classical study of the concept of collapsed states, see Zartman (1995).

137 The rebels controlled much of the so-called ‘triangle of death’ (Medea and the Mitidja Plateu) for nearly three years until the Algerian military managed to recapture it in 1995-1996. A good account on the dynamics of the Algerian civil war is Kalyvas (1999).
the number of failed and collapsed states is partly due to superpower withdrawal following
the collapse of the Soviet Union and the bipolar world order. Without superpower backing in
terms of military and economic assistance, a number of client regimes came under pressure
and some succumbed. Another possible explanation is that globalisation has brought
increased potential for lucrative illegal or semi-legal transnational trade, which weakens the
state economically vis-à-vis sub-state actors.\textsuperscript{138} Thus, economic incentives add to other
grievances and strengthen the centrifugal forces inside weak states or, alternatively, the state
may be transformed into inherently unstable criminal state entities or warlord-dominated
zones of influence. Such patterns of trade sustain the political economy of internal wars and
perpetuate situations of state collapse. This is part of the expansion of what Timothy Luke and
Gerard Toal have termed “contraband capitalism,” a pattern of interaction between markets
and states in conflict zones where the world political map is “fraying” and coming undone.\textsuperscript{139}

In Europe’s periphery, the potential of new collapsed states may be most imminent in some of
the southern Mediterranean countries, in the Caucasus region and Central Asia. Most Middle
Eastern and some African regimes rely heavily, and in some cases exclusively, on petroleum
exports for their foreign currency earnings and thus food imports.\textsuperscript{140} A sudden and dramatic
drop in price of petroleum products, caused for example by new revolutionary energy
technology, will therefore put severe and unprecedented strains on these regimes, dramatically
increasing the prospects of state collapse.\textsuperscript{141}

As for the Mediterranean region, several analysts have stressed the ‘dysfunctionality’ of the
states in the South and their inability to provide basic services to their population, as a major
factor for the eruption of internal wars in the region during the 1990s.\textsuperscript{142} The economic crisis
is compounded by a profound crisis of legitimacy, due to both weak economic performance
and the widespread abuse of power. Human rights abuses are rampant in virtually all states in
the Middle East and North Africa, even if there is a significant difference between the ‘benign
authoritarianism’ of Morocco and Jordan and the totalitarianism of Syria, Iraq and Libya.
Torture and extra-judicial killings by the state’s security apparatus are frequently the direct
cause of unrest and popular riots.\textsuperscript{143} Finally, both external (the United States in particular) and
regional powers (Iran and Iraq) have vested interests in toppling or at least undermining one
or more of the regimes in the region, further exacerbating political instability in the region.

\textsuperscript{138} There is a greater awareness of economic agendas in civil wars. See for example Berdal and Keen (1998) and
Duffield (1999).
\textsuperscript{140} Most countries in the Middle East and North Africa are not self-sufficient in food production. Oil revenues
often account for the majority of their foreign currency earnings.
\textsuperscript{141} A recent study of Euro-Islamic relations concludes that “the principal source of threat to Europe from the
Islamic world is the multifaceted crisis of Muslim societies and the inherent vulnerability of their political
systems. This crisis causes turmoil and upheaval in the Muslim countries and increases the risks of a large flow
\textsuperscript{142} See for example Ian Lesser, ‘Unresolved issues: Assignments for the North and South’, \textit{Afers Internacionales}
\textsuperscript{143} Lia (1999b).
4.5.1 New Collapsed States in Europe’s Periphery May Cause A New Surge in International Terrorism

Theories on terrorism and the international state system suggest that the existence of weak and collapsed states tends to encourage both internal armed conflict and international terrorism.\(^{144}\) As we have seen above, there appears to be a significant likelihood of new collapsed states in Europe’s periphery. It follows that the prospects for increased levels of international terrorism spilling over from new collapsed state may be a serious source of international terrorism in the future. Increasing interventionism in internal conflicts, however, tends to mitigate, albeit not completely remove the consequences of such a scenario.

4.6 More Peacemaking

*There Will Be More International Military Interventionism in Internal Armed Conflicts.*

After the end of the Cold War, there was a strong belief that the UN should assume a greater role in resolving international conflict, in what has been termed ‘a euphoria for peacekeeping.’ To deal with the predominantly intrastate nature of post-Cold War conflicts, new types of peacekeeping operations were established. Hence, the 1990s witnessed a significant shift in the development of peacekeeping (now usually referred to as “peace support operations”) in terms of the types of tasks, the spectrum of actors involved as well as the mandates and the level of force used in peacekeeping operations. Most importantly, there has been a gradual, controversial evolution towards relying on the use of military force to enforce peace agreements between parties in internal conflicts. The concept of “peacekeeping with muscle” was revived.\(^{145}\) The changes in political thinking about the international community’s role in intrastate conflicts have been no less profound, and have challenged core aspects of the traditional concept of state sovereignty.\(^{146}\) As Michael Glennon has observed, the “the anti-interventionist regime has fallen out of sync with modern notions of justice” and we now have “a vague new system that is much more tolerant of military intervention.”\(^{147}\)

The shift in political thinking on state sovereignty and military interventionism has been accompanied by a significant restructuring of European armed forces towards peacekeeping

\(^{144}\)The protracted civil war in Lebanon for example (1975-1989) demonstrated the security implications of the emergence of a territory outside the control of a government. Lebanon became the host of a truly international network of revolutionary guerrilla movements and terrorist organisations, including both organisations with a local or regional cause, such as the Palestinian groups and Islamic resistance movements, and organisations such as the Armenian ASALA, and the Japanese revolutionary groups Japanese Red Army. For the Lebanese civil war, see for example Sirriyeh (1989). For Lebanon and international terrorism, see Hoffman (1998).


\(^{146}\) For a discussion of state sovereignty and humanitarian interventions in the 1990s, see Semb (1998) and Annan (1999a).

\(^{147}\) According to Glennon, “[t]he new system acknowledges something else that the U.N. Charter overlooks: that the major threats to stability and well-being now come from internal violence as or more often than they do from cross-border fighting – and that to be effective, international law needs to stop the former as well as the latter.” See Glennon (1999).
and peace enforcement operations in internal conflicts. The process towards a common European security and defence policy has been motivated largely by the need for an independent European military capacity for such military contingencies. Hence, it is probably safe to assume that in the future the military forces of the European powers will to a considerable extent be deployed and used “out-of-area” (i.e. outside the territory covered by EU and NATO member states) for peacekeeping or peacemaking purposes, with a significant enforcement component. Such involvement is most likely in conflict areas in Europe’s geographical periphery and other areas deemed vital to European security interests. The Balkan peninsula (which is – at least geographically – almost in the middle of Europe) has already moved well into NATO (and increasingly the EU’s) security space. It is not far-fetched to assume that both the Southern Mediterranean, the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, the Southern Caucasus and the Caspian Sea Basin gradually will be seen as a potential area for multilateral military peacekeeping interventions by NATO or the EU.

Studies in settlements of violent internal conflicts indicate that one of the most decisive factors for a successful outcome is sustained outside involvement throughout the peace process.\textsuperscript{148} Fen Osler Hampson has argued that conflict settlements that “enjoy high levels of third party assistance and support during the entire course of the peacemaking and peace building process are arguably more likely to succeed than those that do not.”\textsuperscript{149} According to a study by Lake and Rothchild, the failure of a number of peace agreements

\begin{quote}
   is partly attributable to the unwillingness of the international community to provide mediators with economic, logistical, police and military support needed to oversee the process of disarmament, integration of the armed forces repatriation of refugees, and holding of general elections.\textsuperscript{150}
\end{quote}

This suggests that if the international community is more willing to use resources, including a sustained international military deployment, for intrastate conflict resolution, the chances of resolving violent intrastate conflicts will become better.

Increasing international peacemaking and peace building efforts during the 1990s clearly indicate that the international community on the whole is becoming both more willing and able to end intrastate conflicts. Popular commentary has seen ethnic cleansing everywhere and portrays this as a phenomenon of the post-Cold War era. Data on endings of violent nationalist conflicts strongly suggest, however, that the post-Cold War is not one of unchecked nationalist violence on a global scale, despite the resurgence of internal wars in Europe’s eastern and south-eastern periphery.\textsuperscript{151} Ayres has shown that there have been three

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Hampson (1996) and Hansen et al (1997).
\item Hampson (1996), p. 13.
\item Lake and Rothchild (1996), p. 72. See also Hansen (2000).
\item Recent studies suggest that the end of the Cold War did not significantly increase ethno-nationalist violence on a global scale. Ayres’ data “indicate that neither fighting intensity, total deaths per months, nor deaths per 1000 population showed any significant differences between the Cold War and post Cold War conflicts.” Ayres (1999), p. 112.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
major waves of conclusions to violent nationalist conflicts in the post war era: late 1940s and early 1950s, a small group in the 1970s and a third (and largest) in the late 1980s and early 1990s. These conflict endings in the latter period were resolved *more frequently* by agreements than defeat compared to earlier periods. While 22 conflict episodes began from 1985 to 1996, 25 episodes *ended* during the same period. Studies of the way these conflicts ended (defeat or agreement) suggest that the end of the Cold War, in addition to contributing to some new nationalist conflicts, has brought a wave of peacemaking by means of negotiations rather than military action. Thus, Ayres’ study supports the thesis that a new international order is emerging, which is more capable of dealing with internal armed conflicts and bringing these to a negotiated settlement.\(^{152}\)

4.6.1 More Muscular Peacekeeping Will Bring More Terrorism in the Short Run, But Less in the Long Run

The effects of greater international interventionism in internal conflicts on the occurrence of terrorism are complex. The overall effect of increasing multilateral military involvement in internal conflict resolution will probably be a reduction of both domestic and international terrorism in the long-term, for a number of reasons. More determined external involvement to resolve internal conflicts will reduce or contain these conflicts, and will address at least to some extent some of the causes that motivated the conflict in the first place. International terrorism has often been a by-product of protracted armed conflicts, and by improving its ability to address internal armed conflicts at an early stage, the international community may prevent internal conflicts from becoming sources of international terrorism.\(^{153}\)

In the short run, however, there are several reasons why terrorism may indeed increase as a result of more muscular peacekeeping. Stedman’s thesis on spoiler problems in peace processes, theories on democratisation and terrorism as well as theories on terrorism and state legitimacy all strongly suggest that terrorism tends to occur precisely in such transitional phases. Hence, more muscular peacekeeping, for example by enforcing peace accords on recalcitrant parties, or more generally by using military force in societies in transition from a civil war situation towards the implementation of a peace accord, may indeed trigger violent counter responses, including domestic terrorism. Some empirical studies also show that the level of domestic terrorism in Europe has increased during controversial peace enforcement operations, such as the Kosovo air campaign and the Gulf War.\(^{154}\) We may therefore expect more incidents as a result of increased military interventionism in internal conflicts, but the long-term effect will most probably be a lower level of terrorism.

\(^{152}\) According to Ayres, “one may refer to a ‘new era of nationalist peace’ in the aftermath of the Cold War,” rather than talking about a new era of unleashing nationalist conflict. See Ayres (1999) p. 113.

\(^{153}\) In 1994-95 it was pointed out that the likelihood of a terrorist threat in Europe would increase if the plight of the Bosnian Muslims was not resolved. In particular, one feared an Iranian-supported irredentist and possibly fundamentalist Bosnian mini-state on the Balkans. The forceful intervention of NATO in 1995 and the subsequent long-term commitment of Europe and the United States to resolve the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina was partly a result of the belief that “another Palestinian disaster” in the European heartland would have severe consequences, including the risk of more terrorism. See e.g. Farley (1994).

\(^{154}\) Bjørgo (1992).
4.7 Multilateralism Is the Future

*Multilateral institutions, international treaties and regimes will play an increasingly more important role in regulating relations between states.*

The international system as anarchy has been the dominant view among several experts on international relations. It is the dominant precondition in the realist approach to international relations, where the struggle for power and relative gains is the most important feature. Against this background, the famous realist Hans J. Morgenthau wrote: “International politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power. Whatever the ultimate aims of international politics, power is always the immediate aim.” However, several realists seem to underestimate the significance of multilateral institutions, international regimes and international treaties. These international arrangements modify the ways in which states relate to each other. The prevailing tendency in present day Europe is not anarchy, but hierarchy where relations between states have been domesticated through inter alia a web of multilateral institutions. In Europe international institutions, such as the EU and NATO, dominate in that they provide “persistent and connected sets of rules (formal and informal) that prescribe behavioural roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations.”

Europe has therefore moved towards a system of institutions and highly regulated treaties on how states, firms and persons shall relate to each other. The result has been a more “universal type of system,” with common policies in several important areas. In the future, even European security and defence policy will be based upon integration among states, which indicates progressing ‘Europeanisation’ of European security. Moreover, the very concept of ‘national security’ is being modified by the concept of ‘European security.’

Such multilateral institutions will probably continue to grow in importance in Western Europe and increasingly in Central and Eastern Europe. The European model has also been emulated throughout the world albeit with mixed success, such as in the establishment of the North African Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) and the efforts towards the creation of an Arab common market. The expansion of regimes and international regulations is motivated largely by the intensification of economic interdependence. Globally, economic regimes and regulations have made significant advances. For example, the former free trade regime (GATT), which initially included some 20 states, has now been superseded by the World Trade Organisation (WTO), with a membership of more than 130 states. After China’s recent entry into the WTO, the organisation encompasses virtually the entire world economy. Further global economic integration is expected. In a 1997 report, the OECD predicts that “there would be a deepening and widening of economic integration among all economies…”

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155 Bjørn Olav Knutsen assisted in writing this section on the future of multilateralism.
156 Quoted in Østerud (1992), p. 270.
158 Haas (1964).
159 The so-called Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) was forced to freeze its activities in 1995 due to a long-standing conflict between Morocco and Algeria over the West Saharan issue. See Lia (1999a).
trade would rise from 30% of world GDP today to almost 50% in 2020, stimulating growth in all countries.\footnote{OECD (1997), p. 22.}

To a significant extent – though not exclusively, the United States will choose to conduct its foreign policy through multilateral institutions. Still, there has also been a tendency in American foreign policy towards a higher degree of unilateralism, where recent events like the non-ratification of the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTB), the non-participation in the International Criminal Court, and the Helms-Burton bill are cases in point. As Christoph Bertram underlines in his book \textit{Europe in the Balance}, there is an anti-multilateralist mood among the political elites and a general feeling that, as far as US influence in Europe is concerned, present arrangements are, after all, quite satisfactory.\footnote{Bertram (1995), p. 93.} But also a superpower like the US is knitted into the global international economy in such a way that it cannot control the international system alone. These developments indicate that even a superpower will have to devote more efforts to managing international challenges through multilateral institutions and regimes, and in coalition with other state actors.

\subsection*{4.7.1 More Multilateralism Means Less State Sponsored Terrorism}

The theory on state sponsorship of terrorism as well as theory on hegemony/bipolarity and terrorism suggests that the growing strength of multilateral regimes and regulations will reduce the potential for international terrorism and reduce the attractiveness of international terrorism as a foreign policy tool. Moreover, growing multilateral co-operation will probably also enhance law enforcement and counter-terrorism co-operation across national borders, thereby reducing the capabilities and room for manoeuvre of terrorist and insurgent groups.

\subsection*{4.8 More Powerful NGOs}

\textit{Growing Relevance of the Transnational NGO Community in International Politics.}

It is increasingly acknowledged that global politics can no longer be analysed from a state-centric point of view, and that the role of non-state actors must be taken into account, especially the role of multinational companies and non-governmental organisations, on the one hand, and illegal organisations such as organised crime, terrorist groups and guerrilla movements, on the other.\footnote{See for example Baylis and Smith (1999).} The word “transnational” has been coined by academics in order to assert that “international relations are not limited to governments.”\footnote{Willetts (1999), p. 289.} Some of these non-state actors are growing in size and importance. Over the past 15 years, there has been a remarkable increase in the number and size of NGOs. According to a recent study, there are some 10,000 single country NGOs that have significant international activities, and 4,700 international non-governmental organisations.\footnote{Willetts (1999), p. 290.} The growing importance of NGOs in global
politics can be illustrated by the fact that NGOs, particularly trade unions and campaigning groups in the fields of human rights, women’s rights and the environment, have their membership measured in millions, whereas 37 countries in the world have populations of less than one million. The growing role of the NGO community is nevertheless largely contingent upon the benefits that especially Western states derive from their activities, especially in terms of foreign aid policy. Despite the term non-governmental organisation, much NGO funding, especially in the relief and development sector, still originates from government budgets.

NGOs can be defined as “privately organized and privately financed agencies, formed to perform some philanthropic or other worthwhile task in response to a need that the organisers think is not adequately addressed by the public, governmental or United Nations efforts.”

NGOs frequently focus their work on issues beyond the borders of their country, such as alleviating human suffering as a consequence of armed conflicts and philanthropic work in Third World countries. Most internationally active NGOs are involved in:

- Humanitarian emergency aid;
- long-term social and economic development in the Third World;
- promoting and monitoring respect for fundamental human rights;
- peace-building activities (reconciliation, negotiation techniques, conflict settlement, non-violence, etc.);
- support for liberation movements, oppressed groups and minorities.

The NGO-sector is characterised by an increasing diversity. Compared to UN humanitarian organisations, the NGO contribution today is much larger than some 15 years ago. During the 1990s, a large number of NGOs have been present and active in the field in conflict zones alongside international peacekeepers. In Kigali in 1994, some 175 international NGOs operated, while there were 200 in Zagreb, 200 in Mozambique, and 600 in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the autumn of 1997.

4.8.1 A Much Needed Mouthpiece for Disaffected Groups or Front Organisation for Terrorists?

In principle there may be at least three relevant effects of a growing transnational community of NGOs and lobby groups with regard to the occurrence of terrorism. Theories of democratisation, state legitimacy and terrorism provide a strong argument that integration problems and the lack of channels for political expression available to disaffected groups tend to encourage terrorism, in particular ideological terrorism. In this light, the growing transnational NGO community constitutes a new and increasingly powerful mouthpiece for disaffected groups and represents a valuable channel for voicing political and economic grievances, which may otherwise have produced political violence. Hence, the growing NGO

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community may indeed contribute to diminishing the prospects for revolutionary terrorism. Our guess is that this will be the main effect of a more powerful NGO community.

On the other hand, there are several examples of single issue and ideological terrorist groups growing out of a radicalised NGO activist community, and that NGOs have served as front organisations, auxiliaries or at the very least sympathetic supporters for guerrilla or terrorist organisations. Furthermore, the growing role of the NGO community in conflict areas contributes to establishing closer links between disaffected groups in Third World conflict areas and Western countries where many NGOs are based and/or receive their funding from. There are examples that NGOs have been affiliated with guerrilla and terrorist organisations, and thus have served as a useful vehicle for exercising influence outside of a local conflict area. But again, growing access to a world-wide NGO community, sympathetic to their causes but not their means of struggle, may well encourage terrorist and insurgent groups to pursue a political track rather than armed campaigns and political violence.

4.9 The Rise of Private Security

*The influence of private security organisations will grow but they will not replace the state’s security apparatus.*

In recent decades, a challenge to the established notion of the state has come from the rise of a variety of private security organisations. Private security companies can perform a variety of functions. The most spectacular are those that have actively participated in combat on behalf of a party to a conflict. However, the vast majority of private security companies provide services as guards, private police or consultants. Two factors have facilitated the mushrooming of private security enterprises. First, the downsizing of militaries and defence budgets around the world has left a number of military personnel looking for alternative employment. At the same time, it has become a more attractive option to hire the relevant military capability as the need arises rather than maintaining large standing forces. Second, as the economic dimensions of conflicts grow in importance, so does the profitability of private security services. They are central to the future global security environment as “interactions and ties between […] conflicts and the trans-national trade in narcotics, weapons, nuclear materials, slaves and terrorism are becoming indistinguishable,” with serious implications for the security of the North.

Several points suggest that the increased influence of private security companies will not be curbed in the near future. First, by virtue of their sheer number and their apparent cost-effectiveness, private security companies will continue to expand their sphere of activity. Secondly, private security companies have gained significant political and economic influence that is not easily controlled. As private armies gain increasing shares in strategic mineral

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168 This also includes demobilised soldiers in the wake of a conflict.
holdings all over the world, their influence increases steadily and they may become crucial players.\textsuperscript{170}

A danger may arise when private security companies are controlled by a state that is looking to assert its power elsewhere in the world, such as only indirectly happened through the deployment of Afghan war veterans in other conflicts. Given the urge for greater (Western) interventionism, they might be considered a convenient alternative to direct military involvement, be it intervention, peacekeeping or support to reform processes. In its extreme this can lead to a “privatisation of warfare.”\textsuperscript{171} As internal conflicts will frequently spill-over and become transnational, the involvement of private security companies can affect the security balance of an entire region.\textsuperscript{172}

Although the ‘mercenary’ component of private security companies has received the most attention, it remains a remote concept for most states in the industrialised world. Instead, their function as a private police force has been a cause of concern. Sklansky fears that private police will ultimately replace the state’s responsibility to provide security and result in a two-tiered society where only the affluent will be in a position to purchase their safety. He suggests that “the dramatic spread of policing-for-hire should prompt us to rethink what it means to guarantee all citizens, regardless of wealth, the equal protection of the laws.”\textsuperscript{173} This erosion of the state’s monopoly on violence is particularly dangerous in weak states or states in transition to democracy. As O’Brien writes, “[w]hile [private security] groups […] are attempting to reconstruct the state in order to ensure stability and security sufficient for economic activities, they are also removing the state’s right to control violence and war.”\textsuperscript{174}

There are a number of checks on the influence of private security companies. In most countries, regular military forces will continue to outweigh private actors, not the least because the historical legacy will not render private armies an attractive option for Western governments. Moreover, Loader argues that there are “potential cultural limits to the extension of a ‘consumer attitude’ in this field [which will in the end favour] modes of policing, shaped by citizens acting in a democratic polity.”\textsuperscript{175} In contrast, less democratic regimes and/or terrorist groups will have no such qualms about hiring private security companies to gain access to expertise, personnel and equipment. In essence, the services resemble traditional military assistance or the arms trade. The major difference lies in the privatisation of the services which means that there is seldom an identifiable state sponsor, which, in turn, undermines accountability and renders them more difficult to control through national or international law.

\textsuperscript{170} The most prominent examples are Executive Outcomes and Sandline both of which were particularly active in several African countries, but also in East Asia.
\textsuperscript{172} O’Brien (1998), p. 92.
\textsuperscript{173} Sklansky (1999). For more on private policing, see Davids and Hancock (1998); Sklansky (1999).
\textsuperscript{175} Loader (1999).
4.9.1 Private Policing, Private Security, … Private Terrorism?

Theories on terrorism do not help us much in this regard other than pointing to the intimate relationship between terrorism and internal conflicts. The privatisation of policing is likely to continue, eroding but not replacing the state as the prime provider of security to its citizens and affecting the legitimacy of a given state. The use of private security companies in combat will be limited to the developing world. Many private security companies are headquartered in the industrialised world and may become targets due to their involvement in a conflict. It is important to note, however, that these attacks are not directed at the host state, but are merely taking place on its territory, indicating a possible trend towards the privatisation of terrorism. As the state loses its preferential status as the only relevant actor in the international system, it is likely that the new members of the more complex system – including private security organisations – will be targets for terrorism.\textsuperscript{176}

5 THE GLOBAL MARKET ECONOMY

There are two major opposing perspectives on global integration – liberal theory and radical dependency theory. The paradox of globalisation refers to the gap between the liberal assumptions that a global market reform will promote growth and peace, and the fact that we are being confronted with globally increasing inequalities and serious violent conflicts on a daily basis.\textsuperscript{177} The process of globalisation has brought some major qualitative as well as quantitative changes to the world that require a parallel redefinition of the established notion of world structures. Almost all of the factors usually related to civil violence in one way or another – be it economic development, trade, dependency, inequality, social welfare or political system – are likely to be affected by the process of globalisation.\textsuperscript{178}

The main objective in the discussion of the global market economy is to identify whether the future holds significant changes with respect to a number of factors known to influence patterns of terrorism and violent internal conflicts. These include for example the level of income inequality, the pace of modernisation, trade and interdependence, economic growth/development and the level of unionisation, and the expansion of transnational organised crime.

In the following, changes in the global market economy will be discussed by reviewing postulates on inequality within states, inequality between states and regions, and on the distribution of power over the economy. The discussion of the postulates ties back into the two dominant theoretical arguments on the occurrence of civil violence and terrorism.

\textsuperscript{176} See also on TNCs as targets for terrorist attacks below.  
\textsuperscript{177} See for example Duffield (1999).  
\textsuperscript{178} Väyrynen argues that “[c]ollective violence is, almost by definition, embedded in social and economic structures.” Väyrynen (1986), p. 515.
5.1 Inequality and Injustice

There will be larger economic inequalities inside states.

Inequality within states has been rising since the early eighties, a trend that is strengthened by differences in education, income, and access to information. Although this is true of the “world at large, […] intra-country inequality offers a mixed record, with some countries improving their condition (e.g. India, the Asian Pacific, Spain), while others have fallen into greater inequality (United States, United Kingdom, Mexico, Brazil). Regardless, the existing inequality within states is exacerbated by modernisation and internationalisation that places some people in the loop of economic growth, while excluding others.

While the modernisation processes that the industrialised world is undergoing at present are different from those of early modernisation, they are no less profound and pose significant challenges to the modern state. Much of the developing world and a growing number of states in transition from the developing to the industrial world, still face the challenges of handling early rapid modernisation, during which economic and social inequality often grows.

There are several trends within the labour markets that will affect the degree of social inequality in the future. Internationalisation has implications for the labour market in that workers must adjust to company mobility and the pace of change. Technological development reinforces the trend, as reflected in the so-called New Economy. The New Economy places less emphasis on the production of physical goods and more on information, services, and non-repetitive tasks and appears to be less vulnerable to economic recession. As a result, there will be a rising demand for highly skilled and specialised labour, resulting in a growing distinction between different groups in society.

Another trend in the labour market, namely individualisation, has more ambiguous consequences for inequality within states. The labour market will be more flexible offering more part-time positions, short-term contracts, etc. This suits businesses, as they will not have to make long-term hiring decisions in an economy that fluctuates to a greater degree and

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181 The concept of “modernisation” consists of two main elements: (1) A historical process of economic and technological change that has produced a society characterised by market oriented, industry-based production and trade, where cities are the home to the majority of the population. (2) Concomitant processes of social and political change, that involve adjustments in political and social values and norms, as a result of the dissolution of traditional family, clan-based, and neo-patrimonial structures. At the political level, the population is increasingly mobilised and the state apparatus grows and is centralised. Utvik (2000).
182 In this study, the term “developing world” is used as an overall description of the non-OECD world, i.e. it includes Eastern Europe, much of Asia and the Far East, as well as Africa and Latin America. In a more detailed discussion it would be essential to distinguish at least between developed, newly developed and developing or underdeveloped states. With regard to the inequality between countries as described below, the gap is mostly between developed and newly developed states, on the one hand, and developing or underdeveloped states, on the other.
thereby be able to maximise efficiency. Due to more flexible arrangements, the workers’ loyalty to both a company and a profession will be weakened. An important consequence of this is the weakening of labour unions and the loss of a channel for addressing grievances.\footnote{Mazur (2000), p. 80f.} In addition, as a result of more flexible and individual arrangements, the picture will no longer be black-and-white with respect to whether a person is in or out of work.\footnote{McRae (1994), p. 104f.}

For the legitimacy of the state, individualisation of the labour market also has an ambiguous effect. The social safety net will be less important to a number of workers, as they have more complex and more self-reliant arrangements. However, the safety net will be even more important to that portion of the population that is already ‘cut off.’ The growing inability of the state to provide public goods and welfare will exacerbate the growing inequality within a state. While the pressure on a state increases to show that it can alleviate the effects of inequality, it has less control over the labour market, which in turn further undermines its legitimacy.\footnote{Human Development Report 1999, p. 2.}

The pattern of inequality within a state described above is typical of industrialised states. Despite the variations that lie in the mixed record indicated early on, developing and newly developed countries are undergoing a similar process of growing inequality, with even more serious consequences. As the legitimacy of the state is not as firmly established in many developing states, it will be all the more challenged when the effects of modernisation are perceived as unjust.

5.1.1 Growing Inequality May Cause More Political Instability, Social Unrest and Domestic Terrorism.

In sum, inequality in terms of unequal income distribution appears to be increasing within states although in the world at large internal inequality offers a mixed record. Theories on terrorism show that economic inequality is strongly correlated with violent confrontations and terrorism. Based on UN surveys (the UN’s \textit{Global report on Crime and Justice}), Buvinič and Morrison argue that “socio-economic strain measured by unemployment, inequality, and dissatisfaction with income is a major factor in explaining the variation in “contact crimes” (such as assault, threats, sexual violence, and sexual harassment and robbery) among countries in the world.”\footnote{Buvinič and Morrison (2000), p. 65.} Rapid modernisation, which is still underway or is still to come in much of the developing world, exacerbates inequality and – in literature on causes of terrorism – has been associated with dissatisfaction and more ideological terrorism, particularly when politically marginalised groups are not successfully integrated.\footnote{See discussions on theory in Chapter 2 and in Lia and Skjølberg (2000).}

Despite a more complex picture emerging in the labour market, changes are nonetheless set to favour the already resourceful and consolidate inequality. Moreover, the state’s withdrawal
from labour relations – also reflected in weakened labour unions – may instil a sense of abandonment in the population and deprive them of mediating institutions and channels of communication. In the final analysis, the population may be driven to resort to more drastic methods of communication, such as terrorism as a communication strategy. Other studies have shown that economic crises are seldom the only cause of regime collapse. The degree to which it might spill over into the industrialised world is in part conditioned by the degree to which injustice can be attributed to the economically dominant part of the world. The following section discusses whether growing inequality between different regions of the world heightens or defuses tension between them.

5.2 The Paradox of Growing Inequality and Growing Interdependence between States

There will be larger and more visible economic gaps between rich and poor countries, but simultaneous growing interdependence due to expanding trade and foreign investment.

It is clear that the gap between rich and poor countries is growing. The 1999 Human Development Report indicates that the richest countries account for 86% of GDP, while the middle 60% account for 13%, and the poorest tier only represents 1% of GDP in 1997. McRae describes the future inequality between different parts of the world in the following manner:

More likely there will be an even sharper global divide than is evident in the early 1990s. On the one hand there will be a worried, even frightened industrial world, which will try to use its technology to preserve its living standards and protect itself from the surge in population elsewhere; on the other hand there will be the burgeoning cities of the developing world, packed with the young and the poor, without the infrastructure which makes the cities of the industrial world effective productive units. In between, there will be the handful of countries, or regions, which will be making the leap from developing to industrial status.

The 1999 Human Development Report takes a similar view claiming that aside from the inequality being a problem in itself, it also brings with it “migration, environmental pressure, conflict, instability and other problems.” Perhaps the most obvious fault line runs along the Mediterranean, as “hardly any economic power relationship between two regions […] is so essentially asymmetric” as the one between Europe and the Middle East/North Africa.

189 Pei and Adesnik (2000).
191 Human Development Report 1999, p. 3, 11. The report use three tiers: the upper 20% are defined as the ‘rich’ countries, ‘middle income countries’ are the middle 60% and ‘poor’ countries make up bottom 20%.
At the same time, the internationalisation of the world economy undermines the traditional distinction between developed and developing countries. Dicken writes that “[t]he global economy is […] ‘a mosaic of unevenness in a continuous state of flux.’” Indeed, Cingranelli and Richards show that Foreign Direct Investment has almost tripled in the period 1981-96. Although economists claim that this trend stimulates economic growth and development, for the poorest countries, the shift from aid to FDI has had negative consequences. Only 1% of FDI goes to the 48 least developed countries, which increasingly fall outside of the pathway of capital flows. This trend reflects Castells’ notion of “black holes” in “informational capitalism” and may be exacerbated by the development towards more mechanised production which is less reliant on cheap labour, further marginalising the developing world.

In order to better gauge the conflict potential inherent in inequality between countries and regions, the current section takes a closer look at what inequality between states/regions consists of and whether or not those aspects indicate greater or lesser tension. There are three central aspects of inequality. The first and most straightforward element of inequality is the unequal level of development. Often this entails that lesser developed countries lack influence in international decision-making. Second, in line with the level of development, different parts of the world are marked by different patterns of consumption; in other words, the rather small number of countries in the developed world use a disproportionate share of the world’s resources. Finally, inequality emerges in the preponderance of different political systems in different parts of the world. Most of the developed world is characterised by democratic systems of government, whereas most newly developed and developing countries – though they may be democracies in name – struggle with significantly lower levels of legitimacy and stability.

With respect to the level of development and influence in international decision-making, there is a significant gap. Jones writes that

[i]f there is one generalisation which stands out sharply about international business over the long term, it is that its distribution over the world has been remarkably uneven. In each generation particular countries and regions have always attracted disproportionately more investment than others. This trend is as persistent in the 1990s as in previous generations. Although MNEs [multinational enterprises] are said to be engaged in global integration strategies, the process of ‘globalisation’ continues to leave Africa, and many Latin American, Asian and Eastern European economies, comparatively unaffected.

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This is reflected in the global labour market which is “increasingly integrated for the highly skilled […] with high mobility and wages. But the market for unskilled labour is highly restricted by national barriers.” McRae points to a modifying development and argues that the young societies of the developing world provide valuable labour in manufacturing. As cash and location become internationalised, the real valuable asset is human skills, both in terms of education and culture.

The key question with regard to the use of resources and patterns of consumption is whether or not resource scarcity is a source of conflict in itself or whether it is abused by those who will profit from a conflict or features as an additional dimension of more deeply rooted conflicts. Indeed, de Soysa points out that – contrary to common belief – it “is not a ‘shrinking pie’ but a ‘honey pot’ [i.e. the abundance of renewable resources] that is associated with civil conflicts.” Energy scarcity is the only aspect of resources that might have conflict potential. According to McRae, the “only important resource which is scarce in many parts of the world is water.” He claims that it is the commonly owned resources that are endangered, “while those primary products whose exploitation is privately controlled are not in danger of exhaustion.” Smith disagrees, arguing that “if current trends continue, a combination of environmental degradation […] and a doubling of population to about 11 billion in the latter part of the 21st century will lead to extreme hardship, even disaster, in many parts of the world.”

What is clear, is that resource problems are distributed unevenly regionally. As the rich world has been forced to become less wasteful and is relieved of the pressure of population growth, it is likely to fare better than poor countries. Moreover, rich industrialised countries benefit most from new technologies, while simultaneously disrupting the environment the most. As the Human Development Report 1999 points out “[m]ost of the costs are borne by the poor – though it is the world’s rich who benefit the most.” In poor countries, stability will be conditioned by the way in which resources are managed, in particular food production and water, and the environmental and economic costs of different policies.

Another major gap between industrialised and developing countries is the degree of political legitimacy and stability and the relative distribution of power within states. For developing countries this entails a particular challenge of maintaining the balance between critical foreign direct investment and a minimum of national control over the economy. Capital mobility benefits the developing world, as financial resources can flow more easily into countries and

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203 McRae (1994), p. 120.
204 McRae (1994), p. 120.
205 R. Smith (1998), p. 200. Smith couples his predictions with the notion that scarcity might be used specifically as an instrument in genocide.
allow for more rapid growth. However, it is also an unstable situation, as cash can rapidly be withdrawn or redirected. For a relatively weak government whose legitimacy hinges not the least on economic performance, relying on a shifty economic basis is dangerous and leaves little room for independent economic government. Thus, “states are grappling with the needs for effective governance, on the one hand, and the pressure for fast economic reform, on the other.” The circle can be a vicious or a virtuous one: stability will attract investment, but withdrawal of investment can both be a product of and a cause of instability.

5.2.1 Global Inequality and Terrorism

Liberal theory asserts that economic growth and development will promote internal political stability and work against the occurrence of domestic terrorism. As we have seen, however, the link is ambivalent. While inequality between states is growing, there is also greater interdependence between the regions with respect to capital flows, highly skilled labour mobility and information. Although interaction defuses tension, in accordance with the notion of liberal peace, there is also a rising potential for internal conflict. In developing countries the interdependence with other parts of the world tends to encompass only the upper echelons of society. The elite is seen as ‘collaborators’ with an exploitative and imperialist West, among radical left and Islamists in the developing world. Therefore, both global inequality between states and the threat of terrorism within these states may increase. The danger of tension spilling over to the industrialised world as a result of either aspect may be reinforced by labour migration and enhanced information networks.

The growing gap between rich and poor countries is also visible in environmental and resource issues. These issues place an increasing burden on already unstable governments in the developing world. They also place growing pressure on governments in the industrialised world to intervene in the developing world. When external intervention serves to strengthen a weak state and enhance its legitimacy, it may alleviate some of the pressures known to cause terrorism. Still, when intervention takes the form of volatile investment, a crisis can trigger terrorist responses against the ‘rich’ world and merciless market mechanisms, which are perceived as controlled by the industrialised world.

5.3 Powerless Politicians? Powerful Businesses?

Many governments will face reduced legitimacy due to a loss of control over economy.

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210 Skjølberg (2000), p. 12. One should also keep in mind that FDI does not build critical infrastructure, nor does it provide public goods.
213 Finsterbusch for one suggests that “[u]nderdeveloped countries and terrorist groups might also war or terrorize rich countries, demanding a greater sharing of world wealth and resources.” Finsterbusch (1981), p. 162. See also Queiser Morales’ view that the industrial world is waging war on the developing world. (Ref?)
When discussing the distribution of power over the economy, the central question concerns the role of national governments and the extent to which their influence has been reduced. According to Castells, “the new power system is characterised by the plurality of sources of authority and power, the nation state being just one of these sources.” The role of the state in the economy is complex and is influenced by a number of factors: (1) The state’s political and cultural complexion and strength of institutions and interest groups. (2) The size of the national economy, especially that of the domestic market. (3) The state’s resource endowment, both physical and human. (4) The state’s relative position in the world economy, including its level of economic development and degree of industrialisation. It is particularly the first aspect that is addressed in the current section. Has the legitimacy of the state been affected and who are the challengers to state authority?

In the further discussion, it is important to distinguish between trade and finance. Whereas governments maintain control over trade, they are rather ineffectual in regulating – and perhaps unwilling to regulate – cash flows. Similarly, the “rise of power of the financial markets, together with their increasingly international nature, has inevitably reduced the power of individual national governments.” Nevertheless, business cannot escape their territorial affiliation and Jones points out that “[t]he persistent national influence on international business has been one of the most striking features of continuity.” The state still forms the territorial basis for business, in that it is the place of business and provides the rules for business activity. Although boundaries become more permeable, national governments continue to exercise control over their economy by providing specific cultural, political, social and economic conditions for the economic activity within its borders and by setting concrete rules for economic activity in three major policy areas: trade, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), and industry.

A key to the legitimacy of the state has been its role in maximising social justice among its citizens in the context of the welfare state. As the “fiscal squeeze on public goods” grows tighter, the ability of the state to sustain social welfare may be reduced and national governments struggle with challenges to their legitimacy. In an ageing society the pressure will be especially strong on a government to get “health and education right.” A counter development to the weakened role of the state, is the growth in the service industry that will fill some of the gap left by the state. When market mechanisms and private business interests fail to adequately fulfil the part of the state, the state must either re-establish control in order to safeguard social cohesion and a strong community or risk challenges to its legitimacy. As

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214 Castells (1997), p. 303
218 With respect to the first, the state can act through international regulatory frameworks, which do not exist for two and three. Dicken (1998), p. 112f.
these types of services for the most part cannot be internationally traded, the governments will also have a relatively larger influence on them through regulation and/or legislation.\footnote{McRae (1994), p. 107, 195-9.}

The most influential challengers to state authority are Multinational or Transnational Corporations (MNCs or TNCs). The relationship between states and TNCs has undergone some changes over the years. Following a period of growing restrictiveness in the 70s and 80s, states have moved from wanting to control TNCs, to wanting to attract them – often by providing a less restrictive environment than other countries. TNCs are attractive to states, as they bring with them technology and access to markets, allowing states to partake in the benefits of their presence.\footnote{McRae (1994), p. 107, 195-9.} The opposite is also true: TNCs profit from “a range of collective goods that are valuable to firms and investors [and] may at least balance the costs of interventionist government.”\footnote{Garrett (1998), p. 791, 823.} Similarly, Dicken argues against the conception that TNCs have no territorial affiliation and can therefore not evade all national political control. In fact, there is an interaction between states and TNCs in which the state provides a cultural and other framework for the TNC, while the TNC affects states and communities in which they operate.\footnote{Dicken (1998), p. 199f., 275; Hirst and Thompson (1996), p. 95.} States need TNCs to create the wealth that is a necessary ingredient in their legitimacy, but TNCs depend on the infrastructure provided by a state. The specific relationship will depend on both sides’ perception of their costs and benefits and their relative bargaining power. Clearly, “TNCs tie national and local economies more closely into the global economy.”\footnote{Dicken (1998), p. 276.}

Transnational corporations (TNCs) may be significant political actors, through their ability to put pressure on and lobby foreign governments. As Willett has observed, “TNCs have the ability to evade government attempts to control financial flows, to impose trade sanctions or to regulate production. [As a result,] the sovereignty of most governments is significantly reduced.”\footnote{Dicken (1998), p. 199f., 275; Hirst and Thompson (1996), p. 95.} Although Hirst and Thompson make the reservation that TNCs remain heavily “nationally embedded,” they agree that “it is beyond the powers of national governments to regulate these companies.”\footnote{Hirst and Thompson (1996), p. 98.}

There are other trends that cloud the picture of the ever more powerful TNC. First, the high degree of capital mobility favours smaller more ‘nimble’ companies that can adjust more easily to new conditions and that can move around more freely. However, they will not be able to evade national regulation as easily as larger companies might. Second, shareholders will increasingly come from several different countries, resulting in more foreign ownership.

\footnote{For a detailed description of how TNCs evade government regulation, see Willetts (1999), p. 290-296. See also Human Development Report 1999, p. 8-10, 12.}

\footnote{Hirst and Thompson (1996), p. 98. As mentioned in Chapter 4, power structures extend over borders featuring “transnational alliances among the world’s largest firms” rather than simple TNC-host government relationships. Bornschier and Chase-Dunn (1999), p. 1f.}
McRae points out that “very large international transfers of funds, where people in one country end up owning enormous assets in another, is not a stable situation and will be a source of continuing tension which will need to be handled with great care on every side.”

The role of TNCs is of particular concern due to their control over global food production. As food markets continue to be internationalised, “the power of such companies is set to increase.” Given the inequality between regions, control by private enterprises over food production is a sensitive issue. In order to deflect tensions, global efforts to fill the gap left open by domestic deregulation through global re-regulation are underway. It is increasingly understood that irresponsible behaviour by TNCs can be dealt with if governments act collectively.

McRae suggests that “the whole process of trade liberalization has come to a halt: we may have reached a plateau from which further advance is politically impossible.” While MNCs might increase their political importance and economic power, they are unlikely to gain more political room to manoeuvre. On the contrary, they will increasingly be subject to political scrutiny and control by both national and supranational bodies and be more sensitive to political considerations.

Calls for controlling the forces of globalisation are increasingly being heard and Vollebæk underlines the need to strengthen international institutions to manage “the forces of globalization – its speed and its direction.” Calls also reflect a desire to devise both formal and informal mechanisms to make ethical standards and human rights binding for corporations and individuals. The goal is accountability and an established view that economic growth is an instrument towards human well-being rather than an end in itself. As mentioned above, multilateral co-operation in this and other fields is likely to increase in the future.

Different parts of the national economic policy will be affected by international regulations to various degrees. As mentioned above, trade policy is subject to extensive supervision through international regulatory frameworks, such as under the GATT – since 1947 – or the WTO – since 1995. For instance, “[t]he WTO represents a rule-oriented approach to multilateral trade co-operation rather than one which is based on results.” Rules can also be implemented in the context of regional blocs, which have a “considerable influence on patterns of world trade.” But most have not progressed beyond free trade arrangements, EU and NAFTA being the major exceptions.

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234 Vollebæk (2000), p. 21f. The Human Development Report writes that “[t]he challenge is to find the rules and institutions for stronger governance – local, national, regional and global – to preserve the advantages of global markets and competition, but also to provide enough space for human, community and environmental resources to ensure that globalization works for people – not just for profits.” Human Development Report 1999, p. 2.
5.3.1 Will Private Business Become the Prime Terrorist Targets? And New Sponsors of Terrorism?

We have seen that globalisation and the rise of TNCs pose several challenges to the legitimacy of the state, the lack of which has been associated with social tensions and terrorism. The withdrawal of the state from its welfare functions matches the trend towards individualisation in the labour market and the greater reliance on private savings. This entails that those that have no savings ‘fall off the wagon’ and inequality increases. Where the state is being undermined, its authority, but not its responsibility is being replaced by TNCs. Although they contribute to economic growth, they do not necessarily bring internal stability, as TNCs “have not provided any convincing response to the erosion of the notions of security and predictability in people’s lives.” In the worst case, the effects of the policies of powerful TNCs will provide the focus for the formation of protest movements for whom the TNCs are the ultimate symbol of turbo-capitalism and global injustice. One may predict a future shift in focus for terrorist groups away from states and symbols of the state towards businesses and TNCs.

Should actual progress in international re-regulation reflect the idealistic notions currently being put forward, they would serve to contribute to stability and strengthen the legitimacy of states in developing countries by taking account of fringe interests that otherwise have been shown to encourage ideological terrorism. Alternatively, there is a danger of breeding antagonism in developing countries and of heightening the existing gaps between rich and poor countries, when regional regulatory arrangements function in an exclusionary or protectionist manner. As mentioned above, social injustice across regions has been identified as a source of ideological terrorism.

One side-effect of the drive for marketisation, privatisation and globalisation of the economy is the accumulation of wealth in private hands. Already, a number of private individuals have private capital far beyond the annual GDP of the majority of the world’s states. We have also seen that private companies have been sufficiently powerful in financial terms to cause severe currency crises for states. In this context, it is interesting to note the emergence of the phenomenon of private sponsors of terrorism, namely the network of radical Islamist groups reportedly sponsored by the Saudi dissident Usama Ben Laden. If the current trend towards large private capital accumulation continues, one may predict that the recent example of private sponsors of terrorism will not be the last.

5.4 The Globalisation of Organised Crime

The extent of transnational organised crime will continue to increase in the future.

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238 Smadja (2000).
The forces that have been shaping the world after the end of the Cold War have made transnational crime and the globalisation of crime a major focus of security policy studies and threat assessment. Some of the most pessimistic analyses even describes the growth of transnational organised crime “as a major threat, perhaps the major threat to the world system in the 1990s and beyond.” The rise of transnational organised crime goes further back than to the end of the Cold War, but it received a powerful impetus by the growth of the global illegal trade in drugs.

For the last three decades illegal drug trade has become the major source of income for organised crime, and it has transformed local and regional mafias into global gangs. They do not grow raw materials or sell the refined drugs on the street, but monopolise the refining and transport sectors. The global supplies of opium-heroin and coca-cocaine have grown dramatically over the past decades. In 1950, an estimated 500 tons of heroin were produced world-wide, in 1970 about 1,000. Global heroin production remained fairly steady during the 1970s, then increased again during the 1980s, until more than 3,500 tons were produced in 1990. In other words, between 1950 and 1990 world heroin production grew sevenfold. According to the UN’s Global Report on Crime and Justice, the production of illicit drugs rose sharply world-wide from the mid-1980s, the production of cocaine doubled and that of opium more than tripled during the 1990s. In 1995, the illegal drug trade was estimated at $400 billion, about 8% of the world trade.

There are no indisputable explanations for fluctuations in drug trade, but it seems that both anti-drug action and political events do have an impact. In 1970 Turkey produced 80% of the world’s opium. The United States exercised considerable pressure on Turkey to eradicate poppy, and Turkey’s role as the world’s premier supplier soon ended. The Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979 led to the overthrow of the Shah and a ban on opium production and heroin use, which seriously curtailed opium production. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan also reduced opium production somewhat. But the effects of these events were limited in time, as opium cultivation shifted to other regions, primarily the Golden Triangle (Myanmar, Laos and Thailand, which explains the increase in production in the 1980s. In sum, there is no doubt that both drug supplies and drug use have increased. So far, attempts at curbing the drug trade have only yielded limited or temporary results.

Transnational organised crime has also surged because of expanding business opportunities in other fields. As a result of the crackdown on illegal immigration, the illegal market of human trafficking has become the domain of sophisticated organised crime groups. Moreover, it has laid the basis for “new forms of collaboration between and across previously competitive

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244 The rising drug supplies then led to a drop in street prices and increasing purity, which made it economical to develop cheap kinds of drugs that can expand consumer demand in new ways. This process occurred first with cocaine, more recently with heroin. See Schaeffer (1997), pp. 329ff.
organised crime groups. As Margaret Beare writes in a recent study on human trafficking, a smuggling ring in China involved Triad members working together as partners with Japanese Yakuza. Similarly, Chinese Triad members have teamed up with Italian Mafia members to smuggle foreigners into Italy and Europe. Finally, expanding networks of transnational and transregional trade patterns appear to have paved the way for global trafficking in guns and small arms. Although few reliable figures on illegal trafficking of light weapons exist, anecdotal evidence suggests that it is a growing business.

The reasons for the recent surge in transnational organised crime are complex. According to Manuel Castells, global crime is “a fundamental actor in the economy and society of the Information Age.” It has become easier to move people, commodities and capital from country to country. Information can be transferred and obtained with fewer obstacles and at a higher pace than ever before. A transnational economy with deregulated financial markets and free trade is being promoted and enforced. A global market is developing for an increasing number of products. States are becoming increasingly interdependent, and they have less and less control over transnational activities of non-state actors.

These trends affect all kinds of activity, including crime. Willetts has observed that “the operations of criminals and other non-legitimate groups have become more complex, spread over a wider geographical area and increased in scale, because improvements in communications have made it so much easier to transfer people, money and weapons and ideas on a transnational basis.” And perpetrators would seem to be at an advantage, since law makers and enforcers of laws and regulations will be at least one step behind a criminal community that is unrestrained by democratic procedures. Pessimists such as Susan Strange argue that the chances of an efficient international regime to counter transnational crime are likely to be poor. It would require “far more co-operation and co-ordination between national police and enforcement agencies than either Interpol or high-level ministerial conferences have so far been able to achieve.”

Other reasons for the surge in transnational organised crime may be found in the hapless economic conditions in many of the former communist countries. They have been largely unable to create sustainable economic growth at home. In an environment of low profitability of legal business and insufficient legal mechanisms in place to protect legal investments, organised crime is set to thrive. The situation in the Russian Federation is a particular source of concern. There have long been fears of increased trafficking of commodities that would create an obvious security risk, first and foremost as nuclear material. While Russian officials argue that they largely contain illegal trafficking in nuclear material, reports from other ex-Communist states still point to the availability of sensitive biological, chemical and nuclear

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246 Buvinić and Morrison (2000), pp. 66-67 For a recent article on clandestine arms trade, see Young (2000).
material on the illegal market. The Russian Ministry of the Interior’s annual report from 1999 expects that the current growth rate in organised crime in Russia will not be significantly reduced, even under more favourable circumstances than today (for example if there were to be economic growth and an improvement in living standards).

Regarding the illegal drug industry, the Russian Ministry of the Interior expects that drug trade will become an even more important part of Russian organised crime. According to a recent report by Russia’s Ministry of the Interior and the UN Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention, there has been “an avalanche of growth of smuggling of narcotics and psychotropic substances” in recent years. Within recent years, Russia has become a target for expansion by international drug traffickers. Over half of all narcotic substances seized in the country have foreign origin. Drug dealing has become one of the most lucrative criminal activities.” Interviews with Russian officials in Interpol in Moscow also reveal that Russian crime fighting organs primarily hope that they will be able to limit the growth rate of organised crime, and prevent its expansion to new spheres, rather than bring about an actual reduction in organised crime.

In addition to the prospects for further growth in organised crime in Russia, demographic trends in a number of countries in the developing world are also expected to influence the crime rate negatively, such as the increasing urbanisation and accompanying process of dissolution of traditional structures of social control. Finally, the emergence of new types of conflict in the post-Cold War era may lead to growth in transnational crime. It is argued that internal conflicts today are less characterised by ideology and increasingly dominated by war lords with local horizons and leaders aiming to accumulate wealth for redistribution to followers, loyalists and clients rather than seeking to implement a political programme for a state. This new war economy feeds on new transnational parallel trade and illegal trafficking. Goodhand and Hulme for example interpret these conflicts not as events, but as processes with no discernible start or end. Duffield argues that such protracted conflicts are symptomatic of new and expanding forms of political economy. Today’s conflicts are characterised by long-term and innovative adaptation to globalisation, linked to expanding networks of parallel and grey economic activity.

5.4.1 The New Bedfellows of Organised Crime and Political Violence

Theoretical and empirical literature on the relationship between transnational organised crime and terrorism strongly suggest that the two phenomena, albeit still relatively distinct despite a trend towards convergence, frequently correlate and reinforce one another. As we have seen, a
continued growth of transnational organised crime appears to be very likely in the near future, although regional differences may be significant. Europe’s eastern and south-eastern periphery appears to be exposed to further growth in organised crime. In sum, increased levels of the types of terrorism in which political and economic motives are difficult to distinguish, may then be expected in those areas.

5.5 Europe, Mideast Petroleum and the Mediterranean Fault-Line

Europe’s economic dependence on petroleum imports from the Middle East and North Africa will continue to grow.

Europe’s large degree of interdependence in energy economy with Middle East and North Africa (MENA), and the possibility that instability and armed conflicts in the region can disrupt oil and gas supplies to Europe have long been a key issue in the debate on Mediterranean security. It has been a dominant feature of Euro-Arab relations since the early and mid-1970s when the Arab-Israeli wars and the oil embargo enabled Arab countries to successfully lobby the European Community and European states to alter their policy towards the region.

At present, the greatest part of the EU’s gas consumption is covered by European suppliers, such as the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Norway. In the future, however, this may change. A substantial expansion of natural gas pipelines from North Africa to Europe was completed in the 1990s. The expansion of the Trans-Mediterranean (Transmed) natural gas pipeline (2512 km) was completed in 1995, linking Algeria to Italy through Tunisia and Sicily. The construction of the Maghreb-Europe Gas (MEG) pipeline from Algeria to Spain through Morocco (1390km), and a projected pipeline from Libya’s offshore natural gas fields to Sicily and Italy are to be fully operative by 2002. As a consequence, European dependence on North African energy supplies will most probably increase in the near future, especially for the Southern European countries, which are already heavily dependent on Maghrebi gas imports. According to Calabrese, Algeria alone has supplied some 70% of Spain’s gas supplies and 25% of Italy’s. Since the mid-1980s, Algeria has supplied 11% of OECD’s total natural gas imports. In general some 60% of Europe’s hydrocarbon supplies are imported from countries in the MENA-region and the Persian Gulf, while the Mediterranean countries alone provide some 25% of the EU’s total energy imports. Natural gas is increasing its share of the EU’s energy balance, and it will reach some 26% by the year 2010. As a result, dependence on imports from third countries is projected to rise to around 60% by the year 2010 and as high as 75% by 2020.

257 Lia (1999a).
263 Aghrout and Alexander (1997), p. 312 quoting reports prepared for the Commission of European...
An important but often ignored side effect of the expanding petroleum co-operation with the MENA-region is the obvious effect on the political system in the region. While an economic analysis of the economies in the MENA-region is clearly outside the scope of this study, socio-economic characteristics of the societies in question can at least partly explain the political authoritarianism on the part of the regimes. First of all, national income of most of the countries in the MENA-region is greatly dependent on sources directly controlled by the regime, of which petroleum exports is by far the most important. It has been pointed out that this so-called “rentier nature of the state” minimises the regime’s dependence on direct taxation, and creates a certain insulation from the population, which in turn diminishes the population’s leverage over the regime. There can be little doubt that this “rentier nature” of the Arab states “is a significant factor in discouraging democratisation” in the region. As European states are set to expand their economic co-operation with the region, this pattern of political rule will be reinforced.

5.5.1 Will Civil Violence and Terrorism in the South Spill Over Into Europe?

From what we have said above, we may predict that future democratisation processes in the MENA-region will not come easily, rather they will be protracted. As we have seen, terrorism occurs more frequently in authoritarian and semi-democratic countries, than in totalitarian states at the one extreme and mature democracies at the other. The patterns of economic interaction between Europe and the southern Mediterranean appear to strengthen and sustain authoritarian and illiberal forms of government in the South, slowing down the global progress towards democratisation. In addition to dependence on energy supplies, increased European investments in the petroleum sector in North Africa have also created additional interest in maintaining political stability in the region. In practice, this does not imply that European countries are prepared to push harder for democratisation in the South, despite the lip-service that is paid to human rights and democratisation in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Instead, European states have proved to be more than willing to offer more economic and military aid, intelligence co-operation and diplomatic support to the relatively authoritarian regimes in the South. This is done in order to help them fend off Islamist opposition movements who, should they manage to take power, may threaten foreign investments and vital energy supplies.

Communities in 1995.

264 Oil and natural gas exports form the single major source of national income in Algeria and Libya, and represent major national sources of income in Egypt, Tunisia, and Syria, while the export of minerals (phosphate) is a major source of state revenues in Morocco. Similarly, the Suez Canal revenue is another economic pillar for the regime in Cairo.


266 Luciani (1994).

267 For a more thorough discussion of Euro-Mediterranean relations, see Lia (1999a).


269 The Barcelona Declaration signed in November 1995 establishes a broad co-operative framework between the EU and the other states bordering on the Mediterranean, including a plan for establishing a Mediterranean free trade area by the year 2010.

270 The level of French economic and military aid to North Africa and Algeria in particular has been quite
Domestic terrorism and political violence have long been a problem in several Middle East countries, and it has frequently transformed itself into international terrorism. The contagion theory suggests that the level of terrorism in one country tends to affect the level of terrorism in neighbouring countries as well. Contagion of terrorism may increase in the future as a result of improved communication and transnational contacts. Our guess is therefore that increased European involvement in the MENA-region, including more direct support for the regimes as a result of developing energy relations, will sustain and in some cases increase the level of spill-over of international terrorism into Europe, compared to what we have seen during the 1990s.

6 THE DEMOGRAPHIC FACTOR

6.1 Has the Population Bomb Fizzled? The Security Dynamics of the Demographic Factor

A rapid population growth in the non-OECD-world will continue, albeit at a somewhat reduced rate. The population in the OECD world will grow older.

During the 20th century there has been a tremendous growth in the world’s population, rising from less than 2 billion people during the first quarter of the century to 4 billion in 1976, and finally reaching six billion at the end of the century. If current demographic trends continue, the world’s population will double to about 11 billion in the latter part of the 21st century. Population growth will take place almost exclusively in the developing world, shifting the geographic distribution of population and decreasing the share of people living in the industrialised part of the world. During the next century the demographic growth in the developing world will probably slow down, but the growth rate will remain high for the next few decades.

exceptional during the 1990s. For France the main security challenge in the Mediterranean is the volatile situation in Algeria where the dread scenario is an Islamist take-over, resulting in a mass exodus to France, a renewal of terrorist attacks on French soil, and major unrest among France’s 800,000 Algerians and four million Muslims. A deterioration of the Algerian situation would almost certainly affect France, which hosts some 200,000-350,000 illegal immigrants and which has experienced waves of terrorist attacks in retaliation against French economic and military support for the Algerian military regime. French military aid to the Algerian regime has reportedly included helicopters, night-sight equipment for aerial surveillance and other equipment needed for the Algerian regime’s counter-insurgency campaign. In addition, there has reportedly been extensive intelligence sharing between Algiers and Paris. Information about this co-operation is scarce, and much of French military assistance to Algeria is stated to be covert, although France has acknowledged the sale of some 9 Ecureuil helicopters to Algeria, ostensibly for “civilian purposes.” During much of the 1990s, France has granted some 6 billion francs annually (ca 800 mill USD) in development aid to Algeria. See Howorth (1996) and Fisk (1994).

271 There are few theoretical studies, however, explaining the relationship between domestic and international terrorism, other than empirical observations that they very often correlate.
The social and political consequences of population growth are complex and numerous and have long been an object of debate. Since the 1950s, one has feared that rapid population growth would create global problems of catastrophic dimensions. For example, in a booklet *The Population Bomb*, published in 1954, T.O. Greissimer wrote that “the population bomb threatens to create an explosion as disruptive and dangerous as an explosion of the atom bomb, and with as much influence on prospects for progress or disaster, war, and peace.”274

One argument was that “the stork has passed the plow,” as Paul Ehrlich put it.275 He predicted that widespread hunger and starvation would be the result of continued population growth, causing the death of hundreds of millions of people.276 This Malthusian line of thinking on population growth also informed the debate in the security policy community, but from another perspective. Many US government officials viewed “social unrest, communist insurgency, and guerrilla warfare in poor countries as the likely political product of ‘overpopulation’.”277 Environmental degradation and rapid depletion of non-renewable resources were another expected by-product of population growth.

Today, writers acknowledge that the “population bomb has fizzled,” largely because socio-technological revolutions have dramatically altered the relation between population growth and food supply.278 Firstly, the world’s population is growing more slowly than demographers in the 1960s had expected.279 Growth rates for the global population have declined steadily over the past two decades, from 2.2 per cent in 1980 to 1.7 per cent in 1992. This reduction is most marked in the developed world, but a number of third-world countries have greatly slowed their population growth in a very short time.280 Secondly, food production rose more sharply than experts had foreseen in the 1960s.281 Contrary to what demographers and population controllers warned, food production has not only far outstripped population growth, it has also taken place in those regions in which they least expected it to happen, in the developing world. Food prices have generally also fallen, and a UN study recorded a 38% reduction in prices on ‘basic foods’ during the 1980s.282

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278 Schaeffer refers to what he terms the “Sexual Revolution, which altered the relations between the sexes in the first world and in many third world countries, and thereby reduced birth rates considerably. The second revolution was the “Green Revolution,” which greatly increased food production through technological innovations. See Schaeffer (1997), pp. 222ff.
279 In the 1960s, for example the United Nations estimated the world’s population to exceed 7.5 billion at the end of the century i.e. 1.5 billion too high.
280 This reduction is not only a result of government sponsored family-planning programmes, but in some countries, like Brazil, also a result of self-induced birth-control. See Schaeffer (1997), p. 223f
281 In the period 1950-1990, food production rose even more sharply than population growth, increasing grain harvested per person by 40%. This enormous increase in food production has stunned historians, who have recorded “no increase in food production that was remotely comparable in scale, speed, spread and duration.” The most surprising is that the largest increases in food production are taking place in third-world countries, particularly in those regions which have the largest absolute increases of the population growth, that is in Asia. Schaeffer (1997), p. 225.
This is indeed good news for the future. Yet population growth is still a major concern. High population growth tends to occur in societies that can least afford it, those that are already resource scarce or that allocate resources in ways that favour some groups and deprive others. For example, Roger Smith predicts that “[g]iven the existing strains in such societies, rapid population growth will lead to increased scarcity, violence and possible genocide.”283 The social and political effects of rapid population growth are complex, however. One major effect is that population growth tends to be accompanied by even more rapid urbanisation, as the traditional rural society cannot employ the growing number of people. There has been an explosive urbanisation rate in the non-OECD world, and the growth of larger cities has been dramatic. The number of so-called “mega-cities,” cities with more than 10 million inhabitants, is likely to increase from 14 in the mid-1990s to 25 or more by 2015, with a clear majority in the developing world. In 2025, it is estimated that two thirds of the world’s population will live in cities as opposed to just over one third in 1975.284 In most third world cities social and economic problems are acute, and these developments have raised concern. The head of the Habitat II Conference Wally N’Dow has warned against the “explosive nature” of many of the world’s cities in which more than 600 million people are officially homeless or living under life-threatening conditions: “A low-grade civil war is fought every day in the world’s urban centres. Many cities are collapsing. We risk a complete breakdown in cities.”285

While rapid urbanisation in the developing world poses serious challenges for the future, urbanisation in the developed world will probably be far less problematic. The flexibility of the labour market, and developments in information technology may also slow down the process of urbanisation as cities need not be the physical centres of business. Yet the developed world may not entirely escape negative consequences of urbanisation processes. It has long been common wisdom that violent crime rates tend to be higher in urban environments than in rural areas. Buvinić and Morrison have argued that “population density” has an effect on the occurrence of violent crime, citing studies of crime in Latin America, where violent crime is strongly correlated with city size. Crowding “intensifies antisocial behaviour and facilitates anonymity and imitation of violent acts.”286

Another key effect of current rapid population growth is the tendency to produce a relatively large segment of young people in the population, and young people tend to figure most prominently in crime statistics. As Buvinić and Morrison have shown, violent crime tends to be associated with young people between the age of 18 and 24 who commit a significant portion of violent crimes and comprise the largest share of the victims of violence.287 These findings do not vary significantly across cultures. High population growth, then, tends to boost the segment of the population that is especially prone to violent crime. Indeed, global violence measured in homicide frequencies has been on the rise since the 1970, and according

to Buvinić and Morrison, the phenomenon of rising global violence is “best understood by examining key demographic realities that have set the stage for increased violence.”

There are, however, strong indications that the age groups at-risk in the population will decline markedly after 2000, except Africa, where the share of the 15-24 year age group is expected to rise in the next decade. Whether this decline will reduce the level of violent crime is uncertain for several reasons. Buvinić and Morrison demonstrate that although the share of young people has begun to decrease since the 1980s in the developed world after the peak in the early 1980s, homicide rates have not followed suit, highlighting “a key feature of aggressive behaviour: once it occurs, it tends to reoccur.”

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Annual population growth</th>
<th>Population below 15 years</th>
<th>Total fertility rate (children per woman)</th>
<th>Population (July 1998 estimates)</th>
<th>Life expectancy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Western Sahara</td>
<td>2,4%</td>
<td>no data</td>
<td>6,75</td>
<td>233,730</td>
<td>48,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>1,89 %</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>3,35</td>
<td>29 mio</td>
<td>68,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>2,14%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>3,38</td>
<td>30,5 mio</td>
<td>68,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>1,43%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>2,44</td>
<td>9,4 mio</td>
<td>73,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>3,68%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>6,1</td>
<td>5,7 mio</td>
<td>65,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>1,86%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>3,41</td>
<td>66 mio</td>
<td>62,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Bank</td>
<td>3,71%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>4,92</td>
<td>1,6 mio + 320,000³⁹⁰</td>
<td>72,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaza Strip</td>
<td>6,4%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>7,57</td>
<td>1,05 mio</td>
<td>72,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>2,54 %</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>4,79</td>
<td>4,4 mio</td>
<td>72,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>3,23%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>5,55</td>
<td>16,7 mio</td>
<td>67,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
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<td>30%</td>
<td>2,28</td>
<td>3,5 mio</td>
<td>70,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>1,91%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>2,71</td>
<td>5,6 mio</td>
<td>78,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1,6%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>2,47</td>
<td>64,6 mio</td>
<td>72,8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2 Demographic Statistics for North African and Middle Eastern States and Non-State Entities.

The population growth in the Middle East and North Africa is of particular interest to our study because of its proximity to Europe. As we shall see below, rapid population growth (and hence a large share of young people in the population), in combination with key social transformation processes, tend to reinforce the tendency towards political radicalism.

As we can see, the annual population growth ranges from 1,43% and 1,62% in Tunisia and Lebanon to 3,86% and 6,4% in Libya and the Gaza Strip respectively (see Table 2.3). It places significant strain on the education system, health care, and state sponsored social services.

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²⁸⁹ Buvinić and Morrison term this phenomenon “criminal inertia.” They also believe that “globalisation breeds violence,” because “globalisation has aggravated income inequalities throughout the world, spread a culture of violence through increased communication and media, and expanded trade in death industries such as firearms and drugs.” Buvinić and Morrison (2000), pp. 61, 63.
³⁹⁰ Number of Jewish settlers in the West Bank and East Jerusalem per July 1997.
welfare programmes, but even more so on the economy which is unable to absorb the swelling ranks of educated young people entering the labour market each year. The share of the population below the age of 15 varies from a moderate 30% and 32% in Tunisia and Lebanon to a staggering 46, 48 and 52% in Syrian, Libya and the Gaza Strip respectively (see Table 2.3).

As we have argued elsewhere, the rapid population growth, in combination with other ongoing social transformation processes, appears to radicalise political opposition movements in the MENA region. The dramatic expansion of education in recent decades has coincided with an unprecedented urbanisation, and together these social transformation processes have contributed to fostering a large class of educated and semi-educated youth. As a rule, they are less likely to be content with the low-paid manual jobs performed by their less educated parents. Structural unemployment tends to be very high, and there are long-term trends towards growing social inequality. Adding to these grievances, the young generation has been profoundly influenced by the consumerism of Western societies, not the least through the information revolution, which has provided Internet access, satellite dishes, and cable television to a growing number of people. The information revolution allows an increasing number of slum dwellers throughout the world to base their material aspirations on soap operas. Remy Leveau has argued that in the Arab world, the image of Western consumerism conveyed to young people through the media, “increases their frustration and stimulates their hostility towards state authorities that are accused of having confiscated the benefits of an independence derived from petroleum wealth.” The young generation is also sufficiently educated and literate to form political opinions. The combination of rapid population growth and expanding education is thus making “youth [...] the key group which forces states from the Nile valley to the Maghreb to modify the way they practise politics.” Young people are especially fertile recruiting ground for opposition movements. As opportunities of raising sufficient money for marriage and family before the age of 35 are dwindling, these bachelors living in a society with strongly enforced gender segregation, are prone to recklessness and risks. Not surprisingly, many of them appear to be willing to pay the high costs of confronting their own authoritarian regimes through underground political activism and armed revolution.

While high population growth rates sustain a large youth segment in the population, low population rates tends to produce an ageing population. If current demographic trends continue, the population of the developed world will age in the future. The share of young people in the developed world has already begun to decrease after a peak in the early 1980s. In some European countries, low birth rates actually produce negative population growth. But the implications of negative population growth in the industrialised world are difficult to pinpoint since the effects of a slow, steady decline in a complex industrial society are a totally

new experience. McRae for one suggests that an older society will be characterised by low tolerance for disorder and a correspondingly high tolerance for government intervention.297

In sum, current demographic trends point to a somewhat reduced population growth in the future in the developing world, albeit with a continued rapid urbanisation rate, and a predominantly young population. In the developed world, demographic trends show an ageing population. Moreover, we have seen that urbanisation and population growth tend to be associated with an increase in violent crime.

6.1.1 More Violence-Prone Youth in Volatile Mega-Cities, or an Ageing Population, Supportive of Law and Order?

Theories on terrorism are not fully developed when it comes to explaining the effects of demography, urbanisation, and violent crime rates. We have seen, however, that high levels of organised crime tend to be associated with terrorism. Moreover, the ecology of terrorism thesis asserts that urbanisation encourages terrorism. Warfare in urban areas often assumes the form of terrorism as guerrilla warfare tactics are much more difficult in an urban environment. Many therefore argue that increased urbanisation increases the likelihood of urban insurgency and will make the urban environment the prime scene of future warfare.298

We have also seen that demographic realities in Europe’s southern Mediterranean periphery, in combination with other social changes, have created an environment conducive to radical mobilisation.

Our guess is that the levels of terrorism in the developing world will increase as a result of demographic changes. The driving factors behind this trend are the combined effect of the growth of mega-cities, the persistence of national age pyramids highly skewed in favour of violent-prone youth, as well as rising levels of education, the information revolution, and growing social inequality providing incentives for radical mobilisation. In Europe’s southern periphery in particular, these trends are evident. Moreover, the demographic crisis is also exacerbated by autocratic forms of government. Hence, for the foreseeable future, radicalised youth will probably be a source of political unrest and political violence, directed primarily against the regime and its supporters. This is arguably already the case, and the potential for future spill-over of international terrorism as a result of internal conflicts in the South will not be reduced.

In the developed world, however, the long-term effect of demographic changes may well be the opposite, namely a reduction of the potential for political violence. As the population is set to become older, society will be characterised by a low tolerance for disorder and a correspondingly high tolerance for government intervention. It is probably safe to assume that an ageing population will be more docile, less violent-prone and more supportive of measures to uphold law and order than a predominantly young population. Radical groups will find fewer potential sympathisers and be more vulnerable to government repression. The end result may then be less terrorism in the developed world.

6.2 The Immigration Dilemma

The influx of asylum-seekers and immigrants – both legal and illegal – into European countries will continue in the future and significantly increase the size of the diaspora communities in Europe.

Historically, migration has been a major force behind demographic changes in a number of countries and regions. During the last century and in the early decades of this century, emigration from Europe significantly shifted the demographic set-up in other parts of the world. Patterns of migration have changed dramatically since World War II. According to one recent study on illegal immigration, there are “significant regional and unregulated movements of large populations within East Asia, into and through Eastern Europe, into and through South and Central America and up to North America.”299 Today’s migration patterns are admittedly complex and rapidly changing. Predictions about future migration patterns are therefore highly uncertain. McRae warns against overstating the impact of migration on economic and demographic developments in the third world. He believes that migration will only represent a marginal fraction of world population growth, and it will be “too small to have any real impact on the economic conditions in most of the developing world.” 300 Targets for migrating populations are more likely to be the traditional immigrant countries, such as the United States, Canada and Australia. In much of the newly developed world, McRae predicts, much of the migration will take place within rather than between countries or regions. 301

In Europe, migration patterns have long been characterised by substantial immigration of non-Europeans, altering the ethnic composition of most European countries. There are reasons to assume that these broad patterns of transnational migration are set to continue in the future although there will certainly be ebbs and flows and the exact set-up of the South-North migration axis will change from time to time. In recent years immigration restrictions in Europe have been tightened, but the pull and push factors that drive the immigration to Europe will most probably continue in the foreseeable future. As Margaret Beare has noted, the rate of migration has accelerated over the past decades, and more countries are being more affected by global migration patterns than before. 302 Phil Williams argues that most developing countries have a flow of both legal and illegal immigrants seeking to escape from poverty or repression or to obtain greater freedom and economic opportunities elsewhere. In other cases, war, ethnic cleansing, environmental degradation or political persecution are the driving factors for the exodus. 303

The driving force behind emigration from the third world has undoubtedly increased through the development of modern mass media and information technology. As a result of

300 McRae, p. 118.
301 McRae, p. 117f.
communication, increased travel and international business, differences between rich and poor or safe and unsafe societies, are far more ‘visible’ than before.\textsuperscript{304} In his book on the economic sociology of immigration, Alejandro Porte writes that “the fulfilment of normative consumption expectations imported from advanced countries becomes increasingly difficult under conditions of economic scarcity, while growing cross-national ties make it easier to seek solution through migration.”\textsuperscript{305} Beare has also observed that “[i]ncreasingly, as all forms of commodities cross borders […] people will also move – pulled by the hope of better opportunities or pushed by violence and deprivations.”\textsuperscript{306} It is a paradox, then, that while legal barriers to trade and investment abroad are falling, while corporations relocate around the world and seek out or abandon adverse labour and environmental conditions almost at their will, migration control is tightened. From the migrants’ point of view, it may seem as though everything and everyone can move except non-specialised labour.\textsuperscript{307}

Sociologists who study migration have noted that international labour migration largely originates at an intermediate level of development not at the lowest level. The very poor and the unemployed are not the first to migrate.\textsuperscript{308} This implies that future economic growth in the developing world will not necessarily reduce the push factors for emigration, instead, it may well increase the motivation for and the ability to migrate to a country with better economic prospects. As we have seen in a previous chapter, economic inequalities between rich and poor states have generally widened over the past decades, presenting an additional incentive for labour migration.

In Europe a number of new circumstances also appear to set the stage for increased migration. The historic changes in eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union involved not only unprecedented changes to borders and systems of sovereignty, but dramatically reduced some of the main obstacles to emigration from these countries. The introduction of the Schengen Agreement and the removal of internal border controls in the European Union may also unwittingly facilitate increased immigration rates into the European Union. Furthermore, the formation of sizeable European-based diaspora communities has created new cross-national ties and bonds of kinship, which in turn will facilitate further immigration. Finally, depending on the scale of refugee flows from armed conflicts, especially in Europe’s periphery, the pressure on European governments to open their borders to refugees and asylum-seekers will probably persist in the future.

In a Euro-Mediterranean context, the issue of immigration has been and continues to be the object of extensive debate and policy measures from both the European Union and individual member states. There is a general convergence towards a policy of reducing unwanted immigration. The immigration issue has strengthened the perception of proximity to the

\textsuperscript{304}\footnote{Beare (1997), p. 21.}
\textsuperscript{306}\footnote{Beare (1997), p. 16.}
\textsuperscript{307}\footnote{Beare (1997), p. 37.}
\textsuperscript{308}\footnote{Beare (1997), p. 20}
Maghreb. The stream of political and economic refugees to Europe has consolidated the belief that the problems of poverty and underdevelopment in Maghreb have become a European problem.\textsuperscript{309}

The European Union’s comprehensive approach to Mediterranean security, first and foremost through the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (the so-called Barcelona process), includes substantial economic and development aid to the Southern Mediterranean countries. It is based precisely on the belief that there is an urgent need to reduce the “push” factors that motivate migration, and that this can be done through external aid, liberalisation of trade relations and economic co-operation.\textsuperscript{310} There is a prevalent view that tighter immigration controls alone do not “deter determined would-be immigrants,” and that the only remedy lies in the European Union and others providing more development assistance to the South.\textsuperscript{311} As we have argued elsewhere, the effectiveness of these policies is highly uncertain and the push factors – the socio-economic and political crisis in the South – will most probably continue unabated.\textsuperscript{312}

There are a host of political and socio-economic implications arising with the immigration of non-European citizens to Europe, which cannot be dealt with in full scope here. We will focus on three possible long-term effects that are relevant to this study. First, the most obvious effect of current migration patterns is a slow, but gradual change in the ethnic composition of European growth, making most European cities more multicultural and multiethnic than before. Over the pasty thirty years, ethnic diaspora communities have increased in size, visibility, and impact.\textsuperscript{313} This presents new identity challenges. For one most European states experience a rise of radical rightwing and racist groups and movements that draw support due to a perceived identity crisis. As a result of growing immigrant communities, one has also witnessed the rise of new transnational and cross-national allegiances in a process described by Wong as “dettitiorialization of social identity.”\textsuperscript{314} In many ways, this challenges the nation state’s claim that exclusive citizenship is a defining focus of allegiance and fidelity. Wong suggests instead that “it is possible to have a ‘thin-but-strong’ citizenship.” Still, this would require a policy that recognised that the current models of assimilation and multiculturalism are waning and “are being replaced by transnationalism and diaspora.”\textsuperscript{315}

\textsuperscript{309} A European Commission report noted: “Most Mediterranean countries are facing political instability, rapid population growth, and large movement of population and high unemployment. These problems, especially in the case of the Maghreb countries are also our problems – such is their influence on the region’s security and the potential migratory pressure on the Community.” See Commission of the European Communities, \textit{From the Single Act to Maastricht: The Means to Match Our Ambitions, COM (92) 2000 final} Brussels, 11 February 1992, p. 17, quoted in Aghrout and Alexander (1997), p. 310.

\textsuperscript{310} Aghrout and Alexander (1997), p. 313.

\textsuperscript{311} Winrow (1996), p. 51.

\textsuperscript{312} See Lia (1999b), p. 47ff. For a more general overview of Euro-Mediterranean security challenges, see Lia (1999a).

\textsuperscript{313} Nichiporuk (2000), p. xiv.

\textsuperscript{314} Wong (1999).

\textsuperscript{315} Wong (1999).
Aside from the much touted identity ‘problematique,’ immigration from non-European and third-world countries has also raised the more mundane question of whether European welfare states are able to provide sufficient social security and welfare for growing immigrant populations.\(^{316}\) The fear has been that the formation of a new social underclass, composed primarily of recent immigrant populations, may be a recipe for social and political unrest.

Another and more ominous effect of today’s immigration pattern comes in the wake of tightened regulations. Strict immigration regulations pave the way for sophisticated transnational crime groups, which profit from the illicit immigrant commodity. Because government immigration policies limit legal immigration, there is significant profit in the smuggling of humans.\(^{317}\) Illegal businesses, arising in connection with illegal immigration and human smuggling to Europe have already become a major source of income for a number of transnational organised criminal networks.\(^{318}\) Illegal immigration to European countries has therefore long figured as a prominent issue on the European security agenda, and illegal immigration from the southern Mediterranean is regarded as “one of the most direct security challenges to Europe.”\(^{319}\) France, for instance, already hosts some 200,000-350,000 illegal immigrants, and there are large numbers of illegal immigrants throughout most of Europe.\(^{320}\) The dilemma is that more restriction on immigration will only raise the stakes and hence the profits for criminal enterprises specialising in human commodity trafficking.

6.2.1 More Racial Violence, More Lucrative Human Trafficking and a More Restive Diaspora?

Theoretical studies on terrorism have hardly touched upon the issue of transnational migration. We do know, however, that transnational organised crime and terrorism tend to be associated with and mutually reinforce one another. A side effect of illegal immigration is that it clearly encourages transnational organised criminal networks, specialising in human trade and smuggling. This may suggests that the growth in illegal immigration may further encourage terrorism in Europe.

Studies of European terrorism indicate that social inequality tends to foster domestic ideological terrorism and that coinciding social inequalities and ethnic differences tend to further encourage internal conflicts. Thus, much depends upon whether the growing immigrant community becomes economically and socially integrated in European economies or remains a socially and politically excluded underclass. Some empirical studies also suggest a link between immigration and the occurrence of international terrorism in Europe.\(^{321}\) As

\(^{318}\) Beare (1997).
\(^{320}\) Howorth (1996).
\(^{321}\) Gerald Steinberg for example, asserts that there is a direct link between political and social instability in the South and an increased level of terrorism in Europe. He argues that “the level of terrorism in Europe has been increasing, in large part due to the spill-over effects of domestic political and social instability in North Africa and the Middle East.” Steinberg (1996).
George Joffé has suggested, there have been several sources of international terrorism in Europe, emanating from the Middle East and North Africa-region, the Palestinian-Israeli peace process, the struggle between Arab regimes and Islamist opposition groups in North Africa, and finally, the Kurdish conflict.\footnote{Joffé in Aliboni (1996).} As the diaspora communities in Europe most probably will continue to absorb new immigrants in the future, the links between the diaspora communities and these conflict areas will persist. As Nichiporuk has noted, the growing web of information, communication, and mass media links as well as the expansion of global banking networks, increase opportunities for globally dispersed ethnic diasporas to play a key role in military campaigns involving their home countries or territory.\footnote{Nichiporuk (2000), p. xv.} There will certainly be cases where rival diasporas themselves will engage in violent conflict in their host countries in order to advance the causes of their respective home states or communities. The political violence in Germany as a result of the Kurdish-Turkish conflict is a case in point. Our guess is that radical insurgent groups will continue to find sources of funding, material and political support in the diaspora communities, yet there is no obvious reason why European diaspora communities themselves should become more involved in terrorism and political violence in Europe than is already the case. To an insurgent group, a large European-based diaspora community, sympathetic to their cause, is a most valuable asset, providing crucial political and material support. Terrorist acts in Europe itself would only put this essential support in jeopardy.

Theories on terrorism suggest that ethnically diverse countries may be more susceptible to domestic terrorism than homogenous countries. The growth of the immigrant communities may therefore be a potential future source of political violence. Most likely, a dialectic relationship between will develop racist rightwing violence and political violence by radical Islamists from the diaspora communities. For example, the occurrence of terrorist acts by radical Islamist groups in Europe, first and foremost in France during the latter half of 1995, had a negative impact on civil liberties of North African and Middle Eastern immigrants in Europe. Laws on combating terrorism passed in Britain and more recently in France have come under heavy criticism.\footnote{According to a report published by the International Federation of Rights of Man in January 1999, French police have frequently resorted to mass round-ups and vague charges against suspected Islamic militants. In some cases people charged with minor offences have been held without bail for as long as five years. In one case where more than 200 people had been rounded up in 1994-95 and charged with activities involving aid to Algerian insurrectionists, the majority of them were formally charged only in 1998. See “Rough Justice” by Robert Swan in Middle East International No 592 (29 January 1999), p. 16. See also reports on racism against Muslims by the British police in Al-Sharg al-Awsat (28 February 1999), p. 1.} At the same time, partly as a result of immigration, rightwing extremist and racist groups in Europe have in some areas managed to rally significant popular support. There have also been many occurrences of severe public disorder in Western European cities over immigration issues.\footnote{See for example “Nørrebrox i flammer” in Aftenposten (17 August 1997).} Although it is highly unlikely that this will enhance the possibilities for large-scale ethnic strife in West-European societies, immigration and its socio-political consequences are likely to remain a source of both domestic and international terrorism in Europe.
7 IDEOLOGICAL SHIFTS

7.1 Towards a Diffuse and Rapidly Changing Ideological Landscape

The future ideological landscape will become less uniform and will change more rapidly than before.

Recent decades have witnessed significant ideological changes, a process which started before the collapse of the Soviet Union. The era of dominant ideologies and a clear-cut left-right axis in politics was gradually overtaken by the rise of new political movements that defied traditional categorisation. Ideologies based on the traditional division of labour and capital no longer commanded the same respect. On the ruins of Communism, Fukuyama proclaimed *The End of History* in 1993, pointing to the victory of the Western liberal capitalist model as the only viable way to development.

For the future, the disappearance of a global challenger or counter-core to the United States and the capitalist Western world is unlikely to be supplanted by a new counter-core as we already have seen in Chapter 3.1. Yet a dominant force in world politics, such as the United States and its sponsorship of global capitalism is almost certain to provoke counter-responses in one form or another. The rise of the ideology of Islamism (or “Islamic fundamentalism”) has often been interpreted partly as a response to a Western dominated paradigm that represented imported, not indigenous values.\(^{326}\) The rise of extremist nationalist parties and religious fundamentalist ideologies in various parts of the world may be seen not only as a result of material and political disaffection by identifiable political issues. They are also more broadly a response to a cosmopolitan and alien culture, a vulgar McDonaldism, out of touch with local identities and idiosyncrasies.

The post-Cold War era has thus seen a drying up of financial support from Communist regimes to revolutionary leftist terrorist groups. The collapse of Communism led to a weakening of those ideological trends that imbued radical revolutionaries with a sense of mission and a belief in the historical inevitability of victory in their struggle. The waning of Maoist and Marxist revolutionary thinking also contributed to undermining the ideological framework for urban guerrilla warfare and terrorist action.

While these ideological changes undermined feared socio-revolutionary terrorist groups, they have had less effect upon the ethnic separatist groups whose raison d’être has been less affected by the collapse of Communism. Although the rise of new global insurgency ideologies, similar to Maoist and Leninist Marxism, appear less likely, violent and extremist

\(^{326}\) See for example Fuller and Lesser (1995).
ideologies will nevertheless continue to flourish. Radical ideologies will most likely proliferate in various mutations even more widely than earlier, aided by the new media of communication. Yet no single ideology will be able to capture an entire generation like Marxism in its Maoist version was able to. Instead, we will continue to see the mushrooming of extremist ideas and “para-ideologies,” borrowing ideas and ideological substance from a wide variety of sources, including the growing range of new religions.

The information revolution itself will certainly provide further impetus to the mushrooming of new and new-old ideological substance. John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, and Michele Zanini, writing on information-age activism and organisational patterns of non-state groups, believe that there is a new generation of radicals and activists who are just beginning to create “information-age-ideologies.” They predict a shift of identities and loyalties from the nation-state to the transnational level of global civil society. While new ideologies may provide a framework for the rise of for example “anarchistic and nihilistic leagues of computer-hacking ‘cyboteurs’,” future ideologies and organisational patterns of radicals in a network society are likely to be diffuse and rapidly changing and “odd hybrids and symbioses are likely.”

Processes of fragmentation and syncretism will be the rule and in the landscape of extremist thinking. It will be harder to distinguish theology from politics, and ideological terrorism from economic crime and warlordism. Ideologies will not only be harder to use as a predictive model for terrorist actions. They may become harder to identify in the first place as they rise out of a flood of syncretism of whatever is available in the ideological Internet bazaar. And they will mutate and reconfigure more quickly than before.

7.1.1 From Ideological Terrorism to Individual Single Issue Extremism

If our predictions above are correct we will witness a continuous decline of ideological socio-revolutionary terrorism. In the fluid landscape of new and competing ideological undercurrents, single issue terrorism may rise in more dramatic forms than we have seen so far. The age of terrorism, especially in its Maoist and Marxist form may then be over. Instead, we will see the rise of third-world warlordism in the developing world, feeding itself on the expanding scope of transnational networks of illicit trade. In the developed world, however, a rise of various forms of extremist violence, which will be directed less against the state partly as a result the decline of the state as the single prime actor in international politics. The prime target of terrorism will then perhaps shift more decisively towards a host of other potential targets, such as minorities, refugees, business, transnational corporations, symbols of the traditional religions, other rival gangs and others. Alliances and patterns of co-operations between extremist groups will be unpredictable and surprising. Empirical observations that for example animal rights defenders have occasionally found a common cause with rightwing extremists and that Islamist insurgents in the Middle East have linked up with avowedly racist

groups in Europe point to an ideological landscape with unpredictable alliances and rapid change.

7.2 “Where do All Those ‘Waco’ People Come From?”

The number and strength of “counter cultures,” in particular religious movements and cults, will continue to grow. New movements will rise and spread more quickly than before.

In the fluid landscape of ideological syncretism and fragmentation of established beliefs, counter cultures appear to have found a particular fertile ground. A counter culture can be defined as a cluster of ideological or religious movements, organisations and interest groups loosely organised around a set of basic tenets and slogans in opposition to the established order. For counter cultures the increasingly evident social side effects of informational capitalism – “inequality, poverty, misery and social exclusion” – may serve as the major object of protest. More often, however, counter cultural religious movements rise in response to a rapidly changing socio-cultural environment in order to recreate social cohesion and moral authority at a time when established norms and traditions are being challenged and displaced.

Counter cultures may also be a product of the globalisation process itself. The rise of counter cultures is perhaps one of the most manifest examples of the dialectic interaction between people and technology, producing social and cultural responses to change. Ideas and ideologies are constantly being produced and reproduced in the informational society in which the very speed of transnational communication and diffusion of knowledge creates a wholly new situation of fluidity and uncertainty. The rapidity of change produces social anomic and the future virtualisation of society is expected to blur established perceptions of reality and fiction. Further informationalisation of society may produce unforeseen and at times dramatic socio-cultural responses.

Such social and cultural counter responses to globalisation will most likely find its most manifest expressions in the rise of transnational counter cultures with a global outreach, but focused around specific causes and grievances. There will hardly be any basis for one dominant global counter-ideology opposing the Western liberal paradigm. The absence of a hegemonic counter-core capable of challenging the economic and military supremacy of the United States makes the rise of a new and truly global counter-ideology highly unlikely. Islamic fundamentalism has frequently been touted as the most likely candidate for assuming the vacant throne of Communism, but such a development is improbable. Instead, ideological undercurrents opposing globalisation and Western hegemony in world politics are more likely to find their expression in fluid and rapidly changing transnational counter cultures, and they will probably become even more diverse and manifold than today.

331 We have discussed this in more detail elsewhere, see Lia (1998b).
What is particularly relevant for this study is the rise of those counter-cultural responses, which tend to assume violent forms. In this respect, counter-cultural religious movements such as millenarian and apocalyptic movements and sects stand out as particularly unpredictable actors. Doomsday cults are nothing new, however, and for the foreseeable future “perhaps the majority [of the world’s population] will continue as almost exclusive adherents and practitioners of the traditional systemic forms [of religion].” Still, during the past decades one has witnessed a number of increasingly violent doomsday sects, inflicting mass violence on themselves and in rare cases also on outsiders. According to Camire and Hanchette the number of pseudo-religious extremist “patriot” groups and millenium sects has grown over the past years. Michael Barkun observes that “millenarian movements have grown in contemporary America as a hotbed.” This has astonished social scientists. Hall and Schuyler in their study of the Solar Temple Order in Switzerland pointed to the anomaly that “today’s affluent mostly post-Catholic society of francophone Europe hardly seems to be a place where religious anxieties could take hold, especially among people like those associated with the Solar Temple.”

In his book *Religion and Globalization*, Peter Beyer argues that “modernity and globality do not result in the disappearance of religion either in terms of importance for the conduct of social life or in terms of visibility on the social landscape.” Instead, the question is whether “the globalized context means the gradual erosion of the religious system as system to be replaced by a highly diverse ecology of religious culture.” Beyer hints that in the future, “the market economy model of religion” in which “people ‘consume’ what they want from various religious producers” will become more prevalent.

Manuel Castells considers the paradox that the extraordinary rise of the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo, popularity of the US Anti-Federal Militias and the remarkable growth of radical Islamic fundamentalism over the past decades have occurred at a time when modernisation has spread further and deeper than ever before in history. The emergence of religious counter cultures cannot be understood within a traditional development paradigm, which presupposes the disappearance of primordial social formations and the gradual displacement of religion. Even if traditional religious practises may have receded on a global scale, other and reformulated forms of religious practises have supplanted traditional religion.

In an attempt to predict the future evolution of religious practises, Felipe Fernández-Armesto argues that “we can expect millenarianism to continue after 2000.” One reason for this is that very few millenarian groups have attached special significance to the date 2000.

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333 Camire and Hanchette (1997).
335 Hall and Schuyler (1997).
Furthermore, Fernández-Armesto observes that in the West, the number of adherents to religions was at a low point in the 1960s, and the number of respondents to surveys who identify themselves as religious has “been increasing ever since.” At the same time, religious revival has been much stronger outside the mainstream churches than within them. According to Fernández-Armesto, the explosion of “new religions” all over the world since 1960, and the multiplication of numbers of faithful in traditional communions in Asia and Africa has been too swift to monitor accurately.

The example of Aum Shinrikyo is telling. The movement came into being as part of the second wave of new religions, the so-called “New New Religions,” challenging established forms of religious practices in Japan. Participation in organised religion since WWII in Japan had declined, while the needs for religiosity and spirituality evidently increased. The New New Religions often appealed to the newly educated and more well-to-do classes and “to the more spiritual and mystical desires of financially secure people.” Sociological explanations of how a movement like Aum could attract so many followers focus on factors like the control-oriented and socially conformist society. Daniel Metraux has argued that “the restrictive education and the prospect of an equally boring and restrictive career in industry makes Aum’s leader Asahara’s false promises of scientific freedom sound appealing.” He noted that “Aum was well-placed to attract a younger Japanese whose quest for meaning in their lives proved to be more important than a successful carrier.”

### 7.2.1 The Proliferation of Religious Extremism Will Increase the Prospects of Mass-Casualty Terrorism

A significant theoretical school in the study of terrorism points to the role of ideas and ideology in motivating and shaping terrorist organisations. The basic argument is that “ideas have consequences” and that “the best way of tracing the origin of terrorism is through examination of terrorists’ attitudes and convictions.” While we have no well-established theories on the causes of the rise of religious terrorism, there are strong indications that religious extremism in various forms will continue to grow and proliferate. The improvements in communication technology and information dissemination suggest that religious extremist ideas and beliefs will arise and proliferate more quickly in the future, creating a more fluid landscape of competing ideologies and belief systems.

A number of empirical studies suggest that religious terrorism is more than any other form of terrorism associated with mass casualty attacks. Bruce Hoffman, Walter Laqueur and a number of others have argued that religious terrorism occurs in the absence of clear-cut political motivations, while a more intangible desire for revenge or apocalyptic visions of

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345 Kegley (1990), p. 104. Paul Wilkinson is a typical proponent of this school.
triggering the long awaited doomsday are the driving forces behind these groups.\textsuperscript{346} Such motivations, in turn, contribute to lowering the threshold for inflicting mass casualties. Another argument suggests that the traditional distinction between terrorists and their constituencies does not really exist when it comes to religious terrorism. While traditional leftwing or ethnic terrorism carried out attacks to communicate with the government, appeal to their constituency, and affect their respective constituency’s relationship with the authorities, this may not be so with religiously inspired terrorism. The self-imposed restriction on violence may therefore not exist. Religious terrorists with their self-styled clerics, scriptures and rituals are their own constituency, and as long as the act is sanctioned religiously by a spiritual authority, the opinion of the world outside may not matter at all.

Whether the rise of religiously motivated terrorism represents such a dramatic shift, remains to be seen. Some of the most spectacular terrorist acts this decade, such as the Tokyo subway sarin attack by the Aum Shinrikyo sect, the White supremacist bombing of the Federal Building in Oklahoma City, and the attempt to topple the World Trade Centre in 1993 by a radical Islamist group may suggest this. There has also been a proliferation of suicide terrorism in the 1990s, one of the prime characteristics of religious terrorism.\textsuperscript{347} If this trend proves to be more permanent, it is cause for concern, particularly because, as Falkenrath has noted, there are clear indications that “an expanding range of groups [...] are NBC-capable.”\textsuperscript{348}

Given the lethality of religious forms of terrorism, the growth of counter cultural religious movements, especially in the form of millenarian and apocalyptic groups, suggest that one may expect a rise in this kind of rare, but extremely lethal form of civil violence.

8 OUR TECHNOLOGICAL FUTURE

The theoretical underpinnings of the interaction between technology and terrorism are not particularly well developed. Studies of the relationship between terrorism and the evolution of technology usually paint a picture of terrorists as pragmatic or even conservative in their choice of weaponry and technology. Terrorists are “seldom ‘techno-enthusiasts’ – capable of innovation but not driven by it.”\textsuperscript{349} Although technological developments provide new and more efficient means and weapons to terrorist groups, their willingness to use new weapons and tools should not be taken for granted. Terrorism is more often than not a political communication strategy, “a theatre,” in which attacks are choreographed to effect maximum

\textsuperscript{346} Hoffman (1998) and Laqueur (1998).
\textsuperscript{347} Gunaratna argues that while suicide terrorism traditionally has been viewed as a problem affecting the Middle East and South Asia, the threat posed by suicide terrorism is spreading. In the 1980s suicide terrorism was witnessed in Lebanon, Kuwait, and Sri Lanka. In the 1990s it had spread to Israel, India, Panama, Algeria, Pakistan, Argentina, Croatia, Turkey, Tanzania, and Kenya. According to Gunaratna, ten religious and secular groups are currently capable of using suicide terrorism as a tactics. These include Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, the Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA), the Egyptian Gamaa Islamiya, Barbar Khalsa International of India, the Tamil-based LTTE, the Kurdish PKK, and the Islamic transnational movement of al-Qa’ida. See Gunaratna (2000), p. 52ff.
\textsuperscript{348} Falkenrath (1998), p. 56.
\textsuperscript{349} Hirst (1998), p. 111.
psychological effect on various audiences. It differs fundamentally from military operations, designed to effect maximum physical damage against strategic material targets and personnel. Against this background, terrorist groups may not necessarily resort to new and more sophisticated technology as long as terror attacks that use tried and true conventional low technology still make headlines. However, the relatively recent emergence of new terrorist groups seeking to inflict mass casualty attacks, may make the issue of technology far more relevant for the study of terrorism, than has been the case in previous decades. Finally, the relationship between technology and terrorism is very much a dialectical one. It is acknowledged that technological developments can increase the counter-terrorist capabilities of states significantly. Only by making sense of the myriad of trends and possible causalities, some dispassionate predictions can be made.

8.1 “Will They Blow Up the Power Grids?”

Critical infrastructure primarily in the OECD-world will increasingly become reliant on operative computers and information technology.

Most of the states in the OECD-world may be characterised as interconnected network societies dependent on information technology for communication, production and services. Outside the OECD-world the information technology has not transformed societies to the same extent. Societies in the developed world, however, are becoming increasingly dependent on a wide range of information systems. Infrastructure facilities, such as telecommunication, energy production and supply systems, air, rail and road transportation, banking and financial services, water supply etc are already heavily interconnected and based on interdependent information systems, which are frequently linked directly or indirectly to the Internet. Advanced information technology is used on the battlefield, in military operations and in sustaining critical military infrastructure. Increasingly, due to the expansion of electronic interconnectedness, even highly sensitive military information systems and networks of communication are becoming dependent upon civilian infrastructure. Information technology and Internet-based services are also making inroads into more and more aspects of daily life. The growth in Internet-based services and products as well as services and commodities sold over the Internet has been impressive, primarily because of the cost-effectiveness of interconnected information systems. It seems highly unlikely that the current trend towards more and more reliance on information systems to run critical infrastructure will be reversed.

The societal consequences of the introduction of information technology are complex and can hardly be dealt with in full depth here. One key aspect is that since vital information systems are increasingly becoming interconnected, the complexities of the entire web of information systems are growing so fast that control and security agencies are increasingly unable to assess the consequences of possible system failures. The possible consequences of a breakdown in one part of the system have become much harder to predict and assess. There is

accumulating evidence that the growing reliance on information technology and the interconnectedness and complexities of modern information systems make modern societies extremely vulnerable, if vital information systems and their supporting infrastructure should fail. The vulnerability of these systems is further increased, by the growing concentration of support systems. The logic of the market dictates increased interconnectedness of vital support systems and resource, including a growing reliance on the Internet. In some sectors, such as telecommunication, recent empirical studies have demonstrated that commercial demands for access and profitability are given priority over security.351

There is a growing awareness of the inherent vulnerabilities, stemming from the introduction of information technology in all spheres of life. These fears have been exacerbated by reports of high-profile cyber crime incidents and the hacking into sensitive information systems. The spread of very damaging computer viruses, such as Melissa, Chernobyl and ILOVEYOU has given additional weight to the argument of the new dangers of the information era.352 There is a growing body of literature on emerging threats to national security emanating from the revolution in information technologies. Much of this literature presents a rather alarmist vision of the future information threat, warning against an imminent “electronic Pearl Harbour” or “an electronic Waterloo.”353 For example, one security consultant quoted in a recent edition of Counterterrorism and Security Report stated that “these new technologies are not hard to come by, [and] could cause something like the extinction of humankind within the next two generations.”354 These threats have long figured prominently on the agenda of the United States. For example, President Clinton placed cyber threats against critical infrastructure on par with biological and chemical threats in his January 1999 remarks on American security in the 21st century.355 “Information security” is not only increasingly seen as a growing national security challenge, but also as an international security concern, warranting multilateral co-operation.356 Russia has already become a proponent of concerted international action to face the growing information threat, calling for a new international legal regime on information security within a UN framework.357 Due to the vested interests of business and governments alike to secure the modern information highways, one may safely

351 For a recent and widely acknowledged study of vulnerabilities and security risks in the Norwegian telecommunication network, see Hagen and Nystuen (1999). Although other countries have paid more attention to the information threats, their conclusions appear to be valid for a number of Western European countries.
355 International Institute of Strategic Studies (1998). Walter Laqueur has also joined this chorus, arguing that “if the new terrorism directs its energies towards information warfare, its destructive power will be exponentially greater than any it wielded in the past – greater even than it would be with biological and chemical weapons.” Laqueur (1996), p. 35.
356 See for example Valeri (2000).
357 According to Andrei Krutskikh, head of the Department of Security and Disarmament in Russia’s MFA, “the interconnectedness of the world information space” and the growing threats to vital information systems makes the problem of information security as topical as other global problems, such as non-proliferation and liquidation of weapons of mass destruction. Krutskikh therefore calls for “regulat[ing] the world-wide processes in civilian and military informatization and to create a concerted international platform of information security,” echoing earlier Russian efforts to initiate a new international legal regime on information security within a UN framework. Krutskikh (1999), p. 34.
assume that further steps to deal with these challenges will be taken in the future, both on national and multilateral levels.

8.1.1 Why Terrorist Groups May or May Not Shift to Infrastructure Warfare

As we have seen the ecology of terrorism-thesis argues that modern terrorism occurs partly because modern circumstances make terrorist methods exceptional easy. Significant technological developments, associated with modernisation, such as the rise and expansion of modern transportation and communications as well as modern mass media are seen as important, at least for the types and patterns of terrorist acts, though not as a motivation for employing terrorism in the first place. Furthermore, the contagion-theory of terrorism points out that an increased transnational flow of information, and the symbiotic relationship between modern mass media and terrorism, may further terrorism. Hence, the occurrence of terrorism in one country often leads directly or indirectly to more terrorism in other countries. In line with these two theories, we may suggest some preliminary effects of the growing reliance on IT-based systems for communication, production and services.

Information technology systems may be seen as part of the new “ecology of terrorism,” providing new opportunities, targets, audiences and anonymity. As Hirst has noted, “the historical interfaces between technology and terrorism may be set to change as society itself becomes increasingly reliant on technology in every sector,” thus “technology will itself become a target for terrorism.”

Empirical studies show, however, that reported attacks mainly consist of penetration of computer files, spreading of viruses on networks, and sabotage of web sites and so on. So far, there have been no serious cyber terrorist attacks reported, satisfying a meaningful definition of the term. True, various protest groups, radical Islamist organisations and rightwing extremists are known to have made use of the Internet for communication, recruitment and propaganda purposes. Yet this hardly qualifies as terrorism, as it does not involve the direct use of the Internet or information systems to perform acts of terrorism.

One of the foremost experts on cyberterrorism in the United States, Dorothy Denning, for example, defines cyber terrorism as “the use of hacking tools and techniques to inflict grave harms such as loss of life” and she finds that “there has been no reported incidents that meet the criteria.”

One often quoted example is a Tamil guerrilla organisation’s (the Tamil Tigers) information attack on the Embassy of Sri Lanka, inundating it with thousands of e-mails in a so-called denial of service attack, as well as hacking into the government’s web site and changing it. This attack has even been termed “the first known terrorist attack towards a

359 See for example Whine (1999) and Damphouse and Smith (1998).
360 Denning (2000), p. 19. A definition used by the FBI is the following: “cyberterrorism is the premeditated, politically motivated attack against information, computer systems, computer programs, and data which results in violence against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents.” See Denning (1999), p. 69.
country’s computer systems” in several newspapers. Still, it can hardly be described as an act of terrorism in the academic understanding of the word. Radical and extremist groups on the Internet are not always allowed to roam there freely and web pages are regularly shut down. Furthermore, a host of what Damphouse and Smith have called ‘citizen counter-terrorists’ or ‘watchdogs’ have emerged on the Internet. These keep track of the activities of radical and extremist groups on the WWW and publicise information on them, in an effort to counter their activities.

Based on past experience, it is hard to see why information threats should be placed on par with conventional war and weapons of mass destruction. The threat of cyber terrorism has hence been constructed mainly on perceived vulnerabilities, rather than past experiences. The ecology of terrorism does not predicate that terrorist groups necessarily will exploit available technologies and opportunities. As already observed, terrorist groups tend to be conservative in their choice of weapons. As we have documented elsewhere, civil infrastructure has seldom been a preferred target for political terrorists, and that those terrorist attacks which affect civilian infrastructure, were primarily meant to target people, not the infrastructure itself. In civil wars, however, insurgents and guerrilla movements have often targeted domestic civilian infrastructure. If anything can be learnt from the past, it is that regimes, facing militarily strong guerrilla movements are more likely to suffer from infrastructure attacks than states facing political terrorists.

There is admittedly much uncertainty regarding the consequences of the expansion of information technology to all spheres of life. The growing interdependence of information systems suggests that co-ordinated attacks on information infrastructure may have unforeseen and large scale cascading effects, with a paralysing effect on society. Or as August Bequai warned already in 1987 “a disruption in any one of its critical units could cause domino-effect failures in other interdependent-units.” Furthermore, according to the contagion theory, successful terrorist attacks tend to be emulated quickly. The absence of serious cyber terrorist attacks today may well come to a sudden end, if a dramatic and skillfully choreographed cyber terrorist attack succeeds and makes it to the headlines of the global media. As a result, cyber terrorism may then become a much more popular method of struggle for terrorist groups. Another and quite possible development is that the recent surge in ‘ecotage’ – sabotage attacks by various single issue groups, especially environmentalists and radical animal rights groups – will trigger a development towards ‘eco-cybotage’ (i.e. physical or digital sabotage attacks against information systems, motivated by various eco-environmentalist concerns).

365 One example of eco-cybotage may be physical or digital sabotage attacks against information systems, which control power supplies to a power plant under construction, an oil refinery, or a butchery. For the growing militancy of eco-environmental groups, see for example Dr G Davidson (Tim) Smith (1998) “Single Issue
Another major uncertainty is that while much attention is devoted to a possible terrorist threat against the Internet, a host of other actors may well be more likely to take advantage of new opportunities for information disruption than political terrorists. These may include insiders or disgruntled employees, leisure-time hackers, criminal networks and the intelligence services of enemy states. An analysis of possible future capabilities and motivations of these actors is outside the scope of this study, however.

As suggested above, considerable attention is currently devoted to containing the perceived information threat. One may therefore expect that vulnerabilities arising from growing dependence upon information systems will be met by a wide range of counter measures from business, industry, states and within international institutions to contain the information threat. History has often demonstrated that technological innovations have only been revolutionary within a dialectic framework of human decisions and interaction. The alarmist vision – while useful in order to mobilise opinion and political will to face the information challenge threat – may thus serve to invalidate itself through the development it has already set in motion.

In sum, although critical infrastructure will increasingly rely on information technology, there are no clear-cut systemic factors pointing towards large-scale terrorist and sabotage attacks against these targets. In the (perhaps unlikely) event of a successful and spectacular cyber terrorist attack, the rise of such attacks could be sharp, however.

8.1.2 Terrorism and More Competitive and Diversified Mass Media

An already obvious trend in the digital revolution is the evolution of electronic media towards greater diversification and flexibility. We may expect that in the future, mass information production will become far more advanced and diversified than today. New communication solutions are developing, which can be tailored to fit individual consumers’ special interests and preferences. The spread of more and more sophisticated forms of interactive media has already begun to challenge traditional concepts of news and mass media.

The revolution in news and mass media production is revolutionary and will most probably affect in one way or another the interaction between electronic mass media and terrorism. The symbiotic relationship between terrorism and media has long been a core element in the understanding of terrorism. The surge of international terrorism in the late 1960s is widely believed to be connected to the media revolution, taking place at that time, which for the first
time in history made live reporting possible, transmitting scenes of hijacking directly from the scene to a global audience.\textsuperscript{367}

At that time modern electronic mass media was at its infancy extremely uniform and commanded extraordinary attention among the public. Instead, the digital revolution, offers a multitude of solutions tailored to the specific information and communication needs of the individual.\textsuperscript{368} In their futuristic analysis of media evolution, Paddy Barwise and Kathy Hammond predict that technology will increasingly allow consumers to ask for the information they want. They claim that “[t]his potential shift from a model where producers ‘push’ information out to the public to one where consumers ‘pull’ only what they want, when they want it, applies to all media including television.”\textsuperscript{369} News will then become more and more a commodity which is searched for and purchased alongside other commodities and services, rather than something which is controlled by a few national news agencies and transmitted uniformly to the masses. Even the technology to produce ‘digitalized paper’ may soon be available on the market, further undermining the notion of a newspaper as a standardised and mass-produced item.\textsuperscript{370} One consequence of the digital revolution is a growing fragmentation of the news market, and subsequent lower potential for capturing the attention of a global audience, through acts of violence. Undoubtedly, spectacular acts of violence will also hit the headlines of digital newspapers and networks. Yet the question is if information and news production becomes far more tailored and consumer oriented, will the news agencies still keep up their coverage of acts of political violence and terrorism? If not, one may expect that terrorist groups will resort to more lethal and more spectacular attacks in order to capture an inattentive public. On the other hand, depending on the circumstances, an alternative outcome is also possible. Terrorism as a method of struggle may become less attractive for insurgent groups, because of its ineffectiveness in attracting international attention and setting agendas. Some anecdotal evidence suggests that the former is the case. The proportion of terrorist incidents with fatalities is growing, albeit slowly, and large-scale indiscriminate violence has become more common, a trend which is ascribed to the hardened battle for proper media attention. Martha Crenshaw argues for example “the need for international recognition encourages […] more destructive and spectacular violence. As the audience grows larger, more diverse, and more accustomed to terrorism, terrorists must go to extreme lengths to shock.”\textsuperscript{371} It is quite possible that this may also be the case in the future digital age.

8.2 The Terrorist – Counter-Terrorist Technological Balance Sheet

Rapid advances in information, communication and sensor technology will produce far more powerful instruments for surveillance and monitoring of people in the future.

The proliferation of more powerful weapons and effective equipment for low intensity warfare to non-state actors will continue.

8.2.1 Towards a Neo-Orwellian State …

One of the most basic issues in history is the way technological innovations have shaped human interaction, production systems and the relationship between rulers and subjects. If generalisation on the history of man is at all possible, it must be that technological developments more often than not have served to create powerful instruments of coercion and control, available to a ruler in order to exercise control over a population, not to enhance the power of the individual vis-à-vis the state.

Technological innovations have played a fundamental role in paving the way for the centralised state, by enhancing its control of violence and by improving its ability to extract resources from the subject population. The entire process of modern state building depended on technological innovations, which dramatically increased the power of the state vis-à-vis the individual. In this light, the brutality of penalties of pre-modern societies has often been explained by the rulers’ inability to supervise and monitor people’s behaviour, hence dreadful fear-inspiring penalties were necessary to compensate for the lack of control.

In order to come to grips with the societal and political effects of technological developments, we should take a look at modern state building in a comparative perspective. The process of modern state building in Europe occurred at a time when military organisations and other instruments of state power were still weak. This had profound consequences for the evolution of the European political systems. In a seminal study of state building in Europe, Charles Tilly argues that European states built up their military apparati through sustained struggles with their subject populations and by means of selective extension of protection to different classes within those populations. The rulers were forced to reach agreements on protection, which constrained their use of coercion, making them vulnerable to courts, assemblies, to withdrawals of credit, services, and expertise. Hence, institutions and norms were created which constrained the absolutist state and its use of arbitrary force, which the technological evolution had made possible.

According to Tilly and others, the emergence of new coercive instruments such as modern military organisations account for one of the most central distinguishing feature between early European and later third-world state building. Hinting at the large amounts of military security assistance transferred to third-world regimes by the superpowers during the Cold War, Tilly argues that “outside states have continued to supply military goods and expertise in return for commodities, military alliance or both.” The result has been that new states harbour “powerful, unconstrained organizations that easily overshadow all other organizations within

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their territories.” In this setting, “the advantages of military power become enormous, the incentives to seize power over the state as a whole by means of that advantage very strong.”373 Keith Krause agrees with Tilly’s interpretations and considers third-world authoritarianism to be largely a result of “[t]he transplantation of unprecedented means of institutionalised violence and surveillance into political arenas that were empty of the countervailing checks.”374

Throughout the 20th century, technological progress has tended to tilt the balance of power decisively in favour of states rather than non-state groups and organisations. The technological advances have revolutionised the state’s coercive instruments and its power to control the population. During the 20th century, then, political elites in the developed world for the most part learnt to tame Hobbes’ Leviathan monster by institutionalising checks and constraints on the use of violence and by nourishing political norms on accountability. When these failed, however, the 20th century, modern, technologically potent state became the worst mass murderers in the history of mankind, keeping millions of people in perpetual fear. The almighty omnipotent and ubiquitous state, portrayed in George Orwell’s famous novel 1984 perhaps represented the culmination of a historical process towards an increased capability for state coercion. Terrorist and insurgent groups in the modern age have come to terms with the power of the modern state, more often trying to provoke the state’s coercive apparatus into overreaction, rather than attempting to defeat it.

The Orwellian vision of future society has often been lost in the discussion of the future security environment and has been completely overshadowed by the perception of global anarchy and disorder and the empowerment of non-state actors. But as Paul Rich and others have shown, not only inter-state wars but also counter-insurgency warfare often contributes to building stronger states.375 This may suggest that the long-term effect of the sudden post-Cold War surge in ethnic conflicts is not Kaplan’s Coming Anarchy – empirical evidence already shows a declining trend – but paradoxically a further consolidation of states and the state system in the Third World.376

In the future, technological advances will continue to provide states and their coercive apparatus with powerful instruments of physical coercion, surveillance and control. The current rapid advancements in information and communication technology will produce far more powerful instruments for surveillance and monitoring of human activity than previously seen. A recent Working Document on advances in the technology of political control submitted to the members of the European Parliament gives us some hints of what the future may bring in terms of technological possibilities for state control.377 The report surveys a long range of technological advances in areas such as area denial, identity recognition, surveillance systems based on neural networks, discreet order vehicles, new arrest and restraint methods and non-

376 Gurr (2000).
lethal weapons, as well as in the field of restraint, torture, killing and execution technologies. It identifies in particular a “trend towards militarisation of police technologies and the paramilitarisation of military technologies with an overall technological and decision drift towards world-wide convergence of nearly all technologies of political control.” 378 The working document reveals the extent of scientific research, production and export of interrogation and torture technology from the United States and Europe. It is particularly worried about the use and abuse of electroshock devices and their proliferation and urges stricter control.

The report is very explicit indeed in its recommendation that all surveillance technology and other technology for political control must be subject to democratic accountability and control. According to the author, the “implications for civil liberties and human rights of proliferation of this technology are literally awesome,” and it sees “a pressing need for an adequate response by the European Union to ensure that it neither threatens civil liberties in Europe, nor reaches the hands of tyrants.” 379 The need for democratic accountability and protection against abuse of civil liberties is indeed a common theme in much of the literature on counter-terrorism technology. Richard Clutterbuck observes that the challenge will lie in “the parallel development of means to prevent or detect their abuse, in order to safeguard civil liberties.” 380

In the field of surveillance technology, technological advances have been particularly disturbing. The report submitted to the European Parliament, demonstrates the virtually “unchecked proliferation of surveillance devices and capacity amongst both private and public sectors.” 381 Recent innovations allow bugging, telephone monitoring, visual surveillance during night or day over large distances. New forms of local national and international communication interception networks and new human recognition and tracking devices are already available. The so-called Echelon affairs — the reported discovery of a world-wide telecommunication interception network, targeting telephone, fax, and email messages of private citizens, politicians, trade unionists, companies, etc and run by the United States in cooperation with a few close allies — is illustrative of the expanded possibilities for surveillance and monitoring over the past decades. A report on the Echelon affair and related communication technologies, published by the European Parliament’s Technological and Scientific Option Assessment Panel, concluded that “Comint [communication intelligence] technologies currently available has the capability, as tasked, to intercept, process, and analyse every modern type of high capacity communication system to which access is obtained.” 382 The report argues that the Echelon network is based on the technology of the past, however. The shift in telecommunications to high capacity optical fibre networks has made interception far more difficult. Furthermore, over the past few years, “the substantial technological lead in computers and information technology once enjoyed by Comint

379 Wright (1998), pp. 5-6
382 Campbell (1999), p.18
organisations has all but disappeared. Their principal computer systems are bought ‘off the shelf’ and are equal of or even inferior to those used by first rank industrial and academic organisations.” Finally, the report also argues that “the long war against civil and commercial cryptography has been lost”. In general, the media of telecommunications is no longer seen so “intelligence friendly” as it used to be.383

Much of the technology for political control may also be relevant for counter-terrorism, depending on the state’s willingness to apply them. There is a growing body of counter-terrorism specific technology, focusing on technological solutions, which not only meet new challenges such as detection of biological and chemical warfare agents, but also strive to find the perfect balance between security and government intrusion. Paul Hirst, Science and Technology Advisor to the United Kingdom Parliament, has surveyed some of the most prominent trends in counter-terrorism technology.384

- More advanced methods are being developed for detection of weapons being carried or transported.

- In the field of explosive detection, new technologies are underway, superseding X-ray, which is the only widely deployed system to date for scanning luggage and packages. A Thermal Neutron Analysis system has been developed, capable of analysing the chemical composition of a target and thus directly detecting the presence of an explosive. Other new detection techniques are different versions of nuclear magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) and acoustic resonance techniques capable of measuring the resonant absorption of sound waves to identify the acoustic signature of over 100 chemicals, nerve agents and explosives. Technology to counter the use of biological warfare agents by terrorist groups is also making some advances, in particular in the field of detection and bio-sensors.

- Surveillance technology is developing fast. A highly sophisticated surveillance camera system, linked to data bases has successfully been deployed by the London Metropolitan Police in the City of London financial district. In 1996 a closed-circuit camera network was enhanced with an optical character recognition system, which can identify and read vehicle license plates of vehicles moving at a speed up to at least 120kph, check the details against law enforcement computer databases and alert the police control room. The system can be used to track and locate suspected criminals’ movements around the city.

- Facial recognition systems are also being developed. They could be used to track the movements of suspected terrorists. A more subtle approach is to track an individual’s ‘digital persona’ through his use of telecommunication services, transactions etc. ‘Data matching’ systems which compare an individual’s details between different computer databases are being used to great effect in the UK, Australia and other countries to combat crimes. The latest intelligence analysis software can trace logical threads through vast sets

of free-form data and could be a powerful tool for law enforcement and the intelligence communities.

- Technologies which provide an additional layer of protection against terrorist attacks are being improved, such as new bullet- and blast-proof composite materials for personal protection, design features and strengthening materials for protecting physical infrastructure and buildings and special techniques for minimising the consequences of explosions on aircraft.

- To improve prosecution of terrorists one option, which is being explored is to add ‘taggants’ to explosives and normally innocuous precursor chemicals like ammonium nitrate fertiliser so that these materials can be traced back through an audible supply chain. Some explosives are already tagged. The US 1996 Anti-Terrorist Act requires that all plastic explosives include chemical markers, and other countries have similar regulations.

Other technological advances in sensor technology, satellite communication, and precision-guided missiles, have potentially made the lives of known international terrorists, residing in distant countries, far more insecure. According to Clutterbuck, newly developed technologies for identification and detecting impersonation are also promising, such as fingerprint scan, digital recording and matching of voiceprints and signature dynamics. DNA analysis, while not yet applicable to instant identity checks, has proved the best of all for forensic evidence in court.385 Perkins and Mijares have studied the value of various sensory-enhancing technologies in counter-terrorist operations, such as ambient light magnification, audio amplification, infrared light and radar. Their conclusion is that today’s technology can still only provide “an approximation of the facts needed to make informed tactical decisions.”386 Nevertheless, they believe it will be possible to “integrate these impulses into a virtual reality depiction of the situation,” significantly improving the accuracy of the information about for example the activities inside the perimeter of a hostage crisis.387 The more efficient use of traditional technology, such as more widespread video-camera surveillance of public space in urban areas to prevent crime, will enhance law enforcement efforts against both politically motivated and ordinary crime.388 Paddy Barwise and Kathy Hammond in their futuristic analysis of media evolution, predict that “city centres, car parks, playgrounds, homes, offices, factories and roads will all become equipped with video cameras,” but it would “not be the foolproof way of making the environment safer.”389

The recent concern of the urbanisation of warfare, has stimulated new research efforts into technologies for urban warfare, which ultimately also will enhance counter-terrorism capabilities. As Brian Nichiporuk has observed, technologies for urban warfare are a priority in the Pentagon. These new technologies will probably include better intelligence-gathering platforms, such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) with improved sensor suites. Another

option is micro-sensors, based on the emerging field of nano-technology. Other new capabilities to be expected are better protection for personnel, such as ‘body armour’, and new generations of non-lethal weaponry.\textsuperscript{390}

The Internet revolution, usually seen as a technological advantage to terrorist and extremist groups, also offers the intelligence community new opportunities. Ian Dennis notes that offensive web-sites can be closed down, while pages outside the reach of legislation “can be jammed electronically to some extent.”\textsuperscript{391} Internet may also be used to gain information about the groups by regular scanning of their web-sites or by surveillance of emails. Moreover, the World Wide Web may also be used by the intelligence community, for example for anonymous tip-offs from the public.\textsuperscript{392}

In sum, technological developments have generally reinforced the state’s coercive capabilities and their instruments of control. Current advances in technology for political control and counter terrorism underline the need for protecting citizens against the state’s possible abuse of these new instruments.

8.2.2 … or Towards Global Networks of ‘Empowered Small Agents’?

One of the most dominant themes in the vast body of literature on terrorism in the post-Cold War period is the so-called ‘superterrorism,’ i.e. terrorism aiming at mass casualties using extremely lethal technology, in particular NBC-weapons. The new generation of terrorists is portrayed as more geared towards exploiting destructive technology than their forerunners. Moreover, this destructive technology, whether it consists of ‘loose nukes’ from the former Soviet Union or home made biological and chemical warfare agents, is generally considered to be more available to terrorist groups than ever before. If these threat scenarios are taken at face value, they have serious implications for strategic thinking. As Guéhenno has observed, weapons of mass destruction in the hands of sub-state actors represent a revolution, transforming terrorist groups into strategic threats.\textsuperscript{393} The perception that a dramatic shift in the balance of power between the state and its subjects is about to occur, i.e. that certain non-state organisations are potentially capable of transforming themselves into strategic challenges to states, is reflected in the term ‘Empowered Small Agent.’ According to one author, an

\begin{quote}
Empowered Small Agent can threaten a state with unprecedented powers of blackmail that could force the demands to be met. […] The ESA may not just be a self-styled potent terrorist, but anything ranging from a fiendish criminal, to a renegade industrial organisation, to an under-cover commando unit controlled by an enemy power.\textsuperscript{394}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{390} Nichiporuk (2000), pp. xx-xxi.
\textsuperscript{392} Dennis (1998), p. 136.
\textsuperscript{393} Guéhenno (1998).
\textsuperscript{394} Barry (1997).
If true, this supposed revolution in state-society relations represents a dramatic breach with a long historical process of state building and centralisation of coercive power, and contrasts sharply with what we already have discussed in terms of emerging technology for political control.

To analyse this apparent contradiction, we will survey how technological changes have affected the potential arsenal of anti-state terrorism. Regarding conventional weapons and tools, the terrorist repertoire has traditionally been rather limited. Terrorist groups are usually extremely ‘low-tech’ and primitive, relying on home-made weapons and explosives rather than trying to acquire militarily advanced weapons. Although mortars and rockets have been used by terrorist groups, it is unlikely that technological advances in this field will affect terrorist groups. Availability is still a major constraint. Bombs and explosives are still the weapon of choice for many groups. Again, costs and availability are likely to be paramount considerations. According to Hirst, most terrorists will therefore rely on homemade explosives synthesised from readily available and relatively inexpensive ingredients. The more dramatic threat stemming from the possible proliferation of ballistic and cruise missiles to terrorist groups has been addressed in several studies. Yet cruise missiles are usually seen as too sophisticated weapons for a terrorist threat. Innovative use of traditional technology may still enable terrorist groups to construct a crude cruise missile. For example, as Hirst has noted, “any kind of aircraft packed with explosives (or worse, armed with WMD) would be a cruise missile.”

There are however, a number of technological innovations, freely available which may have an important effect on terrorist capabilities. Paul Hirst notes in particular enhancements in small arms such as “laser-targeting gun sights and image intensifier (‘night vision’) equipment.” These are already commercially available over the counter and without restrictions for a few hundred US dollars. The increasing availability of computer programs to model blast processes and their potential to cause damage enhances the possibility of more sophisticated and precise bomb explosions. There is a potential for innovation by terrorists in the mechanism employed to trigger bombs, such as timers, barometric sensors, remote control, and tamper proof triggers. The guided missile has been touted as a possible terrorist weapon. Hand-launched surface to-air missiles have been used to devastating effect in guerrilla attacks on civilian air crafts in Rhodesia (1978-79), Sudan (1986) and Morocco (1988), but terrorist use of surface to air missiles has been fairly isolated. Still, these weapons are available on the black market.

395 F ex the IRA used homemade mortars on numerous occasions, f ex against Downing Street, Heathrow and British Army barracks in Germany. The Iranian Mujaheddin al-Khalq has also used mortars during a recent attack in Tehran.
400 In 1990, for example, the FBI thwarted an attempt by Michael Mixie Martin to purchase a Stinger missile for the IRA in Florida. See Hirst (1998), p. 116.
Rand Corporation researcher M.B. Schaffer warned in the early 1990s of surface-to-air missile attacks by terrorists. His study asserted that “the most likely threat is the shoulder-fired surface-to-air missile (SAM).” Historically such munitions have been used routinely on a world-wide basis at the rate of several per year for the last 15 years with considerable success. SAM of more advanced designs are being developed and will likely be available on the open market, he concluded. A more recent study by Ralph E Stephens argues that drones or UAVs may also be a future terrorist weapon. Terrorists “could use these drones to observe targets, detonate planted explosives or even deliver bombs in a kamikaze fashion.”

In a seemingly rather speculative account of future technological trends, Stephens observes that “biotechnology offers new targets and new methods to terrorists.” Some involve biotechnology itself, such as using genetic engineering to create super predators or new lethal micro-organisms. The possibility of developing bio-chip implants into the human body in the future to enhance the computing power of the brain, to monitor bodily functions and correct their malfunctions is no longer remote, according to Stephens. The technology to accomplish this is already being developed. If this ever becomes reality, these bio-chips would probably also be vulnerable to hacker attacks. Only the imagination limits the possible range of terrorist threats towards a civilisation of bio-chip implanted human beings.

Technological advances may not only provide new weapons to the arsenal of radical groups and insurgents. New technology may also serve as operational support for terrorist groups. The so-called Revolution in Military Affairs has many potential parallels for terrorist operations. Some key elements are already available to anyone with the will, know how and funds to acquire them either directly or through modification and enhancement. The GPS satellite navigation system may be very useful in terrorist operations. Secure mobile communications are also widely available in the form of re-chipped mobile phones, which provide anonymity to the user. Another technology causing growing concern is the commercial exploitation of high-resolution satellite remote sensing systems. Equally, the powerful computer systems required to process satellite images and extract useful information

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404 By constructing computers and their software of organic material and using “a DNA-mimicking approach to programming,” the human body would become “compatible with biochip implants,” according to Stephens (1998), p. 204.
405 Stephens (1998), pp. 204-205
406 See for example Libicki (1999).
407 In its assessment of the implications of open access to GPS for US national security, RAND’s Critical Technologies Institute concluded that terrorist and special operations use of GPS is the most significant threat to US lives and property from misuse of this technology. Hirst (1998), p. 117. Ralph E Stephens has observed that the use of GPS in combination with computer networking and computer drones will greatly reduce the personal danger – of injury or death or of getting caught – for the terrorist. Bombs can be planted or placed near targets hours and even days or weeks in advance, and detonated from a foreign country by using radio waves and the new GPS of satellites. Similarly, missiles can be placed within a few miles of the target, even in international waters [...] and fired remotely from halfway around the world via GPS assistance. See Stephens (1998), p. 198.
408 The willingness of former Soviet Union to sell high resolution images for hard currency, a number of planned 1 metre resolution (or near) commercial satellites and developments in ‘micro-satellite, will make access to security-sensitive images increasingly difficult to control, according to Hirst (1998).
and intelligence from them are also proliferating. Thus, it can be expected that in the near future, it will be possible and relatively inexpensive for terrorist organisations to support their operations with sophisticated reconnaissance systems previously reserved for the most technologically advanced military forces.

The former Soviet Union is not the only one to blame for proliferation of such sensitive technology. Libicki has observed that “[d]uring the Cold War, United States declassified advanced technologies slowly and restricted sales to an inner circles of allies. Today, the race among nations to secure a niche in lucrative high-tech markets, combined with the collapse of trade barriers world wide, has made dual-use components such as high-speed transmitters and receivers available to all. Existing export controls serve more as bumps that real barriers.” 409

The trend towards globalisation of arms industry may divest firm control from national governments and increase the chances for dual-use technology proliferation. 410

Increasing information access is another by-product of the digital revolution, especially when coupled with the logic of the market. Hirst makes the point that an important factor in the proliferation of home made weaponry is the availability of information on making bombs (and other weapons). The existence of popular manuals such as the ‘Anarchist’s Cookbook’ and the ‘Terrorist’s Handbook’ in print and on the Internet have been well known for several years. 411 But he also admits that there is a much wider greater range of such publications – with over 50 titles available to the public in the Library of Congress, indicating that the Internet revolution may not have changed information access that much after all.

Writing on the issue of nuclear terrorism, Morten Bremer Mærli also notes that previously classified information on the construction of nuclear weapons is now available. The world wide web provides a wide variety of information on the construction of bombs, chemical and biological weapons, and various warfare techniques.

Yet it would probably be wrong to assume that the Internet will remain a free haven for extremist group and allow everyone access to more and more sensitive information. The early lawlessness of the Internet has already become history, and new guidelines for censorship are already in place. As the Internet gradually becomes an electronic superhighway for information, production and services, demands for censorship and control mechanisms etc will increase and tools to restrain the information beast will be developed.

8.2.3 More State Control, or More Destructive Technology Available for Terrorists?

There are at least two other effects of new information technologies, which fit into the ecology of terrorism thesis. It is argued that cyberspace has emerged as a new arena in which

410 Markusen (1999).
411 These manuals may enable less organised amateur domestic terrorists to manufacture weapons. According to Hirst, investigators have discovered bomb making manuals such as Big Book on Explosives,” the “Anarchist’s Cookbook,” “The Homemade C4” etc in the possession of terrorists. Hirst (1998), p. 116.
radical organisations and extremists may operate, in terms of propaganda and recruitment. There is accumulating evidence that terrorist and extremist organisations have their own web sites for propaganda, fund raising and internal communication. Moreover, information technology has provided terrorist groups with unprecedented tools for communication, supported by new encryption techniques and the organisation of clandestine operations and activities. It has also been pointed out that the organisational form of clandestine terrorist groups is changing due to the technological development and is becoming harder to identify and expose for law enforcement agencies. There is a tendency towards groups being organised in flexible networks (although the leadership might still be hierarchical) and even consist of several leaders.

On the other hand, the combined effect of (i) the availability of more powerful instruments of surveillance, monitoring and political control to states in the developed world, and (ii) the possible proliferation of more powerful weapons to sub-state actors may contribute to making terrorism less frequent, but more deadly. Potential perpetrators will be less organised, less identifiable, more individual and ‘amateur’ terrorism. This trend towards higher lethality has been observed for some time already.

9 CONCLUSION

Some authors have belaboured the confusion and complexity that has characterised the international system since the end of the Cold War. Instinctively, one might assume that ‘anarchic’ conditions lead to a breakdown of order and predispose the world towards more terrorism. Conferences, books and widely read articles with titles like Policing the New World Disorder, The Coming Anarchy etc strongly suggest a more violent world in which terrorism will prosper. The truth is more complicated than that. It has been the aim of the present study to make sense of the diverging trends and indicators by linking discussions of developments in globalisation to a set of well-founded and theory-based causes of terrorism. The study arrived at postulates within five issue areas – the international system, global market economy, demography and ideological changes, and technology – that each had implications for the occurrence of terrorism in the future. The current concluding section aims at shedding some light on a landscape characterised by opposing trends and relatively few systemic changes affecting the propensity for and forms of terrorism.

The assessments of changes in the international system suggested that the trend towards a more co-operative unipolar/multipolar situation would result in fewer terrorist incidents, due to the fact that the dominant ideological confrontation that formed the backdrop for international terrorism and the concomitant state sponsorship has largely disappeared. Terrorism has lost its function as a proxy war between superpowers and has diversified to the extent that groups are more transnational and financially self-sustaining. Several other

412 Lia and Hansen (1999a).
413 Arquilla, Ronfeldt, and Zanini claim, for example, that transnational terrorist groups are increasingly building transnational networks as force multipliers with old and new communications technology. See Arquilla, Ronfeldt, and Zanini (1999), p. 48ff.
developments tie into the disbursement of power, such as growing economic interdependence, the empowerment of NGOs in a variety of fields and the move towards more extensive regulatory bodies, international networks, and mediating mechanisms.

The diffusion of power expected at the level of the international system has its counterpart in the global market economy, where it is becoming increasingly difficult to view the world simply as either ‘industrial’ or ‘developing,’ given its steadily advancing interdependence and rapid economic growth in previously underdeveloped countries in Asia and Latin America. Although a growing number of states are in a grey zone, i.e. in transition from the developing to the industrial world, it is inevitable to distinguish between implications of globalisation for different parts of the world. Indeed, economic differences are increasing between rich and poor countries, as well as within countries. The picture is somewhat ambiguous. While the notion of liberal peace suggests that economic growth and interdependence are the path to a non-violent future, terrorism and civil violence tend to occur more frequently in societies with great economic inequalities.

In general, globalisation contributes to blurring the distinction between domestic and international politics and interdependence should therefore be seen in relation to the growing socio-economic inequality within states. As a closer look indicates, global connectedness might be an option only for the elites who benefit disproportionately from increased interdependence and economic growth. Whereas the section of the population that is entirely excluded is not likely to be so large in industrial countries, it clearly excludes large sections of society in most developing countries. It will be critical for governments to manage the gap and promote the integration of those excluded from the global village, in order to avoid future internal armed conflict and civil violence.

Modernisation involves a structural, economic process of change and a societal adjustment process. In rapid modernisation, the latter process often lags behind the former and is a source of tension and instability. Modernisation is partly reflected in the increasing number of states that are in transition to democracy. Particularly the ongoing democratisation processes in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, the Southern Mediterranean are sources of future instability and civil violence in the geographic proximity to Western Europe. While democratisation forms a constituent process of modernisation, modernisation brings with it inequality and thereby a major challenge to a state’s legitimacy. It also transforms traditional notions of state legitimacy and authority, introduces new actors, all of which add to a less defined and supposedly less stable social framework. An important finding of this study is that the transition processes in Europe’s periphery tend to encourage increased domestic terrorism, with significant potential of spill-over into the European heartland.

A central feature of the globalising world is the insecurity that it brings with it. Given that globalisation predominantly is an economic phenomenon, the human consequences of an

414 The Human Development Report lists the following types of insecurity: financial volatility and economic insecurity; job and income insecurity; health insecurity; cultural insecurity; personal insecurity; environmental insecurity; and political and community insecurity. Human Development Report 1999 (1999), p. 2.
economic crisis are often overlooked. The insecurity is closely tied to the role of the state and affects its legitimacy if it is unable to alleviate the insecurity of its citizens. Theory then suggests that the combination of a growing number of states in a vulnerable limbo position between authoritarianism and democratic rule and increasing economic inequality provide an explosive mix for domestic terrorism. As there is a distinct possibility that more states will collapse in Europe’s periphery, there is also a danger that international terrorism will become more prevalent. Failed states have often proven to be safe havens for radical insurgent movements. The instability that the pace of change brings with it should not be discounted in mature democracies either. When a mismatch between expectations and the state’s performance arises, it can expose a society to pressures similar to those of a transition-type setting. Pressure will also be exercised on governments by the continued growth of transnational organised crime that may also result in increased terrorism and related crime in Europe.

The choice of terrorism as a strategy is often promoted by a perception that channels for voicing grievances are limited. This can either be the result of their being existent but not firmly established, such as in countries in transition to democracy, or because large segments of society feel dis-empowered, abandoned and have no faith in available communication channels. The individualisation that will most likely be strengthened in the labour market and with respect to social security, favours the resourceful and leaves the most marginalised to seek expression elsewhere. The emergence of NGOs as influential actors reflects a move towards developing alternative structures to the state, in which fringe interests are better represented and which may discourage the use of terrorism. The growth of counter cultures and neo-religious movements constitutes another part of the world-wide counter responses to globalisation, which have implications for terrorism. The rise of apocalyptic cults represents one of the clearest examples of the low-probability, high risk scenario associated with mass casualty terrorism.

Other ‘fringe’ groups can be found among the disenchanted youth in developing countries, ethnic minorities and immigrant communities. The danger of civil violence increases when ethnic differences coincide with social inequality. In combination with the trend towards urbanisation and transnational migration, tensions among ‘fringe’ groups, as well as between them and other segments of society are heightened in rapidly growing cities, which frequently represent a microcosm of globalisation.

A related question addresses whether the radicalisation of ideas and fora will bring a radicalisation of means with it, such as the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the desire to cause mass casualties. This study has shown that there are very few identifiable systemic factors promoting high lethality terrorism, although the contagion theory and other indicators may suggest so. Also in the field of cyberterrorism, it is hard to find evidence of systemic factors. With the growing reliance of society on information technology and its collateral vulnerability, cyberterrorism has been heralded as the major new threat to security. While no serious cyber attacks have been reported, their potential destructiveness and contagiousness, in case of a successful attack, still render it a significant terrorist threat in the future.
Inequality is not limited to the domestic arena. The development towards a blurred distinction between domestic and international politics underscores the transnational consequences of inequality. Thus, the perceived lack of voice witnessed at a domestic level is paralleled by developing countries’ lack of influence in international fora. Therefore, domestic problems, be they conflicts, poverty, or lack of political legitimacy, may be elevated to a global level and find expression in international terrorism. On the one hand, linking other theatres or regions to domestic concerns is facilitated by globalisation and technological developments, such as labour migration, capital and information flows. On the other hand, transnational implications arise with interdependence and the sense that the world is getting smaller. Both aspects enhance the contagion of terrorism. Both NGOs and TNCs are relatively new actors that promote the transnational interconnections, as they benefit from them, each in their own way.

The same feeling of responsibility is reflected in the growing international interventionism in domestic affairs. Interventions can take the shape of a military operation, economic means – primarily FDI, or the establishment of a universally applicable international regulatory framework. Multilateral military involvement may often alleviate the spread of terrorism by managing conflicts and post-conflict situations that are typical sources of terrorism. On the other hand, military interventions may themselves trigger severe counter-responses including international terrorism. Given the rising levels of foreign direct investment, intervention through economic means may be a powerful tool. Unfortunately, investments are unevenly distributed and aggravate the gap between rich and poor countries, breeding dissatisfaction and potential counteraction in the shape of international terrorism. Moreover, using economic means as sanctions parallel and illegal transnational trade, providing funding for both insurgents and illiberal regimes. Attempts to relieve tensions and pave the way for a more equitable economic development through international treaties and regimes are effective only when they can adequately capture the values and needs of developing countries. It is the same dynamic that is felt at a domestic level, where stability and legitimacy rest on lesser developed countries being integrated into the system. The growing transnational NGO community represents an increasingly important component of the system and serves as a new and powerful mouthpiece for disaffected groups which can contribute to diminishing the prospects for revolutionary terrorism. To the extent that the industrial world is perceived as controlling an exploitative system, it and its representatives, such as TNCs, can become an increasingly more popular target for international ideological terrorism. The weakening of the state, and its coercive monopoly, and the growth of other powerful actors in the international state system may suggest that a gradual shift is underway in which states will increasingly be seen as arenas rather than as targets of terrorism.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Future trends and predictions</th>
<th>Overall effects on the occurrence of terrorism (+/-/0)</th>
<th>Types of terrorism</th>
<th>Geographical locations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A gradual development of regional power centres and a relative decline in the US global hegemony, but no return to intense bipolar military and ideological rivalry.</td>
<td>0/+</td>
<td>No change or possibly more transnational non-state sponsored terrorism.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More nuclear powers and a continuation of B/C-weapons programmes (both most likely in the Middle East and North Korea).</td>
<td>(+)</td>
<td>More mass casualty terrorism.</td>
<td>Middle East and Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth in the number of states in transition to democracy.</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>More domestic terrorism, primarily ideological.</td>
<td>European Eastern and Southern periphery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth in the number of states and growth in the number of weak states.</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>More domestic terrorism.</td>
<td>European Eastern and Southern periphery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collapsed states in the non-OECD world.</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>Domestic terrorism and international terrorism.</td>
<td>Non-OECD-world</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater (Western-led) international military interventionism in internal armed conflicts.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Possibly more domestic terrorism in the short run, but less in the long run.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multilateral institutions, international treaties and regimes will play an increasingly more important role in regulating relations between states.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Less state-sponsored terrorism.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growing relevance of the transnational NGO community in international politics.</td>
<td>-/+</td>
<td>Less international terrorism, more single issue terrorism/sabotage.</td>
<td>More single issue terrorism in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The influence of private security organisations will grow but they will not replace the state’s security apparatus.</td>
<td>(+)</td>
<td>Ideological terrorism against private businesses.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growing economic inequality within states.</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>Ideological terrorism (Ethnic terrorism, if inequality correlates with ethnicity).</td>
<td>Domestic in industrial world; both domestic and international in developing world</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growing inequality between states/regions, but more economic interdependence.</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>Ideological terrorism.</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Event</td>
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<tr>
<td>Governments will face reduced legitimacy, due to a loss of control over the economy.</td>
<td>0/+</td>
<td>Ideological terrorism. Private businesses as new targets. Private sponsors of terrorism.</td>
<td>Domestic, effect stronger in weaker states (developing world)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The extent of transnational organised crime will increase.</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>Domestic and international terrorism (“criminal” or “economic” terrorism).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe’s economic dependence on petroleum imports from the Middle East and North Africa will continue to grow</td>
<td>(+)/0</td>
<td>International terrorism.</td>
<td>Europe and Middle East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rapid population growth in the non-OECD world will continue, albeit at a somewhat reduced rate. The population in the OECD world will grow older.</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>Domestic terrorism.</td>
<td>Non-OECD world</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The influx of immigrants and asylum-seekers – both legal and illegal – will continue in the future and significantly increase the size of diaspora communities in Europe.</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>Domestic terrorism. More racial violence, more lucrative human trafficking.</td>
<td>Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The future ideological landscape will become less uniform and will shift more rapidly.</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>Less ideological terrorism, more single-issue extremism.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth in number and strength of “counter cultures”, in particular transnational religious movements and cults.</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>Mass casualty terrorism (low probability and high risk).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critical infrastructure in the OECD-world will increasingly become reliant on operative computers and information technology.</td>
<td>(+)</td>
<td>Sabotage, single issue terrorism, a sudden upsurge in cyber terrorism may happen</td>
<td>OECD countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass media, information production and even the perception of news will change as a result of the information revolution.</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>Mass casualty terrorism?</td>
<td>OECD countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The proliferation of more powerful weapons and effective equipment for low intensity warfare to non-state actors will continue</td>
<td>(+)</td>
<td>Mass casualty terrorism.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rapid advancements in information and communication technology will produce far more powerful instruments for surveillance and monitoring of people.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Less international and domestic terrorism</td>
<td>Europe, OECD countries</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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A  APPENDIX : THE CAUSES OF TERRORISM – THEORIES AND HYPOTHESES.

A.1  Psycho-Sociological Theories

*Relative Deprivation*

- The perception of relative deprivation, when the gap between expectations and satisfaction is growing rapidly, is the basic condition for participation in collective civil violence and terrorism.415

*The Contagion Theory of Terrorism*

- The occurrence of terrorism in one country often leads directly or indirectly to more terrorism in other countries.
- There is a symbiotic relationship between modern mass media and terrorism, but the character of the relationship and its consequences are ambiguous.

A.2  Societal Theories

*Rapid Modernisation, Inequality*

- Rapid economic modernisation measured in GDP-growth, makes societies more exposed to ideological terrorism.
- Social inequality measured in income inequality tends to increase the potential for ideological terrorism.

*Liberal Peace Theory*

- Increased trade and economic interdependence tends to discourage both inter-state and probably also the prevalence of international terrorism.
- “The prosperous peace” — long term economic growth and development are conducive to internal political stability and hence works against the occurrence of domestic terrorism.

*Political Regime*

- Democracy and terrorism are correlated, but the relationship is complex. States in democratic transition are more exposed to armed conflict and terrorism than democracies and autocracies. Because of pervasive state control, totalitarian regimes rarely experience terrorism. At the same time, states with high scores on measures of human rights standards and democracy tend to be less exposed to domestic ideological terrorism.
- Terrorism is closely linked to a set of core legitimacy problems: lack of continuity of the political system tends to encourage ideological terrorism, while the lack of integration of political fringes also tends to encourage ideological terrorism. Ethnic diversity, however, tends to increase the potential for ethnic terrorism.
- A high level of unionisation i.e. the density of trade union membership in a population, appears to discourage the growth of domestic ideological terrorism.

*The Ecology of Terrorism*

415 This survey is adapted from our previous report Lia and Skjølberg (2000).
Societal changes associated with modernisation have created new and unprecedented conditions for terrorism (such as a multitude of targets, mobility, communications, anonymity, and audiences).

Technological developments offer new and more efficient means and weapons for terrorist groups, but at the same time increase the counter-terrorist capabilities of states.

Transnational organised crime and terrorism are partly inter-linked phenomena and growth in transnational organised crime may contribute to increased levels of terrorism.

A.3 Changes in the International State System:

The character of the international system is significant. A system characterised by strong bipolar hegemony and a high level of bipolar conflict in world politics is more exposed to international terrorism.

State sponsorship of international terrorism has been a significant cause of terrorism.

The existence of weak and collapsed states tends to encourage both internal armed conflicts and international terrorism.

B APPENDIX: POSTULATES AND PREDICTIONS

B.1 International Relations

A gradual development of regional power centres and a relative decline in the US global hegemony, but no return to intense bipolar military and ideological rivalry.

A few more nuclear powers in the world and biological and chemical weapons programmes will continue, primarily in the Middle East and North Korea.

Growth in the number of states in transition to more democratic rule.

The number of states will continue to increase and many states will be weak states.

Collapsed States in the Non-OECD World.

More international military interventionism in internal armed conflicts.

Multilateral institutions, international treaties and regimes will play an increasingly more important role in regulating relations between states.

A growing relevance of the transnational community of NGOs.

The influence of private security organisations will grow but they will not replace the state’s security apparatus.

B.2 The Global Market Economy

There will be larger economic inequalities inside states.

There will be larger and more visible economic gaps between rich and poor countries, but simultaneous growing interdependence due to expanding trade and foreign investment.

Many governments will face reduced legitimacy due to a loss of control over economy.

The extent of transnational organised crime will continue to increase in the future.

Europe’s economic dependence on petroleum imports from the Middle East and North Africa will continue to grow.
B.3 Demographic Changes

- A rapid population growth in the non-OECD-world will continue, albeit at a somewhat reduced rate. The population in the OECD world will grow older.
- The influx of asylum-seekers and immigrants - both legal and illegal - into European countries will continue in the future and significantly increase the size of the diaspora communities in Europe.

B.4 Ideological Shift

- The future ideological landscape will become less uniform and will change more rapidly than before
- The number and strength of “counter cultures”, in particular religious movements and cults will continue to grow. New movements will rise and spread more quickly than before.

B.5 Technology

- Critical infrastructure primarily in the OECD-world will increasingly become reliant on operative computers and information technology.
- Rapid advancements in information, communication and sensor technology will produce far more powerful instruments for surveillance and monitoring of people in the future.
- The proliferation of more powerful weapons and effective equipment for low intensity warfare to non-state actors will continue.
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**FORFAatter(E)**

LIA Brynjar, HANSEN Annika S

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